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PREFACE 
This thesis is a study of the post-war reconstruction plans 
of the Federal Labor Party as they were evolved during the War of 
1939-45. To the Curtin Labor Government,which assumed office in 
October 1941, 'post-war reconstruction' was a synthesis of 
'building again' (or recovery),and 'building afresh' (or an 
attempt at permanent reform). The recovery aspect was the desire 
to reorganise industry from a war-time to a peace-time footing as 
smoothly as possible,and to re-absorb men and women from the 
forces and from war industry - comprising about half the work 
force - into civilian industry. It was hoped to avert a feared 
post-,·mr depression in the process. 
The reform aspect was Labor's resolve to build a "new social 
order" after the war to supersede the "old order" of the inter-war 
years,which had been characterised by a pool of unemployed which 
averaged 14 per cent of those seeking work over the period, wide-
spread poverty, bad housing, malnutrition, inadequate medical 
services, insufficient planning for child welfare and national 
fitness, and poor standards of rural life. 
The Curtin Government stated its post-war aims in the broad 
humanitarian stream of the Atlantic Charter. Its 11 new social order" 
embodied aims officially proclaimed by all the leading Allied 
governments - full employment, comprehensive social security, 
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higher living standards, higher production, and a fair distribution 
of incomes and property. The belief in a better world after the 
war was one of the most interesting social phenomena of the period, 
and, like the A.L.P., most Australians placed a post-war job in the 
forefront of their aims. 
Despite spirited anti- Labor propaganda to the contrary in the 
1943 federal election and 1944 referendum campaigns, a central 
proposition of the thesis is the irrelevance of Socialismoto the 
Curtin Government's vision of the "new social order". Labor's 
plans were reformist and moderate, aimed at realising welfare and 
security objectives accepted by all the United Nations. The 
Government envisaged more room for private enterprise and business 
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initiative after the war than ever before i n Australia ' s history. 
Notwithstanding non- Labor epithets like 1fascist 1 and 
' totalitarian•, the post- war controls foreshadowed by the Govern-
ment were closely attuned to those projected in a British White 
Paper of May 1944,which had all-part y endorsement . Labor sought 
the continuance of some war- time controls, but by no means all, 
nor in unmodified forms, during the critical pe r iod of transition 
from a war- time to a peace- time economy,when short ages of civilian 
goods would persist and a dangerous inflationary boom would 
threaten. 
The thesis is a two- fold study. It gives an account of 
Labor ' s post- w·ar objectives; and it traces the steps taken by the 
Government to reform the Constitution and invest the Commonwealth 
with greatly extended powers felt necessary to reconstruction and 
the achievement of the "new social order". Unless it could acquire 
wider peace-time powers, the Government, in Dr . Evatt ' s \'lords, 
foresaw "social and economic disorganisation, chaos in production, 
mounting unemployment, widespread social insecurity - in short, 
anarchy". In the light of experience after the First World War, 
Labor ' s fears of a post-war depression were understandable. 
My main focus of attention is the period between Dr . Evatt ' s 
introduction of an October 1942 Bill providing for a referendum 
to arm the Commonwealth with wider powers, and the tabling in the 
House of the White Paper on Full Employment in May 1945. The 
former was Labor ' s first decisive move towards its post-war 
objectives, and the latter was the final, most systematic statement 
of Labor ' s aims and the methods for achieving them, adapted to 
the fact of 'failure to obtain wider Federal povrers . 
The Government did not ·proceed with Evatt's Bill, but instead 
summoned a Constitutional Convention of Commonwealth and State 
Parliamentary leaders/which decided unanimously that, in lieu of 
a Referendum, the States should ' refer ' additional Constitutional 
powers f or reconstruction to the Commonwealth,for five years after 
the war. This scheme wa s thwarted in most of the States, primarily 
by hostile Legislative Couu1cils, and the matter dragged on 
unresolved for 18 months before the Government put the proposals 
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to the people in the "fourteen powersu Referendum of August 1944. 
The heavy defeat of the proposal was a bitter disappointment to 
the Curtin Government. 
All events in this period lead up to the Referendum and it 
occupies a central place in the thesis . Indeed,the Referendum 
campaign, when the Government was obliged to explain and defend 
its post-war aims,is the highwater mark. However, the thesis does 
not pretend to be a comprehensive account of the Referendum in all 
its aspects , in the manner of~say,L . c. Webb on the 1951 Referendum. 
That would be a thesis study in its own right . My central theme 
is the nature of Labor ' s Brave New World,and our main concernWith 
the campaign is the light that it sheds on Labor ' s aims . Accordingl~ 
many aspects essential to a referendum- study per se, but not directly 
relevant for my purposes, are either not dealt with or are covered 
cursorily. However, there is some examination of such matters as 
the Campaign in the States, Churches and the Referendum, Newspapers, 
Campaign expenditure, analysis of voting statistics etc . (All 
covered comprehensively in Webb ' s study) . 
I have used the party ' s spelling of ' Labor ' throughout the 
thesis and have substituted that spelling for ' Labour ' when quoting 
from other sources . 
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CHAPTER I. 
Post-War Planning Before October 1942. 
The Australian Labor Party's first public move towards its 
post-war objectives was an October 1942 Bill providing for a 
referendum to invest the Commonwealth with greatly extended peace-
time powers felt necessary for post-war reconstruction. The 
purpose of this chapter is to indicate the attention that both 
Labor and non-Labor had given to reconstruction in the period 
between the outbreak of war and the introduction of the Bill. 
"very early in the Second World War, the Labor Party began 
thinking about post-war reconstruction"(l). As early as June 1940, 
the A.L.P. Federal Conference had called for "an early outline of 
general principles of post-war reconstruction" and for "the 
establishment of a National Council, including representatives 
of Labor, to prepare for post-war reconstruction11 (2). 
In his 1940 Policy Speech delivered on 28 August, the Labor 
leader of the Federal Opposition, John Curtin>insisted that 
planning for reconstruction must begin now. "While the immediate 
task is the successful prosecution of the war, attention must be 
given to the planning of our future so that we shall be in a 
position to honour our promises to those who will bring us victory. 
We must shape our course now so that we shall have a complete 
democracy. The Australian Labor Party is the only political party 
with a forward-looking policy. It visualises post-war recon s .truct-
ion to be in the nature of a new social order---Economic freedom 
must be made real by giving security and a rising standard of 
living to all---"(3). At this stage Labor was speaking in 
unexceptionable generalities. Curtin, anticipating the later 
referendum Bill,warned that "The powers now being exercised in 
regard to the prosecution of the war are powers which will be 
necessary for the Commonwealth to possess in dealing with 
1. L. F. Crisn The Australian Federal Labor Partv 1Q01-1QS1 
2. 1. F. Crisp Ben Chifley - A ~iography (London, Longmans, 1961) 
p.l83 • 
3. Quoted in H.V. Evatt Post-War Reconstruction- A Case for 
Greater Commonwealth Powers; Prepared for the Constitutional 
Convention at Canberra, November 1942,(Commonwealth Government 
Printer) pp.l21-22. 
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post-war reconstruction"(4). 
The main difference between the Labor and non-Labor Campaigns 
in 1940 was stated to be the former's heavy stress on planning now 
for the peace (5). 
The election, held on 21 September 1940 saw the return of 
the Menzies Government, though both Government and Opposition won 
36 seats in the House and two Independents held the balance of 
power. 
Shortly after its election, and in the face of strong Labor 
agitation for action, the Government took "the first steps to 
provide for official consideration of the general problem of post-
war reconstruction" when it created the Department of Labo~r and 
National Service in October 1940.(6) One of its chief functions 
was 'post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction' to be discharged 
by a Reconstruction Division. (7) 
According to E.R. Walker it was intended that the Division 
should stimulate an interest in the problem as a whole, and 
develop research and investigation quietly until such time as it 
might become desirable and feasible to appoint a Minister. The 
qualifying description of 'post-war' was deliberately avoided at 
the time because it was considered that some measures of reconstruct-
ion might well begin before the end of hostilities; and the intro-
duction of child endowment in 1941 was cited as an example. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
An inter-departmental committee was established and all 
J. Curtin The Policy of the Labor Party (Federal elections, 
1940) p.7 
R.H. Barrett Promises and Performances In Australian Politics 
1928-1959 (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, l959)p.32. 
In War And Reconstruction 
This is not to imply that the Menzies Government did no 
reconstruction thinking before October 1940. Indeed, Hasluck 
argues that "The genesis of post-war reconstruction can be 
found in the early months of the war in discussions on wartime 
economic policy11 • Where convenient, the study of war organis-
ation problems was linked with their post-war implications. 
Vide P. Hasluck The Government And The Peo le l -1 41. 
(Canberra, Australian War Memorial 19 2 pp. 9- 70 
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Departments were invited to begin thinking about their respective 
post-war problems. The State Governments were also approached 
and invited to appoint liaison officers who could keep in touch 
with the Department and facilitate the co-ordination of Common-
wealth and State plans as they developed. Finally, the Labor 
Opposition was associated with the work of the Division when 
Dr. H.V . Evatt agreed to act as Director of Research (8). 
Despite the creation of the new Division, the Government was 
afforded little relief from Labor pressure. On 3 December 1940, 
in the Budget Debate, Labors' Deputy Leader, F. M. Forde asserted 
that 11we should plan during the war for the aftermath before its 
problems burst upon us---Here in Australia this problem is not 
receiving the consideration which it deserves"(9) . 
Labor had an eye to overseas developments and Forde pointed 
out that Canada proposed to establish a Ministry of Reconstruction 
which would fully consider every aspect of the problem. In Britain, 
"systematic thought about the shape of society after the war had 
begun in August 1940 11 , and, at the end of 1940 a Minist~r without 
Portfolio was appointed (10). 
The first Curtin Government came to power in October 1941 
after the two Independents joined Labor in opposition to the 
Budget. However, exactly two months after the Government assumed 
office, Japan struck at Pearl Harbour and Australians began 
realising the war might come close to home. However , consistent 
8. E. R. Walker loc. cit. 
9. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates Vol.l65, p.368. He 
mentioned a recent letter which Curtin had sent to the 
Prime Minister urging immediate planning for the peace. 
10. W.K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing British War Economy (London, 
His Majesty 's Stationery Office, 1949) p.534. There was a 
widely-shared conviction in the Australian trade union 
movement that the Government did not realise the gravity of 
the situation. A widely-circulated Australian Railways Union 
booklet, A Trade Union Plan For Australian Post War Reconstruct-
ion (Melbourne, 1941) epitomises the historically-based fear 
of a post-war depression in default of early preparatory 
planning. 
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with its past declarations on the subject, and despite the 
growing problems of war administration, the Government declined 
to 'shelv~ reconstruction problems for the duration of the 
emergency. 
In what was the government's first official statement on 
reconstruction, Curtin, on 6 May 1942, intimated that consider-
ation was being given to post-war social security arising from 
reports of the Joint Committee on Social Security (11), and that 
the Tariff Board had been authorised to report on industrial 
and economic re-adjustments in the post-war world (12). 
On 4 August 1942, the Prime Minister indicated that a 
Cabinet sub-committee had been appointed to "keep under review 
the progresspf reconstruction planning and to co-ordinate and 
direct inter-departmental activities". It would examine all 
schemes and correlate all phases of reconstruction. It would 
then make a recommendation to Cabinet (13). 
In his Budget Speech of 2 September 1942, Treasurer J.B. 
Chifley intimated that Cabinet had accepted the sub-committee's 
recommendation that a referendum be held to allow the Commonwealth 
to deal with reconstruction on a national basis. He foreshadowed 
an early Bill with that object in view (14). 
The Leader of The Opposition, A.W. Fadden, complained that 
the Government was not putting first things first, if, in this, 
'Australia's most critical hour' it devoted valuable time to a 
constitutional issue affecting the post-war period, when all had 
11. Established in July 1941 by the Menzies Government and 
welcomed by Labor. 
12. Commonwealth Government Digest of Decisions and Announcements 
And Important Speeches By The Prime Minister No. 28, p.l2. 
13. The Sub-Committee comprised the Treasurer (J.B. Chifley), 
the Attorney-General (Dr. H.V. Evatt), Minister for Social 
Services (E.J. Holloway) and Minister for Labor and National 
Service (E.J. Ward). Digest of Decisions. op.~ cit. No.36,p.l4. 
14. 1£!£. No. 39, p.l2. 
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not yet been done to ensure security from foreign aggression (15). 
Labor speakers applauded the referendum decision. H.C. 
Barnard (Tas.) spoke for them when he claimed "We cannot approach 
the problem of post-war reconstruction too soon" (16). 
On 23 September , 1942, A.A. Calwell , then a backbencher, 
urged the appointment of a full time Minister. He claimed 
reconstruction could not be handled properly by the part-time 
attention of four busy Ministers (17). 
Curtin replied that it was not intended, at that stage, to 
establish a Ministry. "Our first duty is to draw together the 
threads of the various inquiries that are being made into the 
issues involved - to ascertain exactly what needs to be done . . . 
These general questions have been distributed by the Cabinet 
sub-Committee among various Ministers for inquiry and report". 
He was primarily responsible, as Prime Minister, for government 
policy on the subject.(l8) 
According to L. F. Crisp (19) the only reconstruction 
machinery existing in Canberra in November, 1942, was the 
Reconstruction Division which Labor had continued; an inter-
depart.mental Committee, convened in 1941, which 1 fitfully 
circulated papers and discussed a few issues of domestic policy'; 
and the Financial and Economic Advisory ("F.& E") Committee, which 
had 'posed some questions and stimulated a little departmental 
thinking about the post-war future'. Events overseas had led to 
the consideration of some post-war international economic issues 
by another inter-departmental committee jointly sponsored by the 
Reconstruction Division, and the Post-Hostilities Division of the 
Department of External Affairs. 
15. C. P.D.Vol 172,p.l69i(l0/9J42). In view of these early develop-
ments, it is patent y misleading to say that "After the danger 
of Japanese invasion had been removed, the Curtin Government 
began to look beyond the immediate tasks of organisation for 
war to the problems and possibilities of the post-war period". 
P.H. Partridge in G. Greenwood (ed.) Australia- A Social And 
Political History. (Angus & Robertson 1955) p.390 
16. C.P. D.Vol 172.p.l82. However one prescient Labor member struck 
a note of caut1on in warning that the Commonwealth should confei 
with the State Governments before drgfting concrete proposals. 
C. Morgan (Labor, N.S.W.) Ibid. p.586 
17. Sydney Morning Herald 24.9.42. p.7 
18. Digest of Decisions. No . 43 p.l9 
19. Ben Chifley. op.cit. p.l83 
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CHAPTER II 
The 1942 Constitution Alteration Bill 
On 1 October, 1942, the A.L.P. "commenced a more vigorous 
and sustained drive for constitutional change than Australia has 
ever known"(l). Dr. H. v. Evatt, as Attorney-General, sought 
leave of the House of Representatives~o introduce the Constitution 
Alteration (War Aims and Reconstruction) Bill - popularly known 
as the "Four Freedoms" Bi,ll (2) - to alter the Constitution to 
enable Parliament to pass legislation "for the purpose of carrying 
into effect the war aims and objects of Australia as one of the 
United Nations, including the attainment of economic security and 
social justice in the post-war world, and for the purpose of post-
war reconstruction" ( 3) • 
The Bill was described as one of 'breathtaking boldness 1 (4), 
"the like of which the most enthusiastic advocates of extended 
Commonwealth power had never imagined even in their dreams" (5). 
It is a matter for conjecture whether Evatt took his own 
Bill seriously. If so he was constrained to alter the Bill later, 
perhaps with the urging of his colleagues, to meet and anticipate 
criticism (6). One critic, however, claims the Bill was "in terms 
1. K.H. Bailey in C.H. Grattan (ed.) Australia (University of 
California Press, 1947) p.lOl. This is a reference to the 
three referendums conducted by the Curtin and Chifley govern-
ments in 1944, 1946, and 1948. 
2. L.F. Crisp has commented that "The extraordinarily emotive, 
'catch-vote' wording of the Bill ••• gave the whole proposal 
a somewhat meretricious and 'tricky' air which never after-
wards was successfully shed". The Australian Federal Labor 
Party. op.cit. p.253 
3. C.P.D. Vol.l72 p.1338. It is worth noting, at this point, 
that I could find no mention of a Cabinet or Caucus debate 
on the Bill and J.J. Dedman , then Minister for War Organisat-
ion of Industry has no recollection of any such debate.(Letter 
from J.J. Dedman to writer dated 30-10-67) 
4. K.H. Bailey op.cit. p.l02 
5. F. Louat "The Unconventional Convention", Australian Quarterly, 
March 1943, pp.?-8 
6. Chifley, for one, took the Bill seriously. In December 1943 
when Cabinet was deciding the terms of its eventual Referendum 
Bill, Chifley advocated submitting Evatt's original proposals 
to the people. 
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which were so sweeping that it could only be regarded as a 
campaign manifesto" (7). And it could be argued that Evatt, for 
tactical reasons, submitted an 'unacceptable' 'sweeping' Bill 
so that he could later give the appearance (8) of compromise 
and public-spiritedness in toning it down to meet criticism, 
and so 'spike the guns' of his opponents.(9) 
In his 'horse and buggy speech' (10) Evatt put the case for 
wider Commonwealth powers and his reasons were to be repeated and 
expanded during the following 22 months to the 1944 referendum. 
He argued that after the war, Australia would be confronted 
with the greatest task of economic rehabilitation in her history; 
problems that could only be solvea by increasing the power of the 
central Government. In war time the defence power had given the 
Commonwealth sufficient authority to handle the acute problems 
that arose. In the post-war world, the problems would be no 
less acute, no less urgent. But there would be no defence powers 
on which to rely and unless the Commonwealth were given sufficient 
power by the people, the whole social and economic life of 
Australia would be placed in jeopardy. 
Employment, housing, health, child welfare, marketing, and 
economic stability were all major matters which should be viewed 
on an Australia wide basis. Success in solving these post-war 
7. The Round Table - A Quarterly Reviewpf The Politics Of The 
British Commomo~ealth. Vol XXXIV June 1944, p.281 
8. I say "appearance" advisedly because most critics argued 
that the later alterations were superficial and that the 
revised Bill was every bit as limitless in its scope as 
the first. J.J. Dedman, for example, does not recall that 
Evatt's second Bill was "markedly different" from the 
original (letter to writer op.cit.) 
9. J.J. Dedman is not sure what Evatt's intentions were with 
the Bill. He indicates that he was so absorbed with his 
ovm very onerous duties, that he was prepared to leave the 
matter to Curtin and Evatt. (letter to writer op.cit.) 
10. F. Louat op.cit. p.8 
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problems depended on a 'supreme directing and responsible 
authority'. The division of powers between the Commonwealth and 
six States with divergent policies would be a fatal obstacle to 
speedy and effective national planning. Unless the powers were 
granted there would be no protection from the type of situation 
which followed the First World War and which led to the depression 
of the 1930's. Without the amendment, Evatt foresaw: "social and 
economic disorganisation, chaos in production, mounting unemploy-
ment, widespread social insecurity - in short, anarchy". 
The Constitution of 1900 was outmoded, and the peace-time 
powers of the Commonwealth were inadequate, belonging to the 
'horse-and-buggy age of social organisation'(ll). 
He pointed out that Australia, as one of the United Nations, 
had pledged herself to the objects of the Atlantic Charter (12) 
and the upholding of the "four freedoms" - freedom of speech and 
expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom 
from fear.(l3) 
11. "Although they were written down in the 1890's, many of the 
words and phrases were simply transcribed from the American 
Constitution of 1787". C.P.D. Vol 172.p.l339 
12. The Atlantic Charter was the basic international declaration 
regarding the post-war world. It originated as a joint 
declaration by President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill on 
12 August 1941. At Washington on 1 January 1942 all the 
United Nations including Australia made a Joint Declaration 
of Allied Solidarity and subscribed to the 'common programme 
of purposes and principles' embodied in the Charter. The 
principal article of the Charter, for our purposes,was the 
fifth which stated: "They desire to bring about the fullest 
collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with 
the object of securing for all improved labour standards, 
economic advancement and social security" . H.V. Evatt . 
A Case For Greater Commonwealth Powers.op.cit. pp.42-43 
13. These originated from a message to Congress by President 
F.D. Roosevelt on 6 January 1941. 
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Evatt claimed that our primary aim - the military overthrow 
of our enemies - would be assisted if positive plans were now 
laid. It was an important part of the war effort itself that 
some plan of 'economic and social justice' be prepared for the 
people of Australia, 'that their self-sacrifice will not have 
been in vain'. 
This latter point raises the issue of the timing of the Bill. 
It has been wrongly stated that the Bill was only introduced 
"after the tide of war in the Pacific had turned in favour of 
the United Nations" (14). The Australian Worker, at the time 
however, declared that the Bill was framed "while the conflict 
is at its worst ••• while the enemy is trampling on conquered lands, 
and the integrity of our own soil is menaced". And that was as 
it should be. "Our soldiers and war workers must know to the 
fullest extent what they are fighting for".(l5) 
In his speech Evatt made one observation which is remarkable 
by virtue of the fact that he completely disregarded it himself 
in the ensuing months. Discussing the reasons for previous 
referendum failures, he insisted: 
" ••• the real explanation is to be found not in any theory 
of popular inertia or popular ignorance, but in a fact which is 
so obvious that no one takes account of it ••• (the proposals) were 
14. K.H. Bailey loc.cit. 
15. Australian Worker editorial by H.E. Boote 7/10/42 p.3. 
It is clear from contemporary statements by the Prime 
Minister that Boote is correct. The government di d not 
defer action pending 'the turning of the tide'. The very 
day after Chifley disclosed the referendum plan, Curtin 
announced an 'austerity programme' viz: "The initiative 
never was, and is not to-day with the United Nations ••• 
Our fate is in the balance as I speak to you" (Digest of Decis-
ions No.39, pp.l7-18) The genesis of the Bill dates back at 
least to the appointment of the Cabinet sub-committee in 
August 1942; and Fadden's reaction to the proposal is 
eloquent testimony to the existing bleak military outlook. 
It seems rather that the Government felt that the post-war 
'vision' was necessary to support present morale. 
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rejected because~he pzople could not be reasonably sure how 
the powers would be exercised. What is needed is to tell the 
people more about the objects to be achieved".(l6) 
Evatt concluded that this was not a party measure, and he 
hoped it would not be so considered. 
ANALYSIS OF THE BILL (17) 
Evatt proposed a self-contained grant of power in a new 
Section 60A. This was 'better, and simpler, and clearer'(l8) 
thanmmoving the limitations of some existing subject-matters 
and adding other subject-matters to Section 51. That would be 
a 'patchwork job' and the patches would have to be many, in order 
to make sure of the inclusion of every subject-matter necessary 
for the purpose of reconstruction. 
The powers were expressed in terms of 'purpose' rather than 
•subject-matter'. There was a parallel here with the defence 
power which supported legislation, whatever its subject-matter, 
which contributed to the 'purpose' of defence. This was Evatt's 
idea of •telling the people more about the objects to be achieved'. 
New Section 60A consisted of three sub-sections. The key one 
was the first which gave Parliament full power to legislate "for 
the purpose of carrying into effect the war aims and objects of 
Australia as one of the United Nations, including the attainment 
of economic security and social justice in the post-war world, 
and for the purpose of post-war reconstruction generally" (my emph-
asis). Any law that could be covered by either of these purposes 
would be within the Commonwealth power. 
Sub-Section (2), without limiting the generality of sub-
section ( 1), declared that "the povrer of Parliament shall extend 
16. C.P.D, Vol.l72 p.l340 
17. 
18. 
See Appendix A for a copy of the Bill. 
H.V. Evatt A Case For Greater Commonwealth Powers ol.cit.p.lOl. 
Chapter 6 of this booklet is a rationale of the Bil , and 
this sect i on of the thesis draws heavily from that chapter. 
The booklet is largely an expansion of Evatt's speech in the 
House. It was prepared for the November 1942 Constitutional 
Convention summoned to di scuss Evatt's const itutional pro-
posals. 
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to all measures which, in the declared opinion of the Parliament, 
will tend to achieve economic security and social justice" (my 
emphasis); and would include power to make laws under 14 specified 
subject-matters including the implementation of the "four freedoms". 
However, the latter were purely illustrative - they were matters 
in the mind of the legislator as material to the 'purpose • - and 
they did not in any way limit or exhaust the grant of pm.,er. 
Under the first paragraph of Sub-Section (2), laws made 
under powers granted by the Bill would not be subject to judicial 
interpretation by the High Court. 
Evatt quite frankly admitted in his speech that this was 
a new feature which ran counter to the general tenor of the 
Constitution. The justification was that " ••• it is far prefer-
able that an elected and strengthened Parliament, accountable 
every three years to the people of Australia should determine 
these questions which are really not legal but essentially 
political" ( 1~.) 
By virtue of Sub-Section (3), the new powers could be exer-
cised •notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this 
Constitution or in the Constitution of any State 1 (20). 
~o t~me limit was laid down for the exercise of the powers. 
It was argued that "Reconstruction is not a process that can be 
completed within a short time. It may take longer than the war; 
it takes longer to make than to destroy. And the reconstructed 
edifice must be maintained. 
It is futile to construct a building and then remove the 
foundations upon which it rests" (21). 
19. S.M.H. 16/10/42. p.4 
20 . This aimed primarily at the barrier raised by Section 92 
to control of prices, profiteering, and marketing and was 
a dispensation which does not even in war-time apply to 
the defence power, which must be exercised •subject to the 
Constitution'. State Constitutions seldom restricted the 
exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth, but 
it was suggested in one case that the Commonwealth could 
not impose on a State a legally enforceable obligation to 
pay award rates to its industrial employees. Evatt . Case 
For Greater Powers. p.8o 
21. Ibid. p.l09 
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Recovery And Reform (22) 
Dr. H.C. Coombs has pointed out that 'reconstruction' may 
mean either 'building again' or 'building afresh' and that, in 
Australia, the approach to the task represented a synthesis 
between the two definitions(23). It was, on the one hand, a 
matter of adapting the economy so as to catch up as quickly as 
possible on wartime arrears of production and maintenance; and, 
on the other, an attempt to lay sound foundations fo~ more 
satisfactory environment than before the war . And in Evatt 's 
Convention handbook one can discern both a "recovery" and a 
"reform" aspect. 1 The former was the desire to re-absorb men 
and women from the forces and from war industry as smoothly 
as possible into civilian industry; and to avert a post-war 
depression in the process. Including servicemen, about half the , 
entire working population would have to change jobs when the 
war ended.(24) 
The "reform" aspect espoused by Labor was the attainment 
of the 'war aims' of Australia as one of the United Nations. 
These were the post-war conditions it was intended to achieve 
22. Dr. Evatt's Constitutional Convention handbook deals at 
much greater length and more systematically with the 
arguments he advanced in his October speech. It is felt 
that a section should be included here to expand and 
elaborate Labor's case for reconstruction. 
23. H.C. Coombs in C.H. Grattan (ed.) Australia.op.cit. p.4o6 
24. It was estimated there would be 850,000 in the forces and 
750,000 employed on war production in government and private 
factories by the war's end. This was 1 . 6 million men and 
women in a work force of 3 million. The booklet estimated 
the 'immediate' transfer problem as likely to affect 900,000 
people or 30% of the work force. These estimates were both 
attacked as 'grossly inflated'. It was claimed by opposition 
members that the number to be replaced would probably be not 
more than 250 ,000 . A large proportion of those engaged in 
war-time jobs were not normally part of the work force - e.g. 
housewives and retired persons - and they would revert to 
their former positions. Vide Mr. R. Ryan (U. A.P. Victoria) 
on 9/3/44 C. P.D. Vol. 177, p.1172. However L.f. Giblin 
in 1945 'conservatively' estimated at 6oo,ooo the number 
who would need to be re-absorbed into other than war-time 
occupations (E. R. Walker op.cit . p.331) 
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by victory and to which Allied leaders had often referred. Labor's 
strategy was clearly to seek to 'legitimise' its constitutional 
proposals by claiming an international consensus for the post-
war objectives which they would facilitate. It sought to bring 
in behind the proposals the prestige of the Atlantic Charter and 
"four freedoms" whose virtues were extolled repeatedly in the 
booklet. Numerous "non Labor" Allied leaders were quoted with 
approval to underline the moderate1unexceptionable post-war aims 
of the A.L.P. (25). 
As the terms of the Atlantic Charter and "four freedoms" 
were couched in generalities with which few could disagree, it 
was not difficult for Labor to invest its aims with 'respectability' 
(26). 
The document stated there could be no reversion to the 'old 
order' of the inter-war years. At no time after 1921 was unemploy-
ment below 6% of those seeking work and the average unemployment 
rate was not less than 14% (27). When war began 250,000 people 
were out of work and a peak of 750,000 had been reached during 
the depression.(28) 
25. These included Churchill, Roosevelt, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Britain and the South African Prime Minister General Smuts. 
The quotation of the last-mentioned is typical viz: "We are 
passing beyond ordinary politics and political shibboleths. 
It is no longer a case of socialism, communism, or any other 
ism, but of achieving common justice and fair play". Case For 
Greater Powers.p.50 
26. e.g. In his farewell address to the Australian people before 
retirement to ingland S.M. Bruce, perhaps the most conservative 
of Australia's Prime Ministers, stated that "All our aspirat-
ions are summarised in President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms".· 
A.C. Garnett Freedom And Planning In Australia (University of 
Wisconsin Press 1949) p.268. This serves to underscore the 
broad, all-encompassing nature of the Allies' proclaimed post-
war aims. 
27. Case for Greater Powers. p.56 
28. As Curtin later put it: "We cannot put back the clock. We 
have to accept the momentum that the war has generated and 
look forward rather than backward. We cannot go back to 
what were regarded as normal conditions. Before the war there 
were 200,000 unemployed. Surely it is not the desire to go 
back to that state of affairs". C.P.D. Vol.l77 p.l039 (7/3/44) 
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Much of the social distress of the depression was attributed 
to events immediately after 1918. The profit motive was un-
restrained after the First War and, for a time, there was 
increasing, though unstable, economic activity. But the boom 
inevitably dissolved into slump. Unemployment doubled between 
the third quarter of 1920 and the second quarter of 1921 and not 
till the present war did it ever fall again to the 1913 level.(29) 
The Government was determined to learn from the mistakes of 
the past. In December 1919 a referendum to arm the Commonwealth 
with wider powers for reconstruction was narrowly defeated. The 
document claimed that the referendum had been left too late. There 
had been a mistaken idea that the plan for the peace could be 
safely 1 shelved 1 for the duration. 
The document also claimed there was no practicable alternative 
to holding a referendum. The unhappy experience of the last war 
ruled out the method of 'reference' of State powers to the Common-
wealth under Section 51 (XXXVII) (30). 
The breakdown of the method in both 1915 and 1920 was dealt 
with at some length; and in view of these observations it is 
astounding that the Commonwealth should have fallen into the same 
trap in late 1942. 
The document was notable for its international perspective. 
The building of a new world order and of a better post-war 
Australia, it recognised, went hand in hand. It also eSPoused 
the Keynesian techniques later set out more rigorously in the 
1945 White Paper on Full Employment. The central thesis asserted 
boldly, now and later, was the variation of public capital 
expenditure to offset variations in private spending.(31) 
The other significant feature was the assurance that private 
enterprise would continue to play a large part after the war. 
29. Case for Greater Powers. p.30 
30. Ibid. pp.99-l00 
31. "Experience and instinctive inclination had predisposed 
Labor men to Keynes• approach and central theses". L.F.Crisp 
in Ben Chifley. op.cit. p.l69. Crisp notes that Chifley, 
for one, was a 'Keynesian- of- the- first- hour•. 
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"With the government controlling only the general direction of 
the economy, there will be plenty of room for the initiative and 
enterprise of private individuals. We want to use to the full that 
private initiative, but we want to guide it in the interests of the 
whole community, and not only in the interests of the individuals 
concerned".(32) This was to be a recurring theme in the following 
months in the face of •socialisation• charges against the Govern-
ment. 
Finally, various Federal and State political leaders,particul-
arly on the non-Labor side, who had spoken in favour of constitut-
ional reform were accordingly quoted .(33) A 1938 speech by 
Menzies advocating expanded national powers in a number of fields 
was reproduced in full.(34) 
The Post-War Aspirations of Australians. 
This is a convenient place to examine the post-war hopes of 
ordinary Australians, for the belief in a better world after the 
war was one of the most interesting social phenomena of the period 
and the term •new order' became something of a cliche. 
As Dr. Coombs put it: "Everybody's vision o.f the New Jerusalem 
is, of course, different from his neighbour's, but through them 
all, or at least through the vast majorit~there run common themes 
which may be summed up in the objectives of employment, rising 
standards of living, development, and security. There can be no 
doubt that in the minds of the mass of the people, a job is the 
first requirement of a reconstructed world".(35) 
32. 
33· 
34. 
35. 
Case For Greater Powers. p.93 
Ibid. p.49 The document was far from convincing here. The 
statements were a hotch-potch running the entire gamut from 
N.S.W. Opposition Leader Mr. Mair 1 s belief that social 
services should go from State to Federal control to W.M. 
Hughes ' belief that control of all national matters should 
be vested in the Commonwealth. It was hard to see how some 
of the statements could be reconciled with the October 1~42 
Bill. Most of them fell far short of its proposals. 
~· pp.l24-28. Reference to this speech by YES campaigners 
was commonplace during the 1944 referendum. 
H. C. Coombs in D.A.S. Campbell (ed.) Post-War Reconstruction 
In Australia (Australasian Publishing Co.Pty.Ltd. for A.I.P.S. 
Sydney, 1944) p.78 
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The fear of a post-war depression was endemic in the Labour 
Movement. "With the recollection of the mass unemployment of 
the 'thirties• in mind, the labour movement as a whole was very 
ready to endorse 'full employment• as the principal objective of 
post-war economic policy" (36). However, a Gallup Poll in February 
1943, whilst affirming that •work for all' was the main post-war 
aim of Australians, revealed that non-Labor supporters were almost 
as preoccupied with the employment problem as Labor voters.(37) 
Although L.F• Giblin, in 1943(and later, Menzies, during 
the referendum campaign) could forsee the possibility of a short-
age of labour rather than of jobs in the post-war world "the 
general public were far more conscious of the difficulties of 
absorbing servicemen and war workers into permanent employment 
than of any prospective labour shortage"(3~). Australians were 
preoccupied with the employment problem and the later smooth 
transition to peace conditions and the ensuing sustained 'boom' 
were, for the most part, unanticipated.(39) 
36. E.R. Walker op.cit. p.334 
37. Published in Australian Public Opinion Polls Nos.l09-116 
(March 1943) 
38. E.R. Walker op.cit. p.332. He found evidence of the fear 
of unemployment from the start of the war in specific measures 
designed to protect the post-war employment rights of various 
classes of workers. 
39. A Gallup Poll in September 1945 showed only orie person in 
three confident of •work for all' in the next few years. 
Looking further into the future, people were even less hope-
ful of full employment in 1955 than in the immediate future. 
viz: Immediate Fut~re 10 Years Hence 
Jobs for all 31 2~ Some Unemployment 39 35 
Much Unemployment 28 ~3 
No opinion 2 18 
(A.P.O.P. Nos.294-303 Published September-October 1945) 
This is consistent with the 1943 finding but is incongruous 
with a July 1944 Poll showing three out of four people 
confident of a post-war job. (~P.O.P. Nos. 217-231 Published 
August-September 1944). A May 1945 Poll showed a small majority 
optimistic about post-war employment. (A.P.O.P. Nos. 264-271 
Published May 1945). Hence there was a rapid dropping-away of 
optimism after July 1944. The explanation lies perhaps in 
the relentless Opposition campaign from February to August 
1944 on the theme of a shortage of men rather than of jobs 
after the war. Certainly, Labor's depression spectre made 
little impact on many voters. 
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A mid 1942 Poll disclosed that three people in every four 
looked forward to great changes in the post-war way of life. 
Foremost in the ·minds of all classes was a desire to eliminate 
unemployment and to improve living standards for the masses.(40) 
E.R. Walker believes that 'the war-time utopianism' of the 
people can be explained by the fact that war-time is itself 
usually a period of social progress which stirs hopes for the 
future. In Britain, for instance, it brought advances in 
nutritional policy that had not seemed capable of accomplishment 
in peace. In Australia it brought full employment, child endow-
ment, widows• pensions, increases in age pensions, a greater 
approach to equality in pay between the sexes, improved working 
conditions in many industries, and a system of allowances to 
University students. All demonstrated that some of the resistances 
to social progress were relaxed by war conditions and strengthened 
the public's expectations of continued government action to effect 
social improvements.(41) 
Public Reaction To The Bill. 
The Bill met a hostile recexpti on in Opposition, State and 
Press quarters. Critics assailed the proposal to by- pass the 
High Court. What did the terms 'war aims ' , 'economic security', 
and 'social justice' mean? The overriding provision in Sub-Section 
(3) would place the entire Constitution as completely within the 
authority of Parliament as in Britain. Parliament could extend 
its own life at will, abolish the States, override the religious 
guarantee in Section 116, and, in short, do anything it chose.(42) 
40. A.P.O.P . Nos . 56-65, published July-August 1942. This Poll 
is reproduced in Appendix B. 
41. E.R. Walker op . cit . pp. 336-37. In the 1942 Poll , six people 
referred to material improvement for each one who mentioned 
hopes of a better moral basis for the po st-war world. 
42. F. Louat op.cit . p . 8 
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Evatt disputed these interpretations of the powers and indicated 
that such action had never been contemplated by the Commonwealth(43). 
He argued that the proposals were 'not definite', that there 
should be time and opportunity for public discussion, and that 
criticism would be welcomed. "There was a strong element of 
political strategy in it which at the time passed undetected" (44). 
On 8 October 1942, one week after the Bill's first reading, 
Curtin announced that it would be referred to a Constitutional 
Convention of 24 delegates to meet in November, comprising eight 
members of the House and four from the Senate to be equally 
representative of Government and Opposition; plus the Premier 
and Opposition Leader of each State.(45) 
The- Government's original aim was apparently to improve the 
prospects of the referendum - perhaps on different proposals -
by obtaining general agreement on the need for wider powers (46). 
After discussion at the Convention, it would bring down definit-
ive proposals to Parl t~ment at the end of 1942 with a view to an 
early 1943 referendum.(47) The Convention was not called in 
order to obtain 'reference' of powers by the States but to reach 
agreement on the necessary powers and to gain support for the 
legislation. The Convention handbook, as noted, categorically 
43. Not all commentators were perturbed by the wide scope of 
the Bill . Labor Call (Official Organ of Melbourne Trades 
Hall Council) stressed the 'moderation' of the proposals 
which 'did not approach the policy of Labor' but urged the 
Labour Movement to support them as 'a step in the right 
direction'. (12/11/42 p.l) 
44. F. Louat op.cit. p.9 Thi~ refers~o Evatt's 'eleventh hour' 
withdrawal of the original Bill and the substitution of a 
new Bill 'framed in the light of public comment• which took 
hi~ critics at the Convention completely by surprise. On 
my reading, Evatt advanced the view that the Bill was 'not 
definite' only after public criticism broke loose. Thus, 
it is quite possible that Evatt did take his own Bill 
seriously and was constrained to modify it by the adverse 
public reaction. 
45. ' Digest of Decisions No.44, p.26.Appendix C contains a list of 
Federal and State delegates to the Convention. J.J. Dedman has 
informed me that, in Cabinet, he opposed the whole idea of a 
Convention - "a concept which was applicable in pre-Federation 
days, but out of place after 40 years of party strife in the 
Federal Parliament" (letter to writer). 
46. Evatt stated that "(the) purpose of the Convention is to examine 
the proposals and, if thought fit, to make alterations aiming 
at improvement".S.M.H. 27/10/42 . p.4 
47. Round Table. Vol XXXIII. March 1943, p.l78 
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ruled out the former method (48). 
Reaction In The States. 
Evatt was at great pains to make it clear that the Bill did 
not mean centralisation in Canberra. He favoured 'the maximum 
of decentralisation compatible with unity of plan'(49). The 
interests of the less populous States would not be adversely 
affected. Many of their disabilities were currently beyond the 
legal capacity of their State or the Commonwealth to remove. Neither 
had the power to ensure decentralisation of industry .. on a sound 
regional basis. The less populous States had just claims that 
could be met if the Commonwealth acquired general control of 
reconstruction (50). 
At t he time, four of the six States had Labor Governments 
New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, and Western Australia. 
Some of the State Parliaments held preliminary full-dress debates 
on Evatt's Bill and much opposition was expressed. This is under-
standable, as only five months previously the Commonwealth had 
foisted its Uniform Taxation plan on the States. All had opposed 
the schem~nd four had unsuccessfully challenged its constitution-
ality in the High Court (51) 
In Queensland, theGovernment and A.L. P. State Executive were, 
throughout the period of this thesis, in mutual harmony. They had 
jointly denounced Uniform Taxation on the ground that centralisation 
would mean the further enrichment of the wealthier Southern States 
48. Crisp has argued that the Government called the Convention "In 
an effort to avoid the distraction of a wartime referendum11 and 
that 11 It hoped that the State Parliaments might be persuaded 
to refer agreed power&to the Commonwealth".(Ben Chifley p.l84) 
This conflicts with the Government's public position outlined 
above. Of course this interpretation may reflect the private 
hopes of the Government. After all, at that stage, only 3 of 
18 proposals submitted to the electors had succeeded. 
49. Case For Greater Powers.p.llO 
50. S.M.H. 16/11/42. p.4 
51. Queensland, and Western Australia (Labor); and Victoria and 
South Australia (Non Labor). G. Sawer Australian Federal 
Politics and Law 1 2 -1 4 (Melbourne University Press, 1963) 
p.l 2 n. The N.s.w. Premier W.J. McKell had intended to join the challenge but was vetoed by the 1942 State A.L.P. 
Conference. (S.M.H. 15/6/42 p.5. Daily Telegraph 17/6/42.p.5) 
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to the detriment of those more remote from the influence of the 
centralised Government. Under a State Labor Government, Queens-
land had advanced from the most backward to the most prosperous 
State in the Commonwealth. Centralised authority would reduce 
industrial conditions and living standards to those of the least 
progressive States (52). 
A similar joint attack was launched on Evatt's measure. 
It was claimed that Queensland 'would have cause to mournt the Bill. 
The fear was expressed that, under centralisation, Queensland would 
be as neglected as the Northern Territory; opposition was voiced 
to a war-time referendum in terms that would later have done 
Fadden proud; and it was alleged that for 12 months after the war, 
the Commonwealth had total power (53). 
Tasmanian Labor Premier, R. Cosgrove, rejected the •specious 
argument' that the Commonwealth did not already possess ample 
powers to deal with reconstruction and that the States must be 
deprived of the powers they now retained(54); whilst the Labor 
Premier of Western Australia, J.C. Willcock had expressed the view 
that the people of his State would prefer to see a reduction 
rather than an increase in Federal powers(55). His government 
had, in fact, sponsored a resolution of the State Parliament, 
opposing a war-time referendum and suggesting that specific powers 
he 'referred' by the States for a limited period. For his part 
in the debate, the Premier was censured by the A.L.P. State 
Executive which supported Evatt's measure(56). 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Vide ~ueensland worker (Official Organ of the Queensland Labor 
Party 18/5/42 p.3 
Ibid. 19/10/42 pp.l, 4 
Quoted in Labor Weekly (Official organ of the N.s.w. Labor 
Party and the N.S.W. Labour Council) 18/9/42, p.2 
W.A. Parl. Debs. 12/11/42 vol.llO, p.l324, quoted in 
J. Cardenzana, Back round To The 1 44 Fourteen Powers R fer-
enduro - New South Wales and Western Australia. Government II 
Distinction Thesis, Sydney University, 1959) p.7 
Ibid. p.l8 
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N.S.W. Premier McKell at no stage spoke publicly against the 
Commonwealth proposals. McKell had earlier been over-ruled by 
State Conference in his opposition to Uniform Taxation; and there 
is reason to believe that he may have been less favourably dis-
posed towards the Commonwealth's proposals but for the staunchly 
pro-Commonwealth stand of his A. L.P. State Executive (57). 
In the States of Victoria and South Australia the non-Labor 
Governments sponsored resolutions of Parliament which rejected the 
Bill as one calculated to destroy the federal character of the 
Constitution (58) . 
With the dubious exception of McKell, there was thus a 
consensus of State Premiers against Evatt's Bill. 
57. At a later stage, the Executive was ' directing ' reluctant 
State members to march in a YES procession during the 
referendum campaign. 
58 . In Victoria , the Labor Opposition boycotted the debate on 
the ground that the matter was one proper ly for the Consti tut-
ional Convention to deter mine . Labor Cal l , 19/ 11/ 42 , p. l. 
The South Australian Labor Opposition took a similar view. 
22. 
CHAPTER III 
The A. L.P . Federal Conference - November 1942 . 
The 1942 Federal Conference met just eight days prior to 
the Constitutional Convention and it was a Special Conference 
convened to discuss war and reconstruction questions . Evatt's 
constitutional proposals were the principal item on the agenda . 
Members of State Houses reportedly took a leading part in 
criticising the manner in which the proposals had been brought 
forward and "expressed fear that action by the Federal Government 
affecting State rights would be detrimental to the . party''(l) . 
Conference resolved- that "before any steps are taken or proposals 
enunciated for alterations to the Commonwealth Constitution, such 
proposals shall be a matter for consultation between the 
Commonwealth Party and the State Brahches"(2) . 
Strong support from N. S . N. delegates finally resulted in 
a ' cool endorsement ' (3) for Evatt ' s proposals by 18 votes_ to lo . 
The matter came before Conference by way· of a report of a sub-
Committee which recommended that the Commonwealth be given 
' additional ' powers and that State leaders at the Convention be 
'urged ' to assist the Government toward this end (4) . Because 
the recommendation was nebulous there were ultimately four 
motions before Conference; and some of the State delegations 
(Vic _oria , ~ueensland , and Tasmania) were divided. on the course 
of action to support . Premiers Cooper and Cosgrove took a 
stronger line than some of their State colleagues by endorsing 
the sub-Committee recommend~tion . Whether their more conciliatory 
utterances better reflected the opinion of their _State Branches 
than the stand of their co-delegates is conjectural . 
1 . S . M. H. 19 . 11 . 42 . Pb . The Report of Proceedings of the 
Conference gives no details whatever of the debate or vote 
on the matter; however , 13 of the 36 delegates were from 
State Parliaments , 9 from Lower Houses . There were four 
from Tasmania , includin~ Pre~ier Cosgrove ; three from South 
Australia; and Premier F . . \. Cooper of Queensland and his 
Deputy b . M. Hanlon . 
2 . Offic~al J!eport of Proc~edings of Special Commonwealth 
Conference November 1942, P36 . 
3 . L. F . Crisp The Australian Federal Labor Party 1901-1951, 
op. cit. P253 · 
4 . Report of Proceedings loc . cit. 
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A Victorian amendment sought to have State leaders 
'directed' rather than 'urged' to support the Commonwealth; 
and the Deputy-Premier of Queensland, Mr . E . M. Hanlon wished to 
add the following words to the recommendation : "But Conference 
urges the Federal Government to withdraw its present proposals 
which , if given. effect to , would destroy the Constitution and 
imperil the very freedom which the party is pledged to protect" 
(5) . 
Finally , Mr . A. S . McAlpine of N. S . 1:1 . moved the amendment 
which was narrowly endorsed by Conference . It ' welcomed ' Evatt ' s 
October proposals , regarding them as ' an important step forward 
for the necessary revision of the Constitution and the 
implementation of Labor ' s platform , especially in relation to 
the winning of Labor ' s ideals of peace , prosperity , and security ', 
and affirmed ' as a general principle ' the pr oposals (b) . 
Although it was claimed that the adoption of this 
resolution would prove binding on Labor Convention delegates (7) , 
this was not the case . Perhaps some Labor Premiers were more 
favourably disposed to constitutiona l reform at the Convention 
than might otherwise have been the case; but only McKel l felt 
obliged to give unqualified support to Evatt ' s Convention Bill . 
5. Ibid . P . 37. B. M.H . (20 . 11 . 42 . ~4) erroneousl y argued that 
had Hanlon ' s amendment been carrie~ the effect would have 
been to prevent Labor delegates attending the Convention . 
However , his amendment , though re 1uiring an abandonment of 
Evatt's specific October proposals , was not directed at 
constitutional reform per se and would have added words to 
the original motion , which itself envisaged a Convention . 
6 . S . M. H. 20 . 11 . 42 . P4 . The other amendments were apparently 
lost ' on the voices ' Ibid . The line- up of voters in the 
18- 16 vote for the N. S . W. amendment is not disclosed in 
either the Conference .Report or the Press ; and no explanation 
is offered for the missing two votes . \'Je do know that N. S . .. . 
voted solidly for Evatt ; but the record of the debate does 
not disclose the attitude of all delegates or all delegations . 
One can only hazard a very rough guess ; but as Prime Minister 
Curtin and three Senators were among the W. A. delegation ; 
and as the only South Australians to speak supported N . o . • ~ . , 
I will venture the guess that tbese three States voted 
solidly to supply the 18 votes . This , of course , ignores 
the possibility that S . A. and w. A. mi ght have split l ike 
some other States . With so many unknowns involved one must 
remain uncertain . 
7. S . M. H . 20 .11 . 42 , P4 . 
24. 
Evatt ' sprang ' his revised Bill on the Convention only f(ve., 
days after the Conference debate and it is not known whether the 
Bill was recast prior to the Conference . If so , he certainly kept 
Conference 'in the dark ' for reasons of Convention t actic s . 
However, Evatt had made it clear that the Bill was ' not definite '; 
and the new draft may have been partly in response to the mixed 
Conference reception (8) . 
Conference also decided, this time unanimously , that 
post- war reconstruction must not be regarded as a diversion of 
the war effort , but as a part of it , and ur ged the appointment of 
a .Minister whose sole duty would be "to proceed immediately with 
the preparation of a comprehensive scheme of post- war reconstruction 
and to co- ordinate all Federal and State agencies working or capable 
of working for the solving of this problem'' (9) . 
8 . Dedman does not know whether Evatt ' s Convention tactics were 
influenced by the Conference debate . 
9. Conference Report P . 26 . 
25 . 
CHAPTER IV 
The Consti tutional Convention of November-December 1942 . 
The Constitutional Convention met in Canberra from 24th 
November , to 2nd December , 1942 . It was the first gatheri ng of 
its kind since the beginning of Federation (1 ) . No provisi~n 
in the Consti tution authorises the Commonweal th to call a 
Convention and it is possible that a State could refuse to send 
del egates . However , on this occasion all invitations had been 
accepted and 24 de l er;ates were i n attendance ; 12 from Federal 
Parliament , equally representative of Government and Opposition , 
and the Premier and Leader of The Opposition from all State 
Parliaments . There was thus an even balance of Labor and non-
Labor members . Because of differences of opi nion , it is fairly 
clear that the success of a Constitutional Convention would 
depend on the co- operation of the States . 
The Convention was an advisory body with no power to 
submit proposals either to Parliament or to the people . Although 
the Convention was not el ected , the Commonwealth did not view it 
as a purely nominated body but rather as representative of the 
people (2) ; and the Government ' s earnest wish was to avoid a 
party approach to the great problem of consti tutional refor m. 
After Curtin had opened proceedings , Evatt rose to make 
a ' short but electric speech ' which took most delegates completely 
by surprise (3) . Anti- Labor members , who were organised to 
attack the original Bill - which the Convention was ostensibl y 
cal led to discuss - were dismayed when Evatt announced he was 
withdrawing that Bill and substituting modified proposals ' framed 
in the light of public comment '. Since lst October , the proposals 
had been submitted to exhaustive analysis by the Sta.te Parliaments , 
in the Press , and by the public . Henae, a large number of 
criticisms and suggestions had been received , many of which the 
1. F . Louat , op . cit . P . 9 . 
2 . Curtin described it as "a special advisory Council of the 
whole nation in all its political groupings" S . M. H., 25 . 11 . 42 . 
3. Louat op . cit . F . lO . 
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Government felt to be both valid and reasonable (4) . 
The new Bill proposed to give Parliament full power to 
legislate for the ' purpose ' of ' post- war reconstruction '. This 
was claimed to be ' more specific ' than the previous objectionable 
phrases - ' war aims ', ' social justice', and ' economic security '. 
Twelve specific subject- matters were enumerated , but again these 
were purely illustrativ e . Any law covered by the ' purpose ' would 
be within the Commonwealth power . (5). In view of the hostility 
to the original Bill ' s contrary feature , Evatt decided that the 
new powers would be subject to judicial interpretation by the 
High Court (6); whilst the provision enabling the powers to 
override the rest of the Constitution with its far- r eaching 
implications , was modified to provide merely that the powers 
over prices , profiteering, and marketing should not be restricted 
by Section 92 . 
Instead of a general Commonwealth power of legislation 
for 'carrying into effect the guarantee of the f our freedoms ', 
it was now proposed to prohibit act i on either by the Commonwealth 
or any State to abridge freedom of religion , of speech , and of 
the press . Finally , as an earnest of the Commonwealth ' s desire 
for collaboration with the States , Evatt inserted 'a key 
provision' facilitating State and local authority co- operati on 
in the exercise of the powers . 
When the Convention resumed after a 24 hour adjournment 
to study the new Bill , the Opposition claimed the a lleged 
' modifications • were a sham . \f.hile the original Bill was 
' unification naked and unashamed ' the new draft was ' unification 
with a fig leaf ' (7) . 
4 . It is not known how many , and which persons , were privy to 
Evatt's well-kept secret . Dedman agrees that Curtin and 
Evatt, at this period , had an exceedingly free hand. 
5. See Appendix D for a copy of the Bill . 
6. He stated that ' in the interests of Australia ' he would not 
press the point . Commonwealth of Australi a Convention Of 
Representatives Of The Commonwealth and State Parliaments On 
Proposed Alterat i on Of The Commonwealth Constitution , 1942 -
Record of Proceedings, Governmeht Printer , Canberra , PP. 7-8. 
However , this was the opposite of what he previously had said 
was ln the interests of Australia '. 
7. Sir Earle Page in Ibid~ P. 186 . 
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The Opposition Leader, A. W. Fadden , fired the first shot . 
Like all non- Labor delegates he did not deny the need to confer 
wider powers upon the Commonwealth for the tasks of reconstruction , 
but was bitterly opposed to a war- t i me referendum . He regarded 
the proposals as a ' party measure ' and compared the Bill with the 
Labor Party platform . Under the amendment , 'complete socialisation 
could be introduced in the guise of post - war reconstruction ' (8) . 
He favoured an elected Convention which he claimed would have 
' special virtue and authority in the eyes of the people '. Fadden 
then moved on behalf of all non- Labor delegates - federal and 
state - what appeared to be a rejection of any wartime alterations 
in the Constitution (9). 
R. G. Menzies , in supporting Fadden , charged that the term 
' post-war reconstruction ' was ' undefinable ' and ' illimitable ' 
particularly as no time limit had been specified . The provision 
gave complete power without saying so in plain \'lords . W . M. Hughes 
admitted the inadequacy of Commonwealth powers but argued that 
Evatt , posing ap a federalist , was attempting ' to disembowel , to 
eviscerate , to emas~ulate the Constitution ' (10) . Thus the main 
speakers opposing the proposals adopted the ' party approach ' 
which was to characterise the contest right up to the referendum . 
The proposals were A. L. P . ' planks '; attempts at introducing 
socialism or unification under guise of post- war reconstruction . 
~remier McKell gave the new Bill unqualified support and 
defended the holding of a war-time referendum . He could see no 
difference between the latter, the election of a Convention , or 
a general election (11) . 
8 . 
9. 
10. 
11 . 
Ibid • , P . 14- • 
r.-
A copy of Fadden ' s motion is found in Appendix 
S . M. H. which supported the Commonwealth until the very eve of 
the referendum, remarked that 11 Mr . Fadden and other non-Labor 
members of the Convention seem to misconceive utterly the 
nature of Dr . Evatt ' s Bill ••• to deny to Parliament powers 
which are abstractly reasonable , simply out of fear they may 
be abused , is to put our democracy in leading stringss 
(27 . 11 . 42 , P . 4) . Yet S . M.H. disregarded its own logic at a 
later stage . 
Convention Report P . 34-o 
He was even more unequivocal in his support than Labor State 
Opposition Leaders, R. Richards (South Australia) and J . Cain 
(Victoria), both of whom advocated a large transfer of pov1ers 
and strongly defended the principles contained in the Bill 
whilst not committing themselves to its precise terms . 
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But Premiers Cooper , Cosgrove and Willcock were at best 
lukewarm Commonwealth supporters . All declined to support 
Fadden ' s motion on the pretext that it involved the ' shelving ' 
or abandoning of reconstruct i on planning which they held essential 
during the war . But their attitude to his motion was ambivalent . 
Whilst endorsing the broad principles of Evatt ' s Bill , like 
Fadden they felt the term ' post-war reconstruction ' was not 
sufficiently defined and they spoke in favour of an enumeration 
of specific subjects . They too were averse to holding a war- time 
referendum; and, apparently not content with Evatt ' s assurances, 
they all repeatedly lapsed into ' btate Rights ' reasoning , pointing 
to the dread prospect of ' centralisation' with its neglect of the 
smaller , outlying States in favour of the wealthier , more populous 
States of N. S . W. and Victoria (12) . 
Cosgrove moved an amendment which was later unanimously 
approved by the Convention . It opposed a war-time referendum , 
but proposed that ' adequate ' powers be ' referred ' to the 
Commonwealth by the States under Section 51 (xxxvii) of the 
Constitution for a period of from five to seven years after tbe 
war , subject to a post-war referendum (13) . 
Premiers Cooper and -villcock made plain their support for 
the proposition , and the anti-Labor Premiers A. Dunstan (Victoria) 
and T. Playford (S . A. ) found nothing objectionable in it . Whilst 
attacking the new Bill as a formula for 'dis6uised unification ~ 
they were not averse to specific powers f or a specific period (14) . 
In substance , their stance was not markedly different from that 
of three of the Labor Premiers . Indeed , durin~ the debate there 
was complete unanimity of all present on the need for some 
substantial transfer of powers to the Commonwealth. The critics 
had directed their fire at the holding of a referendum and the 
12 . Cooper warned that "If we are to set up a l l power in one 
particular spot , then believe me , 1t1e are going to fail in the 
very thing we want to do " (Convention Report , P . 48) ; Willcock 
complained t 11at :'The people of Melbourne and Sydney seem to 
have more infl uence with Governments than hav e the people who 
are far distant from the seat of Government" (Ibid , PP . 73- 74); 
and Cosgrove lamented that in giving away the guarantee under 
Section 92 which safeguarded their interstate markets , 
Tasmanians were gi ving away something that was of definite 
advantage to them (Ibid ., P. 51) . 
13. A copy of the amendment is found in Appendix E. 
14 . e . g. See Dunstan Convention Report P . 54 . 
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lack of precision in the Bill. The amendment would meet these 
objections . 
Fadden announced that members of the Federal Opposition 
were prepared to accept the 'Cosgrove Plan' and he was accordingly 
withdrawing his motion in its favour . He argued the basic 
principles underlying the two were the same (15) . 
Only 3 of the 18 proposals submitted to referendum since 
Federation had been carried, and the Commonwealth's hopes to rally 
Convention support behind a proposed referendum, to avert the 
partisan political strife which had doomed so many past proposals, 
had proved abortive . In view of the trend of the debate, one 
can appreciate the Government ' s decision to accept the amendment 
as the best it could hope for . When the debate resumed on 
Monday , 30th November , Curtin announced that in view of the 
consensus in its favour, the Government would accept the amendment 
subject to the condition that the powers be adequate for the needs 
of reconstruction; the period of grant be s ufficiently long; 
revocation of the grant be made impossible without a State 
referendum; the Convention, with the aid of a drafting Committee , 
proceed to recommend the powers to be granted; and the Premiers 
do their utmost to pass the draft bill into law within the 
immediate future . At the same time he stressed the hazards of 
this method , pointing to the fiascos of 1915 and 1920, and 
reaffirmed his preference for a referendum. 
The amendment was then carried unanimously (16); and a 
drafting Committee comprising Dr . Evatt as Chairman , Mr . Hughes 
15. Both recognised the need to confer additional powers and 
opposed pe~·manent alterations in war-time, "lnd Fadden had 
earlier argued that Cosgrove ' s proposal did not constitute an 
amendment to his motion which was ' practically the same in 
substance' (Ibid, 1175-76) . But Curtin insisted that 
Cosgrove ' s plan was ' more positive ' in proposing a ' reference ' 
of powers . Fadden replied that this was similar to his 
"scheme of reference by means of an agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the States in order to obtain experience and 
information of a working arrangement between the Commonwealth 
and States'' (Ibid Pl38) . 
lo. Menzies, \vho had attended the earlier sittings, was the only 
delegate not present when the amendment was endorsed and he 
was absent from all subsequent sittings . It was variously 
reported that he was absent on account of private business 
29a . 
16 . (ctd . ) 
commitments and of illness . His ' convenient ' absence spared 
him from the jibes incurred by Fadden , Dunstan and co . for 
later opposing the very proposals they had sponsored at the 
Convention . 
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and the six Premiers, was appointed to prepare a draft Bill . 
There are no minutes of the deliberations of this Committee , but 
"It soon became clear ••. that the Premiers of South Australia 
and Victoria were proving the hardest men to convince" (17) , and 
Curtin was twice called in to reconcile differences of opinion 
(18) . 
The Committee, after lengthy discussions , brought back a 
Bill setting out 14 specific subject-matters that it unanimously 
decided should be transferred for five years after the cessation 
of hostilities . This Bill was to be the substance of the 1944 
referendum proposals and it was also th~ Bill introduced into the 
six State Parliaments in the foll owing months (19) . 
The Convention unanimously approved the Bill. after it had 
been considered clause by clause with no serious attempt at 
amendment . The Leader of The Opposition in the Senate , Sen . 
McLeay , was the only delegate to oppose the Bill in principle , 
for reasons unspecified in the official Report , but he di~ 
support its submission to the State Parliaments (20) . 
At the Convention ' s conclusion Fadden , on behalf of the 
Opposition , expressed sentiments that were to be quoted back to 
him repeatedly during the referendum campaign . He described the 
result as the one :which is best calcul~ted to serve the interests 
of the nation '. The Bill was a ' monument of cooperation' , and he 
hoped it would pass through every House of Parliament in 
Australia (21) . 
17 . Louat op . cit ; P . l2 . 
18 . Labor Weekly , 11 . 12. 42 , P . 3 . Curtin ' s key role as a 
conciliator is illustrated time and again in the Convention 
Report . Dedman, who was present at all the sittings , says 
his ' outstanding impression ' is that Dr . Evatt handled the 
Premiers ' very badly ', and that only Curtin ' s ~kilful 
diplomacy ' averted an impasse . 
19 . A copy of the draft Bill is found in Appendix F . The language 
of the Bill bore in some places the unmistakable marks of 
compromise by the Commonwealth . This is witnessed by the 
several special safeguards to State interests . 
20 . Report, 1 . 166 . 
21 . Ibid~ PP. l81-82 . 
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The Failure of Reference 
The Bill became "bogged down in the State Parliaments in 
a morass of legal controversies, constitutional doubts, regional 
jealousies, business fears, and political antagonisms" (22). 
Hostile Legislative Councils played a particularly destructive 
role . In all States , bar Queensland , there were Upper Houses; 
and, with the exception of N. S . \L , these were limited - franchise 
bodies which were ' at once powerful and Conservative (sic . ) and 
I 
not very amenable to party discipline (23) . 
The passage of the Bill was "vigorously opposed by many 
leading business organisations such as the Chambers of Commerce 
and Manufactures., , and some Stock Exchanges " (24). The business 
campaign reached its height in South Australia where a Powers 
Committee was set up to foment opposition to the Bill and pressure 
was allegedly put on clients who sought overdrafts or business 
privileges with firms supporting the Committee (25) . 
In the States , particularly the non- Labor ones, where 
business opposition was best organised, legal doubts on whether 
a time limit could be placed on a State ' reference• were widely 
canvassed . The Commonwealth and its advisers claimed the time 
limit was effective . 
In the event the fiascos of 1915 and 1920 were repeated; 
two (Labor) States only , passed the Bill in the agreed form . In 
N. S . W., because of Labor ' s control of both Houses , and the passage 
of the Bill within a fortnight of the Convention , business 
opposition was not organised on the scale of other States; and, 
at this early stage, the Bill still had the support of the 
Opposition . Unrestricted by an Upper House, the Queensland 
Labor Government also gave the Bill a smooth passage . 
22 . Round Table Vol . xxxiii, June 1943, P . 286 . 
23 . Ibid . March 1943, P . l80 
24. "Indeed the preservation of substantial State powers in the 
federal system has long been recognised as an essential part 
of the political programme of social and economic Conservatism 
in Australia . Through the Legislative Councils ••• , it is much 
easier to curb a radical programme than it is through the 
Senate" Ibid . P . l81 . 
25 . See Labor-Gall 21 .1. 43 , P . 8; and J . E . Bromley The Emergence 
Of The Liberal Part of Australia 1 42-1 46, (Government III 
honours thesis , Sydney University 1953 , PP . 6-7 . 
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The Tasmanian Labor Government carried the Bill through 
the Lower House , but it was rejected three times by the anti-
Labor Legislative Council . 
In Victoria, Country Party Premier , A. Dunstan , initiated 
two amendments to legally guarantee the limited period of grant 
and to avoid proclaiming the Bill unless all other States passed 
a ' substantially similar ' measure . Labor l eader , J . Cain , claimed 
that the Government was responding to U. A. P . and business pressure 
which had spread from South Australia . 
In both Western and South Australia , the Bill was amended 
' almost out of recognition ' (26) , and West Australian amendments 
betrayed South Australian influence . In these States the 
employment , marketing , production , monopolies and other powers 
were emasculated . In South Australia , his own party in the 
Legislative Council refused t o fol l ow Premier T. Playford ' s lead 
in sponsoring the Bill ; whilst in West Australia , the anti- Labor 
Council was again the destructive agent . However , the Labor 
Government had earlier sponsored two amendments in the House to 
guarantee the time- limit and to permit any trade union to choose 
between Commonwealth or State determination . 
By 3rd February , 1943, Curtin conceded that the methcd of 
reference appeared to have failed (27) . That month the Inter- state 
Executive of the A. C. T. U. urged the government to hold a referendum 
(28) . However , the matter dragged on unresolved for 18 months . 
And it was not until September 1943 that Evatt publicly 
acknowledged the need for a ' speedy ' referendum ; (29) and even 
then the matter was not submitted to the people for almost 12 
months . The Government was indecisive and hesitant . It still 
apparently held out some hope that the States might reconsider(30) . 
~ovnl:J 141()/e. 
26 . ~. June 1943 , P . 286 . 
27 . Digest Gf Decisions no . 52 , P . l9 . 
28 . S . M. H. 24 . 2 . 43 , P . 9 . Late in March , A. A. Calwell had also 
pressed Evatt for an ' early ' referendum on the ground that the 
scheme of ' reference ' had obviously failed . Labor Call 
1 . 4 . 43 , P .4 . 
29 . Digest Of Decisions 10 . 9 . 43 , no . 63, P . 9 . 
30 . On 15th October, 1943 , Curtin announced the Government intended 
to deal with the matter at the next session of Parliament . By 
that time , it would be acquainted with the ' final decisions ' of 
the States on whether they would implement the substance of the 
Canberra Agreement . Digest Of Decisions no . 6o , PP. 14- 15 . 
33o 
However, the date of the referendum had to be set with 
due regard to other fixtures . During 1943 , there was a federal 
election in August, and elections in Victoria and West Australia 
in June and November , respectively . Dr . Evatt was in America 
and England from April to July and Curtin was unwilling to take 
any action in his absence . In 1944 , there were State elections 
in April in Queensland and South Australia , and in May in N. S . W. 
Also, the London Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers was due 
in May 1944 . August 1944, was thus finally chosen to secure full 
benefit from Curtin ' s return from abroad (31) . 
31 . It is reported that Scullin , for one , ·thought Curtin had 
shown 'great lack of judgement in not timing the Referendum 
with the 1943 federal elections : T . L. Suttor in H. Mayer 
( ed . ) Catholics And The Free Societ (Melbourne , F. \·J . 
Cheshire 1961 PP . 43- Lf-4 . J . J . Dedman has informed me that 
the Government did not so time the referendum ' because , 
being a minority government , we could not have carried the 
enabling legi,slation ' . Be this as it may , the two 
Independents , A. vV . Coles and A. Wilson , both supported the 
referendum when it was held . However , the Senate, where 
Labor was in a minority , may have proved a stumbling block . 
A referendum may still be held even where the two Houses 
disagree , but only after the Bill has been rejected a second 
time - three months later . The delay here would be an 
important consideration as Evatt was overseas f r om April to 
July and Curt i n declined to act in his absence . 
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CHAPTER V 
The Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction . 
On 22nd December , 194-2 , Curtin announced the appointment 
of the Treasurer , J . B. Chifley, as Minister for Post- war 
Reconstruction . He linked the appointment with the Government ' s 
apparent 'success ' at the Constitutional Convention which he 
believed would facilitate reconstruction planning (1) . 
The appointment of a senior Minister with great existing 
responsibilities met ' sharp criticism'. There were Cabinet 
colleagues who coveted a portfolio promising excellent publicity 
for the incumbent; and men outside Cabinet had seen the position 
as their avenue to place and power . The A.L . P . Federal Conference 
had specifically requested a full-time Minister (2). 
However , Curtin favoured a ' quiet, exploratory, meth~·cal , 
and unspectacular ' beginning . The war had still to be won , and 
Chifley 's temperament matched this situation ( 3) . Crisp notes 
that the other Ministers best qualified - J.J . Dedman and J . A. 
Beasley - each had a vital and successful role entirely war-
focussed; and had Curtin enlarged his Cabinet, Caucus wouJd 
probably have elected ' one or other of the leading party thorns 
in Curtin's flesh ' (4-) . 
1. Digest Of Decisions no . 4-8 , P .17 . L . F . Crisp in Ben Chifley 
op . cit. P . l84, indicates that Chifley ' s appointment was 1in 
train' since September 1942 which would appear to conflict 
with Curtin ' s 23 September statement that there was no 
intention , at that stage,to appoint a Minister. However , 
Crisp has explained that the whole matter was being explored 
in September in the Reconstruction Division of the Labour And 
National Service Department thou6h blue print stage had not 
been reached nor had dates been fixed (reply to writer's 
letter of 27 . 10 . 67) . 
2 . Crisp loc . cit . In some quarters, there was objection to the 
linking in the same hands of Chifley ' s old and new portfolios . 
H.E. Holt (U. A.P . Victoria) claimed this was ' a serious 
administrative blunder ' : 11 It is notorious that the job of the 
Treasury is not to put forward progressive schemes , sue~ as we 
would expect from the (new) Department, but to scrutinise 
closely the proposals of other departments . Its policy is 
invariably one of retrenchment , and that is the mental approach 
of its officers in the proper exercise of their duty'' C. P .D. 
Vol . 176, P . 306; 8 . 10. 43 . 
3. Crisp loc . cit . 
4 . Ibid . P . l86n . These were apparent ly A. A. Calwell and J . S . 
Rosevear . 
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Chifley chose Dr . H. C. Coombs as Director- General of the 
ne~ Department . 11 Coombs was a Keynesian and his mind worked 
harmoniously with Chifley ' s 11 (5) . Dr . Lloyd Ross later became 
Director of Public Relations . The Opposition lamented that 
Labor had relied too much upon ' persons with a doctrinaire 
outlook ', men with no experience of business or industrial life . 
The . ' professors ' shoul d be restored t o their ' rightful role of 
advisers ' (6) . Chifl ey assailed the anti- intellectual ism of the 
Opposition . He derided the ~otion that a practical and successful 
man was one who had ~iled up' money , perhaps by profiteering . He 
would prefer men who had educated themselves and were capable and 
adaptable (7) . 
Chifley believed in taking reconstruction to the people . 
This involved participation by officials i n public discussion to 
an unusual degree , and the Opposition criticised the Government 
on this score . The Department sought to encourage the public to 
ta~e an acti ve part in post- war planning discussions . It was 
considered a novel move for any Government Department to invite 
comments , criticisms , plans and ideas from the public (8) . 
Pl anning Agencies 
Post- war reconstruction involved as many different 
Departments as the conduct of the war and it was intended that 
the new Ministry ' s function would consist primarily of planni ng 
and co- ordination . In this respect , its functions resembled 
those undertaken during the war by the Department of War 
Organisation of Industry . "The admini strative organisation of 
the Ministry presented some novel features ". In Australia the 
5 . Ibid . P . l86 
6 . A.W. Fadden in C. P . D. Vol . 176 , P . 292 on 8 . 10 . 43 . 
7 . C. P . D. Vol . 176 , P . 483 . 
8 . Melbourne Age 8 . 7 . 44 , P . 3 . However , even in Labor circles 
suspicion and concern was expressed at the activities of the 
Department ' s officers . They were attacked as ' bureaucratic 
professors and research officers ' (an obvious reference to 
Coombs and Ross) , who ' seized inappropri ate occasions to make 
more or less authoritative pronouncements on important points 
o:f Government policy I (Australian wvorker 15 . 3. 44 ' p . 1) . This 
was the period when anti - Labor was exploiting the ' bogey ' of 
post-war regimentation by ' bureaucrats ' and many in the Labour 
Movement were infected with this thinking . 
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term ' Mini stry ' usually applied only to the staff of a Minister 
who had no ' department ' to administer (9) . 
The ' Ministry ' of Post- War Reconstruction , however , 
consisted of the Department , and several Commissions and Committees 
directly under the Minister . The Commissions were to crystallise 
the major post- war problems in their resp~ctive fields and propose 
po l icies that could be discussed by the publ ic and considered by 
the Government . Each of them conducted its own investigations , 
visited the several States , and heard evidence from interested 
parties (10) . 
The pr incipal Commissions were those for Secondary 
Industries , Rural Reconstruction , and Housi ng . There we~e also 
Committees for Re- Employment, Demobilisation , and Reconstruction 
Training . The Secondary Industries Commission was to review and 
investigate wartime industrial deve l opment with special reference 
to government war factories , to define a policy of industrial 
development for the country , and to plan and recommend to the 
Government measures to carry out the policy , whilst the Rural 
Reconstruction Commission was given a wide charter to investigate 
problems associated with primary industry generally . It was to 
submit reports on the rehabilitation of rural industries , on such 
extension or re- arrangement of primary industries as may be 
considered necessary , having regard to markets available or likely 
to be available externally and internally in the post- war period , 
and for the improvement of conditions of life in rural areas . 
A Housing Commission was established to examine and report 
upon all aspects of housing within the Commonwealth and to 
recommend plans for the provision of housing in the post- war years . 
In an interim report in October 1943 , the Commission estimated the 
housing shortage at 250 , 000 to 300 , 000 dwellings by 1945 . The 
post-war task would be beyond the resources of private enterprise , 
9 . E. R. Walker oS . cit . P . 347 . 
10 . Ibid . EP347- 4 • 
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and the Commonwealth should actively participate in the programme 
by providing financial assistance for the housing of low income 
groups . It recommended a target for the first post-war year of 
50,000 homes as compared with 40 , 000 in. the peak pre-war year . 
The Commonwealth subsequently proposed to the States that they 
build 30,000 homes and ~ivate enterprise , 20 , 000 . This figure 
would rise to 80,000 homes in the second post-war year - half 
government - sponsored and half built by private enterprise . The 
Government also decided to provide financial assistance for rental 
rebates to low income groups . 
A National Works Council , set up in July 1943, and 
consisting virtually of the Premiers ' Conference, was also 
associated with the Ministry in the person of the Co-ordinator 
General of Works . It would plan works projects for the postwar 
period . Since the depression, public works had figured so largely 
as a measure to support employment that it was generally assumed 
that a post-war programme of works would be necessary to achieve 
full employment , particularly in the transition period . It was 
to prepare a national works programme in three stages . The first 
was to include everything urgent and would cover works which had 
been deferred because of war conditions. As soon as plans were 
ready to be put into preparation for this stage , a second 
programme of less urgent works was to be prepared, and this would 
be followed by development~l works requiring intensive 
investi gation . The Council , in January 1944 , approved a proposed 
schedule of 'urgent' works estimated to cost about £200 mi llion . 
Full employment and inflation in the 1950 ' s rendered the Council ' s 
function increasingly irrelevant and in 1953 it was allowed to 
fade away (11) . 
11 . L . F . Crisp Australian National Government (Melbourne , 
Longmans 1965), -.' . 97 . 
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CHAPTER VI 
Th.e .1943 Federal· Election . 
This Chapter will not be an adequate account , in any sense , 
of the events of the 1943 federal election held on 21st August . 
That is not its purpose . The thesis is a study of Labor ' s post-
war aims and the attempt to secure wider Constitutional powers to 
facilitate those aims ; and the chapter will be restricted to 
those election- events which shed light on the aims . 
To Curtin it was ' the most momentous election in history ' 
for three r .easons : The Government elected would organise the 
growing offensive against Japan ; it- would probably represent 
Australia in the peace ; and it would be responsible for drafting 
reconstruction plans (1) . 
In his Policy Speech , whilst resting his case broadly on 
the Government ' s record of war administration in the face of the 
Japanese menace , Curtin did refer t o t he _:"l OSt - war world . He 
pledged that servicemen would be provided with a reasonable 
opportunity for employment after discharge . Labor would not 
tolerate an uncontrolled , speculative boom ' which dissolves into 
the prolonged depression of ruined hopes and wasted lives '. 
Primary and secondary industry would be assisted through a smooth 
transition to stable prosperity . But Labor would not be idle if 
national development projects or measures for the nation's " welfare 
languished because they did not offer profits . Every Australian 
would be assured ' a national minimum ' standard of living and 
social services leaving him in no envy of any other land . 
The Government was planning , with the States ~ a programme 
of national works , including the standard gauge railway link 
between Broken Hill and Port Pirie , and ultimatew , Fremantle . 
He also foreshadowed an Unemployment and Sickness Bill (2) . 
1 . S . M. H. 20 . 8 . 43 , F. 7. 
2. S . M. H. 27 . 7 .43 , PP . 5- 6 . 
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The 'Sydney Morning Herald'' praised the ' vision ' and 
' tolerance ' characterising Curtin ' s and Evatt ' s Campaign speeches, 
and landed their 'national ' approach (3) . 
In a speech described as the best of the campaign and one 
which ' shocked Trades Hall circles ' (~), Evatt declared that Labor 
could not govern as a trade union party . Curtin had succeeded 
because he had refused to govern in the interests of any group or 
class . Labor must guard the interests of ' the great middle 
groups '. It was only along these broad lines that the Labour 
Movement could fairly claim a right to govern the country. The 
charge of ' socialisation ' against the Government had no foundation . 
Under the Constitution , there was no power to expropriate property 
except on terms of just compensation . The power of expropriation 
was limited to specified Commonwealth purposes , and there was no 
general power to nationalise industries . There would be more 
room for private enterprise and business initiative after the war 
than ever before in Australia ' s history (5) . 
The Opposition freely contrasted the ' revisionist ' remarks 
of Evatt with the 'fundamentalism' of E . J . Ward who argued in the 
campaign that ' the workers ' would only feel secure in the peace , 
under 'socialism ' (6) . 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6 . 
Ibid . 19 . 8 . ~3 . P4 . It was a commonplace Press claim of the 
period that Curtin ' s ' real object ' was to lead the A. L. P . on 
from a sectional, trade union party to a ' national ' party . 
Ibid . Round Table , March 1944 , P . l71 ; considered the speech 
contributed much to the ~rty ' s success in the key state of 
N . S . VV. 
S . M. H. 5 . 8 . 43 . P . 5 . 
D.w. Rawson has observed that emphasis on the party ' s working 
class aspects has usually been accompanied by advocacy of 
socialist objectives and emphasis on multi-class sources of 
support by non-socialist and reformist policies ("Labor, 
Socialism , And The Working Class" , Australian Journal Of 
Politics and History May 1961) . Rawson has also drawn a 
distinction bet~JJeen the terms ' socialism ' and ' socialisation ' 
(Labor In Vain? Melbourne , Longmans 1966, P . 66) . However , 
in the period under review , few in the A. L. P . bothered with 
fine distinctions between these terms or ' nationalisation '. 
All implied public ownership . There has been an inverse 
relation in A. L. P . history between the popularity of the term 
' socialism ' with the party leadership and the radicalism of 
its meaning . "When its meaning was accepted as involving the 
extensive public ownership of industry, the term fell into 
disuse" (Ibid P . 62) . This is true of the war period . The 
39a. 
6 . (ctd . ) 
above three terms were commonplace at State and Federal 
Conferences where it appeared that ' socialisation ' and 
' nat ionalisation ' involved publ ic ownership and were steps 
on the way to ' socialism ' where the principal industries , 
at least , were in public hands ; but the parliamentary 
leadership used the terms only to disavow them . 
" 
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Evatt ' s moderate views were typical of the Big Four who 
reportedly "practically ran the Government side of the war effort" 
- Curtin , Evatt , Chifley , and Beasley . 11 Until his death , Curtin ' s 
grip on the party was never seriously weakened , and he couJd 
attribute that , at least in part , to the loyalty he received from 
his three lieutenants 11 (7) . 
Curtin was at great pai ns to convince the public , and his 
opponents , that he was not using the war to implement Labor 
policy : "I am not fighting the war on a text - book written by 
Karl Marx , nor on a text - book written by Herbert Spencer . I have 
only one cause to s erve which is the safety of the country 11 (8) . 
Labor had not socialised Australia 11 and we don ' t intend to do it 
just because we are at war 11 (9) . When the critics pressed for an 
unequivocal statement of his aims in the campaign , Curtin stated 
flatly "My Government will not , during the war , socialise any 
industry 11 (10). 
Financial Policy 
In the campai gn , Curtin clashed with Sir Claude Reading , 
Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board, on the financing of post-
war schemes . Curtin argued that , in time of war , money was no 
bar to meeting the demand of work for all and he pledged that in 
peace all the money needed would likewise be found (11) . Reading 
cautioned that the improper use of bank credit could destroy the 
purchasing power of the currency and wreck the standard of living 
(12); to which Curtin rejoined that he would not regard it as an 
improper use of bank credit to provide the means of doubling or 
7. Don Whitington The House Will Divide (Melbourne, Georgian 
House , 1954-) , P . 92 . The term Big Four had a wide currency 
at this period, vide S .M. H. article 11 The Big Four In Labor " 
19 . 8 . 4-3 , P . 4 . 
8 . S . M. H. 12 . 5 . 4-3 . P. 9 . 
9 . Digest Of Decisions no . 58 , P. 28 , (29 . 4 . 43) . 
10. S . M. H. 19 . 8 .43 . P . 5 . Like Evatt he ruled out socialisation on 
constitutional grounds ., In any event , all the physical things 
requisite fQr war , he explained , could , under the National 
Security Act be directed for the purposes of war . 
11 . S . M. H. 9 . 8 . 4-3 , P . 4 . 
12 . Ibido 10 . 8 . 4-3 . This also reflected the stand of the 
Opposition . 
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trebling Australia ' s population, nor did he see any better way of 
increasing the national income , national wealth and security , 
which was the best guarantee of ensuring the solvency of the 
national structure (13) . 
Immigration 
After the Japanese experience , Australians were acutely 
alive to the large populations centred on inadequate areas in 
South East Asia and there was an all- party consensus on the need 
for post- war immigration (14) . During the election campaign , 
Curtin , espousing a ' populate or perish ' theme , foreshadowed the 
Government ' s immigration scheme (15) . Australians could not hold 
their large continent indefinitely with the current population of 
seven million and a declining birth rate (16) . Population must 
be doubled or trebled as quickly as possible . There must be 
migrants , controlled and related to the problem of full employment . 
Arguments based on the national development and higher living 
standards stemming from a larger work force and market were at the 
time subsidiary to defence considerations . In October 1943 
13 . 
14. 
15 . 
16 . 
Ibid . 12 . 8 . 43, P . 4 . In the 1943 Budget and Address-In- Reply 
Debates (C . P . D. Vol . 176) endless Labor speakers , particularly 
backbenchers, pointed to the depression when men rotted in 
unemployment because money supposedly could not be found; 
they argued that if money could be found in war to provide 
full employment , it could be found in peace . They advocated 
the extensive use of national credit for that purpose through 
the Commonwealth Bank - which should be re-organised to 
conform with Labor policy . However , Chifley lent a note of 
warning to the more extreme advocates . Bank credit could be 
used up to the point where all men and resources were employed; 
but beyond that it would create inflation (C . P . D. Vol . 176 , 
P . 484) . 
Only the Communists dissented; however , their objection was 
not to planned immigration but to the preservation of the 
White Australia policy which was otherwise universally 
accepted . 
e . g . vide S . M. H. 10 . 8 . 43 , P . 7 . 
For an illustration of the fear held in some quarters at the 
declining birth-rate see National Secretariat Of Catholic 
Action Pattern For Peace - Statement On Recbnstruction 
Presented to The Federal Government On Behalf Of The Catholic 
Community (Melbourne , n . d . (1943)) . It pointed out that the 
birth rate had fallen progressively from 42 births per thousand 
to 18 per thousand between 1860 and 1940 . On these trends , 
the birth rate would drop to the level of the death rate by 
about 1955 and the population would be stationery. 
Cabinet appointed a departmental committee to report on all 
phases of immigration (17) . 
Results 
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In a landslide to Labor , the party achieved the largest 
majority in federal history . It had a net gain of 13 seats , 
winning 14 from the Opposition and losing only the Queensland 
Country seat , Maranoa . "The swing- over to Labor was greater 
than even Mr . Curtin ' s most optimistic supporters had anticipated" 
(18) . Labor captured -all 19 Senate seats , and would control both 
Houses for the first time since 1916 , as of July 1944 (19) ._ 
Round Table summed up "The portents of this age are 
unmistakable . They are dynamic movements in political democracy 
towards economic equality and social security by the whole- hearted 
use of the State as an instrument for the active promotion of 
social welfare . Only those parties or groups will be trusted 
with power which are believed to align themselves in this direction" 
(20) . 
17 . Digest Of Decisions , no . 66 , P . 40 . The proposal marked 
something of a break with Labor ' s tradit~onal suspicion of 
immigration as a calculated tactic for reinforcing the 
jobless and depressing wages ; and some Labor speakers in the 
1943 Budget and Address-In- Reply Debates , though not opposing 
immigration outright , expressed some of the traditional fears 
viz : T. Sheehy (S . A. ) C. P . D. Vol . 176 , P . l07 ; and D. Mountjoy 
(W .A. ). Ibid . P . 297. Again , there were some A. L.P . men who 
denied that ' Asian hordes ' coveted Australia and deplored the 
' populate or perish ' approach of the ' threat experts ' e . g . 
T. Burke (~ . A . ) Ibid . P . l03 and D. Mountjoy (W . A. ) loc . cit . 
18 . Round Table , Vol . xxxiv, December 1943, P . 77 . 
19 . Election statistics are included in Appendix G. 
20 . Round Table, loc . cit . 
,. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Chifley ' s Post- War Policy. 
Chifley made the first statement on his new Department ' s 
general approach to reconstruction in May 1943 . As Lloyd Ross 
has commented , the general plan for reconstruction reflected 
Chifley ' s moderate views (1). Chifley stated he had ' no starry-
eyed dreams of a new world . The Australia we look forward to is 
very much the Australia we have always known '. There were many 
good things in pre- war Australia which we did not want to lose ; 
however , some things , such as the pre- war uncertainty of 
employment and economic insecurity had to be eradicated (2) . 
In December 1943, Chifley issued ' the first systematic 
statement of the Government ' s views' (3). In a number of Press 
articles (4), he took as his three broad themes , full employment , 
social security , and Australia ' s international economic policy . 
He defined the primary aim as ' a high and stable level of 
employment '. This would not be work for work's sake but 
employment directed towards rising living standards . This was 
the yardstick by which he measured all reconstruction plans 
corning before the Department from the various planning agencies . 
Only on that basis could Australia develop its resources fully 
and build up its population . 
There must be a continuance of the wartime collaboration 
of Government and private enterprise . But the Government must 
determine our most urgent needs and set production goals . During 
the war Vole had achieved most of our production goals by planning 
the use of all our productive resources . ltle had brought into use 
resources we had never thought to use in peace . We would meet 
the new situation successfully only by the same careful planning . 
We must assess our many urgent needs now , and plan on a nation-
wide scale how best to use our resources and man- power to meet 
1 . 
2 . 
3. 
4 . 
Lloyd Ros~~n C.H . Grattan (ed . ) op . cit . P . 250 . 
Queensland Worker 17 . 5 . 43 , PP. l, 5 . 
E . R. Walker op . cit . P . 77 . One critic ridiculed Chifley ' s 
' Brave New \Jorld • and claimed he ' built castles in the air ' 
Smith ' s 1:feekly 11 .12 . 43 , P . 2 . 
S . M.H. 1.12.43, P . 6; 2 .12 . 43 , P . 4 ; and 3 . 12. 43 , P. 4 . 
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them. To assist the transition to stable peece-time conditions , 
some war-time controls · would have to be retained, but by no 
means all , nor in unmodified forms . 
Before the war , Governments exercised only indirect control 
over industry , notably through taxation and indirect financial 
means . We . would need more direct and positive controls . \1e must 
promote wise location of new plants and ensure the best use o£ 
our land . Private and public investment would have to be 
harmonised to prevent unregulated bidding for available materiam 
and skilled labour; und our national productive capacity should 
be built up by public investment in development works - in hydro-
elect r .ic :i.t" ' afforestation , soil and water conservation and 
transport development . Judicious timing of this development 
could itself help stabilise high employment levels . In post-war 
Australia , Governments should root out monopolistic or other 
• restrrctions upon output imposed for private advantage . 
Social Security 
A comprehensive social security scheme was an indispensable 
concomitant of , and stabiliser in , full employment policy . It 
would help sustain purchasing power on which full employment 
depended , while full employment would keep social security costs 
to a minimum in several directions . 
The Government had instituted, commencing from July 1943 , 
a National Welfare Fund which would finance the new social 
services. Into this fund would be paid out of general revenue an 
annual sum of £30 million or a sum equal to one- fourth of income 
tax collections , whichever was less . The fund would co~e into 
full operation after the war (5) . 
5 . The scheme was denounced by the Opposition as ' a deliberate 
confidence trick and a sham ' (R . H. Barrett op . cit . P . 65) and 
it was "in effect, a sugar-coating to the pill of further 
increases in the income-tax rates , particularly in the lower-
income groups which were announced simultaneously" (T . H. 
Kewley in C. H. Grattan (ed . ) op . cit . P . 259) . However , there 
were immediate increas&s in social benefits and unemployment 
and sickness benefits were foreshadowed at the time . The 
Fund ' s establishment was consistent with Chifl 2y ' s belief that 
"if some measures for the promotion of economic security are 
not passed by this Parliament before the end of the War, ali 
44a. 
5. ctd . 
sorts of excuses will be found when the War ends for not passing 
them" (L . F . Crisp Ben Chifley , PP . l89-90) . 
The arrangement was altered in 1945 to provide a solid peace-
time basis for the Fund . The direct taxation paid by 
individuals was divided into two parts - general income tax and 
social services contribution . The principle of contribution 
adjusted to capacity to pay was preserved (Ibid . PP . l90-91) . 
4-5 . 
Chifley pledged the Government would fill in the remaining 
gaps to provide a comprehensive social security scheme . As 
compared with the Beveridge Plan and New Zealand system , the gaps 
were unemployment and sickness benefits , a nation-wide employment 
service , and a nation-wide health and medical service (6) . 
Though inspired by the Beveridge Report , Chifl ey , however , 
rej ected its insurance principle as weighing proportionately more 
heavily on the lower income groups . From consideration s of social 
justice he preferred to base the social security programme on a 
National Welfare Fund financed from progressive taxation . No 
contributory scheme yet devised was self - supporting ; both the 
amount and poriod of benefit were subject to severe limitation , 
and many groups were excluded . Though employer , employee and 
Government formally contributed equal shares of the cost , in fact 
the employer ' s contribution was passed on in prices and the 
Government ' s share care from taxation . The citizen- consumer 
thus ultimately paid all three shares and they were not graduated 
in proportion to the capacity of each to pay (7) . 
Chifley saw social services as at best palliatives to the 
world ' s economic problems , and they would become less and 1ess 
6 . The following were Commonwealth (Labor) social security 
innovations during the War : Widows ' pensions (194-2) , materntty 
benefits for aboriginal mothers (194-2) , recopricity with New 
ZPaland in old age and invalid pensions (194-3) , funeral 
benefits (194-3) , a secondary form of maternity benefit (194-3) , 
unemployment and sickness benefits (194-4) , pharmaceutical 
benefits (194-4-) - later declared unconstitutional , hospital 
benefits (194-5) , tuberculosis benefits (1945) , and the 
Commonwealth Employment Service (1945) . Additionally , old age 
and invalid pensions and other payments were adjusted to 
increased price levels (Ibid . P . l90) . However , T . H. Kewley 
(loc . cit . ) argues these measures could not be credited solely 
to the A. L. P . Other forces playing an important part in their 
introduction were the world- wide clamour for social security , 
.and , locally , the important work of the influential all- party 
Joint Committee on Social Security : "It seems probable that 
much of the wartime social legislation would have been enacted , 
with perhaps less generosity and some differences (e . g . on a 
contributory basis) even if a non- Labor Government had been in 
power" . 
7 . R. G. Menzies stated quite clearly the ' individualist ' 
philosophy underlying contributor y schemes : "Social security 
had to be provided on a basis which would preserve the dignity 
and independence of the individual . This meant a contributory 
scheme" S . H.H. 31 . 7 . 43 , P . lO . Thus , the citizen had to feel 
that he had earned the benefits to which he was entitled , and 
that they were not a ' charity '. 
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necessary as economic problems were mastered , full employment 
maintained , and national incomes raised . 
Intern~tional Economic Policy 
Chifley denied there was any thought of attempting national 
self- sufficiency. The very crux of his thesis was that the most 
complete success of the full employment approach required the 
widest international adoption . Unless domestic policies of full 
.. 
employment were accepted in at least the major trading countries , 
the interwar experience of depressed consumption and sluggish 
demand for exports of foodstuffs and raw materials might be 
repeated . International collaboration for a better world monetary 
system or for tariff revision would fulfil our hopes only if all 
countries aimed at full employment. He looked to the development 
of hitherto under-developed countries of Africa and Asia as 
something not only good in itself , but offering expanding markets 
for Australian exports . 
International Conferences 
Consistent with Chifley ' s sentiments , Australia ' s main 
contribution at a series of Conferences summoned to plan at the 
international level for post- war reconstruction , was to advance 
the full employment thesis ' in season and out ' (8) . Australian 
representatives sought a distinct international agreement binding 
all subscribing countries to pursue domest·ic policies aimed at 
full employment . This was thought an indispensable basis for the 
success of all other economic agreements . Australia was 
inescapably an exporting and trading nation , and was not keen to 
..' 
have restricted her freedom of action toprotect the economy 
against depressed conditions overseas stemming from the failure 
of major trading nations like the U. S . A. to achieve full 
employment (9) . The Government was sensitive to the possibility 
8 . E . R. Walker op . cit . P . 369 . The Conferences were the Food 
and Agriculture Conference at Hot Springs (May 1943) , the 
International Labor Conference at Bb.iladelphia (April 194-4) , 
the Bretton vloods Monetary and Financial Conference (July 
194-4), and the San Francisco Conference on World Security 
(April 194-5) • 
9 . There were strong forces in the U. S . A. unwilling to see their 
country pled6ed to full employment in set terms . See Crisp 
Ben Chifley P . 203n . 
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of a depression , imported from overseas , and revealing itself 
originally in falling markets for Australian exports . 
D.espi te the failure of Australian initiatives to yield a 
binding employment agpeement , there was too much popular support 
for the Australian thesis in all countries for any Government to 
oppose it openly . 11 Consequently a niche had to be carved out in 
every international economic agreement for an appropriate reference 
to the importance of full employment, 11 (10) . .And , ' mainly owing to 
the efforts of the Australian del egation ' (11) at San Francisco , 
full employment was prominent among the declared objectives of 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations . 
10 . E . R. Walker , P . 369 . 
11 . H. C. Coombs in C. H. Grattan (ed . ) op . cit . , PP .4ll-12 . 
r , 
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CHAPTER VIII . 
The A. L. P. Federal Conference - December 1943 
On 23 November , 1943 Cabinet appointed a sub-committee to 
submit final recommendations on the Powers Bill including the 
question of a further approach to the States(l) . The Sub-Committee 
reported in favour of holding a 1944 referendum on the 14 temporary 
powers recommended by the Constitutional Convention (2); and on 
8 December , after lengthy discussions, Cabinet endorsed the decis-
ion by a reported 13 votes to 6. (3) Opini on was reportedly more 
evenly divided on wider powers until Curtin and Evatt delivered 
powerful speeches.(4) They argued that as so few proposals had 
been carried by the people , it was important not to depart in sub~ 
stance f rom the Convention agreement which had been approved by 
all leaders, federal and state . 
Those Ministers in a minority were apparently divided among 
themselves . Dedman has informed me that he led the fight for 
sovereign Commonwealth powers and that Ward supported him (5) . 
Chifley took a stand in between the Curtin- Evatt and the Dedman-
Ward positions. He 'vigorously opposed ' the Convention list as 
involving too much compromise and insisted that Evatt ' s original 
1. The members were the Attorney-Qeneral and Minister for External 
Affairs (Dr . Evatt), Minister For The Army (F. M. Forde), the 
Treasurer (J . B. Chifley), Minister for Trade and Customs 
(Senator Keane)l and the Minister for Information (A. A. Calwell) . 
2• Digest of Decis1ons No. 69, pp . 8- 9 
It is likely that the Committee was split, with Chifley and 
Calwell urging wider po,vers than the Convention list . 
3. S.M. H. 13/12/43 p. 4 J . J. Dedman does not recall whether the vote 
was 13 to 6 but if so, his ' guess ' is that the six - all of whom 
reportedly sought wider powers - would be Dedman, Ward, Chif ley, 
Calwell , Scully, and Drakeford. Press reports indicate that 
the first three were definitely among the six. 
4. S. M.H. 9/12/43 . p.7 
5. Ward apparently sought full powers subject only to safeguards 
limiting the lif e of any one Parliament and protecting freedom 
of speech and religion. Sunday Telegraph 12/12/43, p. 8 
It appears that Ward and Dedman were the only advocates of 
unifi cation. 
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proposals be submitted (6). 
It was considered that caucus would be closely divided on 
the issue of fuller powers and the impending Federal Conference 
was asked to register approval of the Cabinet decision to fore-
stall any moves to reverse the decision in caucus (7). 
Conference 
Conference validated the Cabinet vote and so ruled out the 
projected caucus moves. It resolved "That the Commonwealth 
Government submit the fourteen powers approved by the Constitutional 
Convention at Canberra on 24th November 1942, the same to operate 
for a period of five years after Australia ceases to be engaged 
in hostilities in the present war'' (8) 
There were two lines of attack - by two delegates - on the 
motion. A Mr. Bryan of Queensland opposed it on the ground that 
Queensland was jealous of what Labor Governments had achieved 
there and would not let its powers go lightly. Queensland would 
lose the position it held, politically and industrially (9). 
P.J. Clarey (Victoria), the President of the A.C.T.U. moved 
an amendment seeking sovereign Commonwealth powers as this con-
formed with Labor policy (10). However, after another convincing 
6. Ibid. It was suggested in some quarters that Chifley was ~ 
urged on by his advisers in the Reconstruction Department (Ibid)·' 
and that an important reason f'or Cabinet's more moderate decis-
ion was 'the growing fear of many Ministers of a race described · 
by ••• Senator Keane as 'the bright boys''; and that the latter 
were 'such bureaucrats as believe that the Australian people 
will in peace endurethe pushing around that they have accepted 
as a war-time necessity' S.M.H. 13/12/43,p.4. This is mis-
representation of the intentions of the Government's 'brains 
trust' as I hope to show in the next chapter. And Dedman does 
not recall sensing any feeling on the part of any Ministers 
that those seeking fuller powers sought them to continue war-
time regimentation or that they were so-minded because unduly 
influenced by 'bureaucrats'. However, he concedes that the 
A.L.P. had always been suspicious of 'professors' and special-
ists, and 11 to some extent this was reflected in Cabinet". Keane, 
he acknowledges, was especially vulnerable to such thinking 
because Professor Copland as Prices Commissioner enjoyed a 
degree of autonomy under the Minister for Customs which Keane 
as Minister did not like; but he did not think that Keane was 
any the less enthusiastic about increased powers on this score; 
on the contrary, the wider powers would have put him on top of 
Copland. 
7. D.T. 10/12/43, p. 5 
8. Official Report Of Proceedings Of The Sixteenth Commonwealth 
Conference, December 1943, p.34. 
9. Ibid.p.35. Professor Crisp crhe Australian Federal Labor Party, 
p.254), claims that at Conference, the opposition of the 
(P.t.O.) 
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Footnote 9. (Continued) 
Queensland State Branch to the proposals was ' made plain'. 
However Premier Cooper - like Premier Cosgrove, who also 
attended - supported the motion; as did his Deputy Mr . 
Hanlon, who did , however , argue that Queensland had had a 
' raw deal ' from the Commonwealth. Mr . Bryan' s sentiments 
do call to mind the State A. L. P.' s reaction to Uniform Tax 
and to Evatt ' s first Bill ; and he may well have been 
articulating the ' silent opposi tion ' of his co- del egates. 
However the organ of the State Branch , the Queensland Worker 
27/12/43 , p . 4 was at obvious pains to infor m that there had 
been no antagonism to the Bi ll at Conference and t hat the 
vote was unanimous . Actually, there was ' only one dissent-
ing voice ' - apparently Bryan (S. MoH. 17/12/43 , p. 4) 
10. Conference Report . p. 35. 
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speech by Evatt, Clarey accepted the argument that Conference 
should express its belief in full powers while accepting the 14 
powers as a step in the right direction, and the best course of 
action in the circumstances. He accordingly withdrew his amendment . 
After Evatt spoke, "the discussion so much favoured the Cabinet's 
plan that Mr . Curtin had no need to take part in the debate"(ll) . 
In a resolution carried without recorded dissent , Conference 
drew attention to the 1942 resolution calling for a separate 
Reconstruction Minister . Whilst the work of Mr . Chifley was 
commended, Conference again requested the appointment of a full -
time Minister so that the nation would be ready for the changeful 
days of peace. It also recommended that the Department ' s name be 
altered to Post- \var Planning and Construction. Mr . A. E. Monk 
(Victoria), Secretary of the A.C.T . U., explained that there was 
~r 
a good deal of suspicion among the workers about the term 
'reconstruction'. 11They felt that all that would be done would 
be to reconstruct the old conditions to be followed by another 
depression". (12) 
Conference also tabulated five lengthy post- war objectives 
to be pursued by the Department . These were adopted largely 
!'-.... 
Minister Mr . Dedman (13) . 
Like se objectives can be summar-
ised by the objectives of the 1951 c·ongress of the Socialist 
International at Frankfurt : "full employment, higher production, 
a rising standard of living, social security, and a fair distribut-
ion of incomes and property" (14). The list was ' intellectually 
related' to similar lists put forward by such bodies as the 
National Resources Planning Board in the U. S. A. and the League Of 
Nations Delegation on Economic Depressions. "Their adoption by the 
11. S. M.H. 17/12/43, p . 4. It is thus hard to agree with Crisp 
that Conference gave the proposals only a ' mixed reception ' (loc . cit . ) 
12. Conference Report. p. 42 
13. E. R. Walker op . cit. p. 348. The objectives are listed in 
Appendix H. 
14. Quoted in L.F. Crisp Australian National Government, p. 148. 
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Australian Labor Party signified its participation in a world-wide 
movement of social thought and aspiration" (15). Labor's leaders 
fanned the war-time utopianism of the people by stating their war 
aims in the broad humanitarian terms of the Atlantic Charter . 
Socialisation. 
There was considerable pre-Conference Press speculation 
which proved abortive in the event, that Curtin, consistent with 
his believed aim of a 'national' or 'middle class' party , might 
try to induce Conference to modify the plank requiring socialisat-
ion.(l6) However, delegates from four State Conferences were 
mandated to support motions calling for immediate socialisation 
in some form. South Australia sought the immediate socialisation 
of Coalmines, Shipping and the Metals industry. Queensland 
favoured 'immediate steps to introduce Socialism•. Victoria 
wanted nationalisation of industries essential to defence; and 
N.S.W. sought the nationalisation of banking and credit, of all 
monopolies such as heavy industries, transport, power generation, 
coalmines, oil production, arms, shipbuilding, and munitions 
industries.(l7) This lends support to Lloyd Ross' contention 
that, while the Government~~ general plan for reconstruction was 
moderate, "one should not overlook the fact that among the rank 
and file there is substantial support for a programme of national-
isation which finds no direct expression in the plan'1 (18) We can 
illustrate this point by taking what were perhaps the two most 
disparate State Branches: N.S .W. where 'industrial Labor and left-
wing thought was better organised and developed than elsewhere';(l9) 
and Victoria, which was bitterly anti-Communist and was denounced 
by its left-wing critics as 1 a Tammany appendage of Catholic 
Action' (20) and ' anti working class and reactionary' (21). 
15. E.R. Walker, p.349 
16. See Don Whitington in Sunday Telegraph 12/12/43, p.5 
17. D.T. 13/12/43, P•7 
18. L. Ross in C. H. Grattan (ed) op.cit. p.250 
19. Don Whitington in Sunday Telegraph 19/12/43, p.6 
20. Brian Fitzpatrick in Tribune 20/7/44, p.3 
21. quoted in Labor Call 20/4/44, p.l 
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Yet in both States there was strong support by both Conference 
rank and file and State Executives for socialisation programmes. 
For example, the 1943 N.s.w. Conference called for nationalisation 
o~ll industries essential to defence (22); in 1944 it decided all 
post-war plans should be based on socialisation and that the ALP 
should embark on a 110 year plan for socialisation of Australia 1 (23); 
and in 1945 it claimed economic security required 'full implementat-
ion' of the socialisation objective. The 'reactionary' and 'anti-
working class' Victorian Executive with the endorsement of the 
1943 Conference, called for nationalisation of all industries 
essential for defence and sought a post-war reconstruction policy 
having as its objective 'the progressive abolition of the 
capitalist system, and the establishment of socialism' (24). 
There was thus a consensus of the rank and file of the State 
Conferences that socialisation programmes would play an important 
part in post-war reconstruction, though, as Dr. Ross notes, this 
was ignored in the official plan. 
Crisp has argued that 11The Federal Conferences from the 
beginning ~f the war) commenced to press the general socialisation 
principle on the Government" (25). However, the 1943 Conference 
displayed a muddled attitude to socialisation and I would argue 
that its confused decisions were the inevitable consequence of the 
attempt by the 'party managers' to reconcile the two extremes of 
enthusiasm for the principle at the State Conference level and 
the 'no socialisation' resolve of the F.P.L.P. leadership. Rather 
than 'pressing the general socialisation principle on the Govern-
ment' one could argue that the primary consideration of the 'party 
managers' at Conference, was to insulate, or, act as a buffer 
for, the P.L.P. against pressure from the State Conference level. 
Federal Conference did 'press' the Government to nationalise 
22. Sunday Telegraph 6/6/43, p.3 
23. D.T. 11/6/44, p.7 
24. Labor Call 29/4/43, p.2. Similar sentiments had been 
expressed by the Branch in 1942. 
25. The Australian Federal Labor Party, p.287 
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essential industries as an essential part of the war effort (26). 
Secondly, it did agree to the setting up of a committee 'of one 
delegate from each State, to be appointed by the Conference to 
report upon the following plan for socialisation and recommend 
any amendments• (27). Thirdly, Conference favoured the nationalis-
ation of all transport services at an early date (28) . 
On the other hand, Conference 'watered down into meaningless-
ness• (29) the South Australian item seeking immediate socialis-
ation of coalmines, shipping, and the metals industry. It also 
discharged a Queensland motion - "That the Federal Conference 
accept the challenge of the U.A.P. and the U.C.P. parties that the 
post-war programme of the Labor Party is Socialism and that the 
Party use the opportunity for making definite steps in that 
direction" (30) -on the 'simple and silly ' expedient of deciding 
that the A. L.P. 1 s objective was for 'socialisation' not 'socialism ' 
(31). That this was purely an expedient, and that Conference was 
at great pains to avoid ' pressing the general socialisation 
principle on the government ' is borne out by its contradictory 
acceptance of a resolution ('watering down ' the above South 
Australian item) agreeing "That a nation- wide campaign for social-
ism be started immediately and the implementation of such campaign 
be left in the hands of the Federal Executive" (32). Conference 
here drew no distinction between its objective of 'socialisation ' 
26 . Conference Report, p . 44. This, of course, ran counter to 
Curtin's 1943 election 'no socialisation' pledge. 
27. Ibid . The Report gives no details of the plan in question and 
nothing seems to have come of the proposal. 
28. ~· p . 33. However the President, C.G. Fallon, ruled that this 
was only ' an expression of opinion'. 
29. Brian Fitzpatrick in Smith ' s Weekly 8/1/44. p. ll 
30. Conference Report . p.28 
31. Fitzpatrick. loc . cit . For reasons that I will state, I do not 
believe that this modifies my general point that few in the 
A. L.P. bothered to draw fine distinctions between ' socialism' 
and 'socialisation'. The party ' s official objective during the 
war years was : "The Socialisation of Industry, Production, 
Distribution, and Exchange"; and the word 'socialism' has only 
been included in the party ' s formal objectives and platform 
since 1957, and then only in an inconspicuous place.(D.W. Rawson, 
Labor In Vain? op . cit . p.62) 
32. Conference Report, p.44 
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and •socialism•, apparently because this, unlike the other motion, 
was an innocuous item which could readily be 'shelved' to avoid 
embarrassing the parliamentary leadership (33). On the other hand, 
accepting 'the challenge of the U.A.P. and the U.C.P. parties that 
the post-war programme of the Labor Party is Socialism' would arm 
those parties with an invaluable propaganda"point and prove highly 
embarrassing to the Government; so a 'simple and silly' expedient 
was devised to thwart the motion. 
Whilst Brian Fitzpatrick claimed the Conference was 'abortive• 
and that the rank and file had been betrayed on the socialisation 
issue (34); it is ironical that the Communist Party should defend 
the work of Conference and attack the •utopian', 'disruptive' 
items for immediate socialisation (35). Like Curtin, the C.P.A. 
was overwhelmingly war-minded, and was 'all the way' with Curtin 
to attain victory(36). 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
It must have been obvious at the time that the Federal 
Executive,which met most infrequently, lacked suitable machin-
ery to launch such a campaign, and, predictably, it 'passed 
the buck' to the State Executive~ which were each requested to 
initiate a campaign of propaganda. Labor Call, 13/4/~, p.6 
Smith's Weekly, 8/1/44 and 15/1/44. This opinion was shared 
by Don Whitington, who predicted a •stormof protest• from the 
State Conference level. 'Mass A.L.P. opinion', he believed, 
had been looking to the Conference to press the Government to 
implement platform planks like socialisation of industry, 
nationalisation of banking and other reforms. There "had never 
been a Conference so unwilling to take positive action on sub-jects the rank and file have been hoping that a Labor Govern-
ment will implement". Sunday Telegraph 19/12/43, p.6. ·'Bley 
They would both categorically reject Crisp's thesis of a 
Federal Conference 'pressing' these matters on the Government. 
Tribune. 23/12/43, p.l. To the C.P.A., the Victorian A.L.P. 
Executive were 'Right-wing disrupters' apparently because they 
sought immediate socialisation and dared oppose Curtin's 
Conscription proposals which the Communists saw as essential 
to the war effort. 
The Communist post-war programme, while calling for nationalis-
ation of monopolies, banks, coalmines and transport, also 
stressed the preservation and protection of small businesses 
against monopolies. Common Cause (organ of the Miners' 
Federation of Australia), 5/8/44, p.3. In January 1944, the 
C.P.A. General Secretary could say that "The A.L.P.'s policy 
now is nearer to that of the Communist Party than at any time 
in history". E.w. Campbell, History Of The Australian Labour 
Movement (Current Book Distributors, Sydney, 1945), p.l60. 
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CHAPTER IX. 
Professors and Bureaucrats . 
At the Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political 
Science held at Canberra in late January 1944, some of theGovern-
ment ' s leading economic advisers delivered papers which disclosed 
their views on post-war reconstruction. They cautioned that their 
views were not to be interpreted as official policy. The officers 
were Dr . H. C. Coombs and Dr. Lloyd Ross of the Ministry Of Post-
War Reconstruction and Professor D. B. Copland, Commonwealth Prices 
Commissioner and Economic Consultant to the Prime Minister . During 
the referendum campaign, their views were misrepresented to imply 
that the 'Professors' and 'Bureaucrats ' sought perpetuation of 
war- time controls and that peace- time regimentation was in store 
for Australians if the referendum succeeded. And not only non 
Labor sources were receptive to this appeal (1) . 
A close examination of their papers reveals that all three 
sought an extension of war-time economic controls (and then not 
in unmodified forms) only during the transition period from a 
war-time to a peace-time economy when civilian demand would out-
strip available supplies and an inflationary boom must be held in 
check(2) . Most controls would quickly pass into ' well-earned 
oblivion ' (3) but during the transition period, rationing, control 
of 
of prices,/materials and of capital issues should be maintained . 
This was closely attuned to the policy laid down by the May 1944 
British White Paper on Post- War Employment Policy which had the 
1 . To 'prove' that the ' bureaucrats ' planned to continue ' indus-
trial conscription' into the peace, the anti- referendum 
forces freely quoted Copland ' s statement that "The Manpower 
authorities, in guiding workers into new occupations, can 
perform t\vO important functions at once ••• " (See Au stralian 
Constitutional League advertisement in the Melbourne Af!& 
29/7/44 , p.8) . Copland denied that he had ever proposed 
post-war ' industrial conscription ' and emphasised the word 
'guiding' in the above passage . (The Age 3/8/44, p . 3) 
2. Vide D. A. S. Campbell (ed . ) Post-War Reconstruction in Australia, 
(Australasian Publishing Co. Pty. Ltd., Sydney 1944) which 
reproduces the papers . 
3· Dr . Coombs in Ibid . , p.90 
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support of all British parties. And it is clear that the Australian 
officials were as anxious as any of their critics to liquidate 
controls and restore normal peace-time liberties as early as 
possible (4). 
Copland, in fact, anticipated the l ater distortion of 
their speeches: "Immediately the critics cry that this is Socialism 
or some other ism. By calling on that bogey, they bring in behind 
them a considerable mass of uninformed or self-interested opinion. 
The cry is that this will crush the individual, remove his freedom, 
and make him a pawn in the policy of an impersonal State. This 
argument is the rock on which our economic plans will break unless 
we can convince people that it is fallacious" (5). 
Like Coombs, Copland was concerned to give effect to the post-
war objecti ves of ordinary Australians and he saw these as "the 
maintenance of full employment, the provision of social security, 
the more equitable distribution of the products of industry, and 
the provision of scope for private enterprise within a framework 
of social control" ( 6). There would be 'ample scope' for private 
industry. 
An attack on these speeches by former Labor Premier of N.s.w., 
J.T. Lang was taken up by Opposition and Press critics as Copland 
had anticipated. Lang spoke of the Professors' Five-Year Plan 
for Fascism: "They stripped their plan of all its disguises and 
revealed it as pure, unadulterated Fascism. It is the intention 
4. At the Summer School, Coombs was in fact criticisedfor his 
permissiveness. One critic claimed that, as an expert, he 
should tell the people what they ought to have. It might 
not be in their interests that the planner give them the things 
they demanded. Coombs replied that he was not setting out his 
personal objectives but was attempting to express what he con-
sidered the hopes and aspirations of the people. Ibid,p.lOl 
And he argued there was "nothing more depressing than the 
prospect of a life in which one passes from one form of State 
protection to another".Ibid. p.83 
5. Ibid, pp. 123-24. However, Copland doubtless struck terror 
into the hearts of Conservatives by declaring that certain 
industries either were or threatened to become 'socially 
dangerous monopolies'. They were mostly 'public utilities' 
in the broad sense, and were ripe for nationalisation or 
Government control. Examples were the coal industry, insurance, 
gas and electri city, broadcasting, airways, banking;public healtt 
shipping, munitions and strategic industries. Ibid. pp.l54-55 
6. Ibid. p.l29 
57. 
of the professors that every regulation and restriction that has 
been employed during the war, will be carried on for the duration 
of the Five Year Plan. Every vestige of liberty is to be forfeited 
for a professor's promise of the four freedoms" (7). Lang no doubt 
struck responsive chords in sections of the Labour Movement when he 
charged that "The master minds of the last Depression are to-day 
the intimate economic and financial advisers of the Curtin Govern-
ment " • ( 8) • 
During the Uniform Tax controversy the Queensland Branch of the 
A.L.P. had attacked, in a style reminiscent of Lang: "the reaction-
ary proposals of Totalitarian-minded bureaucrats to dominate our 
future and blindly to direct the destinies of our Democracy upon 
lines that are obviously Fascist in character 11 .(9) And the 
Australian Worker seems to have swallowed uncritically the version 
by the Opposition and Lang of what was projected at the Summer 
School. It alleged a division of opinion between Ministers like 
Chifley and Dedman, each desiring that controls would be liquidated 
as early as possible, and the 'professors' who wanted to perpetuate 
these controls well into the peace. However, unlike Lang, the 
Worker believed that the Ministers, not the bureaucrats, were 
firmly in control.(lO) 
7. Century. 4/2/44, p.l 
8. Ibid, 21/7/44, p.4. He cited 'Professors' Copland, Mills, 
Melville and Giblin. Labor Call, 14/1/43, p.5 illustrates 
the distrust of Copland in some Labor quarters for his part 
in the 1931 Premiers' Plan. 
9. Queensland Worker, 18/5/42, p.4 
A..ST~~IfJ/11 WORI<,;~ Jl~·l ~.PI 
lO.i Dedman has assured me that there was 'almost complete 
unanimity' between he and Chifley and their advisers regarding 
the steps to restore liberty of action to individuals and 
organisations which had had their activities curtailed. The 
"so-called bureaucrats were just as anxious to liquidate war-
time controls as were their critics. It was no fun for Ministen 
or administrators to have to regiment people in the way which 
the stern necessities of war had demanded". 
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CHAPTER X. 
The Post- War Reconstruction And Democratic Rights Bill -
February, 1944. 
On 8 February 1944, the Federal Labor Caucus unanimously 
authorised the Government to present to Parliament, without delay, 
legislation for a referendum on the Canberra Convention powers . 
There was no serious move for more extended powers, and Caucus 
was informed that the referendum would not be held until after the 
State elections due in N.s.w. , South Australia, and Queensland 
that year (1). 
Dr . Evatt made his second reading speech on the Constitution 
Alteration (Post-War Reconstruction) Bill on 11 February, 1944 (2) . 
He recapitulated the genesis of the Bill, stressing that the 
impasse with the States had left no alternative to a referendum; 
he outlined the general scope and objects of the Bill; listed some 
of the special problems attendant upon the immediate post-war 
period - following closely the reasoning advanced in the booklet 
prepared for the Constitutional Convention; and, finally took the 
14 powers individually to explain their raison d ' etre (3) . He 
explained that the Government considered itself pledged, whenever 
possible, to the precise form of the Convention's recommendations 
and indicated that the only differences between this and the Con-
vention Bill were a few verbal changes necessary to convert a Bill 
for a State Act into a Federal Bill. 
Evatt again deprecated the "party approach" to the matter of 
Constitutional reform. If the power was a national one, it should 
be granted to the Commonwealth regardless of whether or not one 
believed that the party in power might abuse it . It should be up 
to the electorate to cast judgement on the Government's exercise 
of the power. 
1. 
2. 
3-
S. M. H. 9/2/44, p. 6 
The title of the Bill was altered during the course of the 
debate to the Constitution Alteration (Post-War Reconstruct-
ion and Democratic Rights) Bill after Evatt had submitted 
three proposed amendments, primarily in response to the 
comments by Henzies and Spender . 
In the follwing Chapter we shall examine the specific uses to 
which the Government proposed to put each of the powers . 
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Evatt underlined the limited and temporary nature of the 
proposed grant . Indeed , its restricted character might disappoint 
many proponents of extended Commonwealth power . The Government 
considered the 14 powers 11 adequate but not more than adequate 11 (4) . 
There were special 'safeguards' to ensure co- operation with the 
States and a number of reservations for the protection of State 
interests . Again, it was only a temporary measure giving powers 
' on probation'. If the Commonwealth ' s use of the powers during 
the five year period commended itself to the people, they would 
certainly approve of the continuance of further enlargement of 
Commonwealth power. The Government, he intimated, intended to 
call a Convention before the end of the five year period to revise 
the Constitution as a whole . (5) 
Most Labor speakers in the debate raised the spectre of a 
post-war depression to d\orarf that of 1929-32 unless the Common-
wealth were given the po\orers . Allan Fraser (1 . S. \/ . ) even canvassed 
the possibility that in the feared post- war chaos, an Anti-Labor 
Government might attempt to abolish democracy and impose a 
totalitarian dictatorship to preserve an economic structure of 
private profit-making ( 6) . 
A. A. Calwell was the leading prophet of ' gloom and doom'. 
He predicted no future for Australia without the powers . There 
would be economic stagnation and our population would remain 
4 . C. P. D., Vol . 177, p . 136 
5. Some commentators noted that ther.e were significant omissions 
from the list of 14 powers - most notably education, viz: 
Round Table, Vol . XXXIV, June 1944 , p . 282. And in vie\v of the 
limited, temporary, nature of the grant , the many concessions 
to st.-~te interests , and the unanimous opinion of the all- party 
Convention that it was essential for the Commonwealth to 
possess this minimum list for reconstruction, one finds it 
difficult to accept the claim that the po\orer s sought were 
'too sweeping '. e . g . A. Dalziel, Evatt The Enigma (Melbourne, 
Lansdowne Press, 1967), p . l; and J . R. Williams "The Emergence 
Of The Liberal Party Of Australia11 in Australian Quarterly, 
Vol . XXXIX, No .1 March 1967 p . l7 . All of these ' sweeping' powers were in any event p6ssessed by the National Parliaments 
of Britain Canada South Africa and New Zealand and could be 
exercised by any of the State Parliaments . At this stage S. M. H. 
was still four square behind the Government : "\vere the present 
Opposition in office, it would feel no less strongly than the 
Curtin Ministry the need for these wider powers~ even though it 
might not put some ol them to the same uses 11 • The changes were 
' reasonable and necessary '. There were adequate safeguards 
against abuses . The electors could bring the Government to 
account at the pollsl and the pm1ers could be withdrawn after 
five years . S. M. H. 2/2/44. 
(P . T. O. ) 
59 a . 
Footnotes Continued . 
6 . C. P. D. Vol . l77, p . ll62 . He was also one of the few people 
in this period to pay any attention to the non- materialistic 
aspects of the •new order •. He claimed "The achievement of 
guaranteed material security should not in itself be a goal, 
but a means to reach a goal, at which should be the maximum 
freedom of the individual to express himself and to develop 
his character 11 • Ibid, p.ll65. 
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stationary at around seven to ten million for the next twenty 
years. Lack of economic progress would deter immigrants and 
seven million people would not be allowed to hold this country 
while teeming millions of neighbouring Asians demanded living 
room (7). 
Most Government supporters made the telling point that there 
had been an all- party consensus of Federal and State leaders at the 
Canberra Convention in favour of transferring the 14 powers . They 
also argued that in Australia, more than in any other member of 
the Commonwealth of Nations, the power of the Central Parliament 
was restricted. The National Parliaments of Britain, Canada, 
South Africa and New Zealan~ossessed every one of these powers. 
Was the Australian Parliament the only one to be distrusted? 
Many Labor speakers, including Ministers J . B. Chifley and 
A. S. Drakeford and backbench members like J . H. Scullin, R. James 
and F. Brennan made it clear that they were far from happy with 
the restricted scope of the Bill and its limited period of operat-
ion. James regretted that theGovernment had not had the courage 
to ask the people straight-out whether or not they favoured the 
abolition of State Parliaments . The people did not understand 
complex questions (8). 
7. C. P. D. Vol.l77, pp . l211-1213. 
8. Ibid . p. lll5. James ' views can not be dismissed lightly. 
A Nation- wide public opinion poll in November 1942 showed 60% of the cross- section in favour of the abolition of State 
Parliaments; and by April 1944, 56% of those interviewed were 
still in favour of unification. R. S. Parker, The People And 
The Constitution (Sydney, A.I . P. S. :Monograph I n . d . ) p. 34. ) 
Indeed, Polls taken during the referendum campaign disclose~ 
that many 'unificationists ' paradoxically would vote NO . For 
example, in the April 1944 Poll one quarter of the ' unificat-
ionists' intended to vote NO . They apparently considered 
that the proposals would not lead to unification and many seem 
to have been deterred by the limitation of the grant to five 
years. The Polls suggested that the referendum may have had 
greater chance of success had it been a simple vote on the 
aboliti on of the States . Australian Public Oginion Polls, 
File of Bulletins in }titchell Library, Nos . 1 6-194, 
published April, 1944. 
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The ideological gulf between Government and Opposition was 
highlighted by Chifley in replying to the 'regimentation' bogey. 
11 If regimentation be necessary in order to ensure to every one a 
decent standard of living, freedom from economic insecurity, 
proper housing, and requisite food and clothing, I say quite 
frankly that I should prefer it to the economic individualism 
that we had under the old order" (9). 
One of the most interesting features of the debate was the 
lack of a unified approach to the Bill by the Opposition. Although 
most of them achieved formal unity in supporting an amendment 
moved by the Leader Of The Opposition, R.G. Menzies> they opposed 
the Bill for a host of conflicting reasons. Whilst some in the 
U.A.P. appeared to concede the case for a referendum, though on 
different proposals, others in that party and all Country Party 
members vigorously opposed the holding of a referendum in war-time. 
Again, though some Opposition speakers deprecated the view that the 
Commonwealth should be deprived of national powers purely because 
it might abuse them, others were not averse to putting precisely 
that view. Thirdly, whilst U.A.P. members were, in general, not 
prepared to concede all of the 14 powers, Country Party members 
believed the Commonwealth should posses s them all. Indeed some 
Country Party members were prepared to invest the Commonwealth with 
wider powers still. 
9. C.P.D.,Vol.l77. p.l288. R.G. Menzies, some months previously, 
had put the view that 11You cannot have progress and absolute 
security at the same time. That perhaps, puts into one 
sentence the entire difference between the political philoso-
phies of this Government and my own •.• To say that the taking 
of risks is now an old-fashioned idea, and that the one thing 
that matters is absolute security is ••• a denial of the whole 
genius of our people throughout their history 11 • C.P.D., Vol. 
176, p.248 (7 October 1943). On a later occasion he despaired 
that "thousands did not seem to care a hoot about their civil 
liberties. They were content to seek clothing, food, and 
houseroom whilst liberty could be taken away from them just 
as the Government pleased". Melbourne Age, 5/8/44, p.3 
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All Country Party members voted for the Menzies amendment, 
apparently because of their opposition to a referendum; whilst~he 
U.A.P. side, though both P .C. Spender and W.M. Hughes supported 
the Commonwealth proposals in debate, only the former voted with 
the Government. Hughes adopted the curious approach that he was 
opposed to a war-time referendum and would thus vote against the 
Bill; but if a referendum were nonetheless held on these proposals, 
he would advocate a YES vote. The two Independents, A.W. Coles 
and A. Wilson supported the Government. 
p 
Menzies, who led for the Opposition, did not deny that some 
further power may be desirable for reconstruction purposes. He 
contented himself with a cautious double negative. The existing 
Commonwealth powers,he argued,had 'not been shown to be inadequate•. 
He divided the 1~ powers into three categories. Firstly, there 
were powers which, he claimed, the Commonwealth already possessed 
and which it was therefore not necessary to ask for. Secondly, 
there were powers which went beyond what a non-Socialist programme 
of post-war reconstruction would require. And thirdly, there were 
powers which might be supported if they were not subject to 
proposed limitations. 
In the first category, Menzies placed the proposed powers 
over repatriation, national works, standardisation of railway 
gauges, and the control of overseas exchange and investment. He 
expressed the view that "whatever the defence power enables you to 
do in time of war, it enables you to undo in t ime of peace. If the 
defence power authorises the Commonwealth, in the course of fight-
ing a war, to mobilise the entire nation, it equally authorises 
the Commonwealth to demobilise the nation during the period of 
transition from war to peace" (10). Thus, powers relating to 
rationing and price and investment control were possessed in the 
immediate post-war years. Evatt replied that the ambit of the 
peace-time defence power was speculative and that Menzies had 
exaggerated the possibilities of the existing Commonwealth powers. 
His present account was in marked contrast with a 1938 speech 
when he had advocated expanded national powers in a number of fields. 
10. C.P.D., Vol.l77, pp.~53-54 
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Under the second head, ~1enzies asserted that the powers over 
employment and unemployment and the production and distribution 
of goods would remove all limitations of substance from Common-
wealth power. They would authorise the nationalisation of 
industries. In the third category, he objected to the five year 
limitation on the companies power and argued that health and works, 
as national powers, should not require the consent of the States; 
and he was disappointed that the operation of Section 92 had not 
been modified. 
Menzies thus felt that existing powers might prove adequate; 
but he was apparently uncertain, and, in order to afford adequate 
power to theGovernment, his amendment provided that the Bill be 
withdrawn and re-drafted (11). He had begun his speech by stress-
ing the undesirability of holding a war-time referendum (12); 
however Curtin pointed out that the amendment conceded the case 
for a referendum. The only purpose of re- drafting a Bill for a 
referendum would be to alter the substance of the referendum pro-
posals. Thus, Curtin argued, the choice was whether there was to 
be a referendum on the Bill as introduced or on the substance of 
paragraph (6) of the amendment which contained modified proposals 
over the same five-year period. And, in~ly to Curtin, Menzies 
seems to have acknowledged that his amendment conceded the case 
for a referendum (13) . 
11. 
12. 
13. 
A copy of Menzies ' Amendment is contained in Appendix I . 
C. P.D. , Vol. 177, p. 448. 
Ibid. P. l040 . One must then ask how Country Party members 
and W. M. Hughes, all of whom supported granting the entire 14 
powers, and were only opposed to the referendum method , could 
support an· amendment which itself envisaged a referendum on 
proposals which emasculated the 14 powers . The Opposition, in 
this debat·e, appears to have been deeply confused, indecisive, 
and disorganised . Though Menzies could not deny that the 
holding of a referendum was implicit in his amendment , he had , 
as noted, opposed a referendum during his speech and his 
U. A. P. supporters in the debate did likewise. 
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Spender dissociated himself from the amendment . He was not 
prepared to rely on the defence power as any basis for post- war 
reconstruction. Menzies, he claimed, had over- emphasised some of 
the existing Commonwealth powers . Spender stated flatly that he 
was a unificationist (14) . Hughes thought the powers were not wide 
enough, and, like Spender strongly opposed reliance on the defence 
po,ver . Both rejected the argument that the powers should be 
opposed merely because the Government in power might abuse them. 
However, other U.A.P. speakers supported Menzies . Holt , for one, 
was not prepared to divorce the two questions of whether the powers 
were national , and which party would administer them. Labor had 
become ' drunk with power ' (15). E. J . Harri son, in supporting the 
amendment, spoke against the referendum which it apparently 
required and thus epitomised the uncertainty on the Opposition 
benches . He and his U.A. P. colleague, J . A. Guy, argued that the 
Bill was "a supreme example of the work of a master craftsman in 
the art of hidden intentions 11 • It was "a design for socialisation" 
(16) . R. S. Ryan (U.A. P. ) advanced the odd argument that the Bill 
provided for greater powers than required for the transition 
period, and far less than would be necessary for Australia's future 
development (17) . He conceded that no country comparable with 
14. C. P. D. , Vol . l77, p. 477 
15. Ibid., p. l278 
16. E. J. Harrison in~. , p.ll54. It is interesting to note 
Brian Fitzpatrick ' s reaction to the raising of the Socialist 
bogey by Opposition members: "This is a good joke. Who are 
the members of Mr . Curtin ' s Govecrmmnt who have ' socialistic 
plans ' ? I can think of two, and two only , who on record, care 
two hoots for Socialism. I can think of four or five who might 
sometime or other have given some attention to Socialism" . 
Smith ' s Weekly, 26/2/44, p . ll . It appears that Fitzpatrick ' s 
•two Socialists 11 were E. J . Ward and Senator D. Cameron. 
17. C. P. D., Vol . l77, p . ll73 
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Australia had a National Parliament with such restricted powers. 
But the Government already possessed all the necessary powers for 
the transition. 
Whilst the U.A.P. wanted the Canberra list of powers substant-
ially reduced, Country Party members believed the Government should 
be granted all fourteen. J. McEwen and H.L. Anthony, in fact, 
favoured even wider powers. The Convention list, McEwen argued, 
would not meet the needs of post-war reconstruction. However, all 
Country Party members opposed a referendum on the ground that it 
would certainly fail and they urged the Commonwealth to persevere 
in its. negotiations with the States from whom, they argued, a 
substantial amount had already been gained. (l7a) They argued 
that the West Australian and South Australian amendments were not 
'substantial' and so would not prevent the Victorian Act coming 
into effect. The plan had foundered only on the opposition of 
two Tasmanian Legislative Councillors, and the Government should 
persevere (18). Evatt, inmply>claimed that the amendments in the 
two States were 'substantial' and that the Bill had been rejected 
by the Tasmanian Legislative Council three times. He made the 
telling point that eminent legal authorities had claimed a State 
'reference' could not be subject to a time limitation and Constitut-
ional difficulties might thus arise later if the Government per-
sisted with negotiations (19). 
17~. They claimed that the Government seemed unable to distinguish 
between "opposition to an objective and opposition to a method 
of attaining that objective ••• it is only the question of the 
method that is causing differences among us". Ibid, p.l266. 
G.J. Bowden (Country Party). 
18. As Sir Earle Page reasoned: "We are here \vi th eleven chickens 
in the coop. In our manoeuvring to get another three into 
the coop, the eleven which we have already bagged escape, and 
our last condition is very much worse than our first". 
Ibid, p.l270. The Government was wrong in "staking all upon 
a gambler's throw, since the people have rejected submission 
after submission". J. McEwen, 1£19.., p.l20l.t. 
19. Ibid., p.l344 
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Fadden appeared less kindly disposed to the 14 powers than 
his party colleagues. He argued that because the proposal for 
'reference' of powers from the States had contained a provision 
for State referenda, the present proposal, which had no such 
provision, was different . But, as Evatt replied, this provision 
in the Convention draft Bill related to the different question 
of restraining State Parliaments from revoking a reference of 
power without first obtaining the approval of the people of that 
State - a protection against the States, not the Commonwealth. 
Fadden also argued that since the Convention, people "have learned 
something of the way in which the Commonwealth Government exer-
cises its pmvers. They have had experience of bureaucracy and 
centralised control of a kind very detrimental to certain of the 
States 11 (20). However, the Commonvrealth should have increased 
powers; but t here was no necessity for a referendum in view6f 
what the States were prepared to concede. 
During the debate, Evatt, by leave, informed the House that 
Cabinet had decided to recommend the inclusion of three amendments 
(21) . These were a guarantee of freedom of speech and expression 
binding both Commonwealth and States; extension of the existing 
Section 116 (religious toleration) to bind the States as well as 
the Commonwealth; and regulations of a legislative character 
pursuant to the powers granted by the Bill to be subject to dis-
allowance by resolution of either House . Evatt stated that, in 
submitting these amendments, he had taken into account suggestions 
made by Menzies and Spender . 
Of the Opposition, only Spender voted against Menzies ' 
amendment (22). However, with the amendment defeated, Evatt, at 
the suggestion of Scullin, outmanoeuvred Menzies by calling for a 
division on the Second Reading . 
20. Ibid., p.l042 
21 . Ibid., pp. ll52- 53 
22. Ibid. , pp.ll53- 54 
The Country Party members/thereupon including Fadden, 
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deserted the U. A. P. and voted with the Government (23). Thus, it 
appears that they voted for the amendment to register their opposit-
ion to the method of attaining the objective, and for the Second 
Reading to record their approval of the objective itself . However 
during the Committee stages, owing to a procedurdmuddle, a 
Country Party amendment was declared defeated without proper 
debate . In the ensuing scene, McEwen was suspended, and eventually 
most of the Opposition boycotted the greater part of the Committee 
debate; "they then used the incident to show how a brutal Labor 
majority would misuse any additional powers it might receive . 
Voting on the third reading was on party lines, only Spender 
voting with Labor" (24) . Thenceforth the Country Party was an 
irrevocable opponent of the proposals . 
Despite the passage of the Bill through both Houses , Evatt 
informed that "the door is not irrevocably closed to action by 
the State legislatures in accordance with the Convention decisions •• ~ 
( 25) . 
23. "While the division bells were ringing, Menzies endeavoured 
unsuccessfully to induce the members of the Country Party to 
remain on the Opposition side of the House, but they refused 
to do his bidding ••• " Australian worker, 22/3/44, p . 9 
24. G. Sawer Australian Federal Politics And Law 1929-1949, 
p . 172. Also see Australian Worker, loc.cit. on these 
incidents. 
25. Digest of Decisions, No . 79 , p . 27 (23/3/44) 
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CHAPTER XI. 
The Fourteen Pmvers. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the more or less 
specific uses to which Labor proposed to put each of the four teen 
powers if they were granted (1). 
I. Reinstatement And Advancement Of Servicemen. 
When the war ended, the care of Servicemen and Servicewomen 
would be the 'primary obligation' of the Common~realth. All would 
need jobs to go to; many would need special training; many would 
need homes and equipment to re-establish themselves in domestic 
and business life. R. G. Menzies argued the Commonwealth had 
sufficient authority under peace-time defence powers , to handle 
this matter and that the proposal was mere 'window dressing'. But 
Evatt doubted that the defence power would prove wide enough. During 
the war, certain limitations had been placed on the power and in 
peace-time it tended to become almost ineffective except in relat-
ion to military and naval purposes, strictly so-called. Evatt also 
doubted that authority to enforce a general and permanent prefer-
ence in employment to returned soldiers fell within the defence 
power. Present preference provisions in the Commonwealth related 
only to Commonwealth employment and he doubted that they could 
constitutionally be extended to all employment. 
Everybody agreed these were national matters and the Govern-
ment wanted to put them beyond doubt. 
II. Employment And Unemployment. 
Evatt considered this the most important of the powers. It 
meant the provision of employment and the prevention and relief 
of unemployment 'by any and every method which the Parliament 
1. The sources for the Chapter are H.V. Evatt Post-War Reconstruct-
ion: Temporary Alterations Of The Constitution- Notes On The 
Fourteen Powers And The Three Safe uards, Government Printer, 
Canberra n.d. 19 ; Commonwealth Government You And The 
Referendum (pamphlet) n.d. (1944); and S.M.H.l2/2/44 which 
reports Evatt ' s Second Reading Speech of 11/2/44. I have 
drawn from all three in writing the following summary of 
the Government's case for each of the powers. 
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thinks appropriate' . It was the widest power in the Bill, but 
he did not agree with Menzies that it was incapable of definition, 
or limitless. The peace-time Federal powers - arbitration in 
industrial disputes 'extending beyond the limits of any one State'; 
regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and among 
the States; the power to make grants to the States; and the power 
to establish unemployment insurance, were 'hopelessly inadequate'. 
They would not allow the continuance of the Womens Employment 
Board or the special authorities set up to control the maritime, 
waterfront, and coal industries, or schemes that had been training 
and placing nearly 4ooo men a month, or the industrial welfare 
services. 
The power was not limited to the provision of employment. It 
would include power to determine the terms and conditions of 
employment. Wages and hours, industrial relations, and industrial 
disputes would fal l within its scope. Security of employment 
demanded some modification of the arbitrary right of dismissal that 
hung 'like the sword of Damocles' over nearly every worker through-
out his industrial life. Full employment could not be secured 
unless you could secure terms and conditions upon which men were 
willing to work. The reason for using both words was that 'employ-
ment' standing alone , might not have been understood to include the 
provision of employment; 'unemployment' standing alone might not 
have included the whole sphere of industrial relations. When the 
war ended there would be no industrial conscription. 
III. Organised Marketing. 
This power would enable the Commonwealth to form compulsory 
or voluntary 'pools'; to provide for zoning and quotas where 
necessary; to arrange for proper grading, packing, and advertising; 
and so forth. 
Australian farmers after years of unstable conditions before 
the war, had secured stability of markets and prices by war-time 
organisation of marketing under the defence power. The income of 
primary producers had risen by £40 million a year since the war 
70. 
began (2) . But in peace the Commonwealth coul d only act in a 
limited field in relation to interstate and overseas markets, and 
most of these benefits might be lost . There might be a return to 
the chaotic days of' economic insecurity , ruinous prices, and 
inevitable production wastage . 
After the war , there would be a period of rapidly changing 
markets ~ There would be great shortages of some goods and huge 
surpluses of others . Some war-time markets would disappear and 
former markets would only slm-rly return. There vTOuld be increased 
threats to some of our main products from substitutes . There 
would be the obligation to help feed the starving millions of 
Europe and Asia. The sudden lapsing of the schemes novT operating 
under the National Security Act would bring chaos . 
Exercise of this povrer would, unfortunately, be hampered by 
Section 92. This was the price paid for compromise at the 
Canberra Convention. However, the position was strengthened by 
a series of High C9urt judgements which, in effect, interpreted 
Section 92 as permittine regulation of interstate t r ade so long as 
it 1vas not mere prohibition of such trade . 
IV . Company Law . 
The failure of the present Constitution to give the Common-
wealth power to pass a national Companies Act for the whole of 
Australia, was a serious defect . Companies of one State were 
treated as 'foreign ' companies under the laws of other States , 
and must register as such. It had been argued that to give the 
pmver for five years would be useless . However, if the Commonwealth 
made a success of the Unifor~ Companies Act , the business community~; 
would never want to see the restoration of the compl icated system 
that now existed. 
2. B. D. Graham , who had made a careful study of the Australian 
Country Party ' s history since 1919, said in 1958 that it was 
his conclusion that the Curtin and Chifley Governments bet ween 
1941 and 1949 did more for the Australian primary producers 
than had the Federal Country Party in its history to recent 
years . L. F. Crisp Ben Chifley, p. 304 n . 
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V. Trusts, Combines And Monopolies. 
After the war, Australia would enter a period of rapid devel-
opment. Experience had shown that these conditions encouraged 
the growth of trusts, combines, and monopolies. With its present 
peace-time powers, the Commonwealth would be unable fully to 
protect the public and bona fide industry from exploitation by 
unscrupulous business interests. The Opposition suggested that 
the subject-matter of the power was so vague as to be indefinable. 
However, each term denoted a different aspect of the same general 
business process. That process was neither obscure nor unfamiliar. 
It took place when persons or undertakings entered into an assoc-
iation for the purpose of suppressing competition to the detriment 
of the public. 
VI. Profiteering And Prices. 
Experience after the last war, when prices rocketed in 1920 
and slumped in 1921, showed what could be expected after the war 
unless profiteers were checked and prices controlled. Price 
control under war-time powers had saved Australia from the social 
chaos of inflated prtces and ruthless profiteers. The same pro-
tection was needed after the war - and the same powers. In peace-
' 
time, power over prices and profiteering could operate only upon 
interstate and overseas transactions. 
Criticism had been directed at the term 'profiteering'. 
However, it had a fairly well-defined meaning. It was the deriving 
of an unreasonable or excessive profit - in particular by the 
charging of excessive prices. 
VII. The Production And Distribution Of Goods. 
In the early post-war years, there would be a far greater 
demand for goods and services than we could hope to meet. We 
should see that essentials were produced first, and that everyone 
got a fair share. Homes, schools, and hospitals must precede 
breweries and cinemas. During the war, the Commonwealth was using 
its emergency powers to producethe needs of war and to see that 
food, clothing, and other civilian goods were fairly shared. The 
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Commonwealth would not have these emergency powers in peace-time, 
but the need for national direction would be just as great. 
No law concerning primary production was to be made without 
the consent of the State concerned. 
VIII. Overseas Exchange, Overseas Investment And The Local 
Borrowing Of Money. 
It was admitted that the Commonwealth's normal powers in these 
fields were quite wide. However, experience during the Depression 
had shown certain~s which it would be wise to close. Exchange 
stability was an important part of general economic stability and 
was necessary for full employment. The po\'Ter would allmi the 
Commonwealth to prescribe the rate of exchange and control the 
extent of exchange. The 'raising of money' related to private 
borrowing and would enable the Loan Council to direct the flow of 
private investment into channels that were best in the public 
interest - as noted, into homes and schools before breweries and 
cinemas. 
IX. Air Transport. 
The Commonwealth had no control over civil aviation within 
the limits of a State. The nature of aviation made it essential 
that there should be uniform regulation throughout Australia. It 
was extremely dangerous in a country with comparatively few States 
that Commonwealth control should be limited by the necessity for a 
particular flight to be of an interstate character. 
X. Uniform Railway Gauges. 
Australia's broken railway gauges had always been an obstacle 
to our national transport system, and, during the war, had endanger~d 
the nation's safety. With this power, the Commonwealth could 
initiate a plan to unify the railway gauges with the assent and 
co-operation of the States which would still own and control their 
own railway systems. 
XI. National Works. 
A carefully planned programme of public works was an essential 
element in any attack on unemployment. It was acknowledged, as 
claimed by Menzies, that under Section 96 of the Constitution .t 
the Commonwealth could make grants to the States for carrying out 
' 
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national works on conditions laid down by Federal Parliament. 
However, though the new power would also require State co-operation, 
Evatt felt that the results would be very different from Section 96 
grants. It was a question of initiative, responsibility, and 
direction. Under Section 96, the initiative tended to come from 
the other end - the State needing assistance. 
XII. National Health. 
During the war, it had become more evident that the health 
of the people was a matter of national concern. Considerations of 
nutrition, of health, hospital facilities, and preventive medicine, 
did not differ from State to State. The Commonwealth wanted to 
make laws regarding the prevention and treatment of disease; the 
maintenance of hospitals and medical services; nutrition; standards 
of purity in food and drugs; and san!ation and public hygiene 
generally. The qualification referring to co-operation with the 
States was a direction to the Commonwealth to continue its present 
policy of avoiding overlapping and duplication of the health 
services of the States, and to base its organisation on joint 
bodies, such as the National Health and Medical Research Council. 
XIII. Family Allowances. 
These would include any allowance given to ~ family or to 
individuals through the medium of, or in virtue of, their member-
ship of a family, and would include child endowment, widows' 
pensions, allowances for medical assistance or vocational training, 
university bursaries, assistance for housing purposes, and unemploy-
ment and sickness benefits. 
The only power granted by the Constitution was over invalid 
and age pensions, and insurance other than State insurance. In 
war-time, support could be found for social services in the defence 
power; in peace-time there was the very doubtful argument that 
Section 81 - the power to appropriate money 'for the purposes of 
the Commonwealth' - would serve as a foundation. This power would 
put the issue beyond doubt. 
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XIV. The Australian Aborigines. 
The Constitution, as it stood, provided that the Commonwealth 
could legislate for the people of any special race, but for some 
curious reason made an express exception of Australian aborigines. 
Their welfare, however, was surely a matter of national concern. 
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CHAPTER XII. 
The Fourteen Powers Referendum August 1944. 
The referendum held on August 19, 1944, embodied "by far the 
most comprehensive measure of Constitutional change that the 
Australian people had ever had to consider" (1). It was a campaign 
"in which crowded meetings have shown a public interest wider than 
that taken in any recent elections" (2). 
Only the A.L.P. maintained formal unity in its public 
campaigning. No Labor Parliamentarian, federal or state, took 
the public platform against the proposals and no trade union 
expressed opposition to the plan. All State A.L.P. Executives 
gave their endorsement as did every State Conference which 
discussed the matter. The Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. 
and all Labor Councils issued strong support to the campaign (3). 
However, as we shall see, there were suggestions of 'silent oppos-
ition' or 'passive resistance' at the State A.L.P. level. 
On the anti-Labor side, W.M. Hughes and P.C. Spender campaigned 
vigorously for a YES vote, as did E.S. Spooner, former U.A.P. 
member for the federal seat of Robertson. The U.A.P. President 
of the Victorian Legislative Council, Sir Frank Clarke M.L.C. 
supported YES as did several radical Victorian Country Party 
members who strongly favoured organised marketing. Other prominent 
members of the Conservative groups, such as Mr. R. Windeyer K.c., 
the leader of the Bar in N.s.w., and Dr. Frank Louat, President of 
the Constitutional Association supported the referendum as a 
national, non-party matter. The Independents Coles and Wilson also 
campaigned for YES; and Labor enlisted the backing of the Australian 
Natives' Association, and a number of public figures, including the 
former Gov.ernor-General and Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir 
Isaac Isaacs, the war historian C.E.W. Bean, and the first 
1. K.H. Bailey in C.H. Grattan (ed.) op.cit; p.l03 
2. S.M.H. 14/8/44, p.3 
3. Indeed, it was claimed that "the Labour Movement has never 
been so united as it is on this issue". Common Cause. 19/8/44, 
p.4. 
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Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, Sir Robert Garran. A 
number of Church figures, including the Anglican Bishops of 
IIi II S. W 
Goulburn and Armidale~and the Dean of St. Paul's Anglican Cathedral 
in Victoria, publicly supported YES; as did the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. 1-fannix. 
On the other hand, F.A. Bland, Professor of Public Administrat-
ion at Sydney University, was one of the few public figures to 
identify with the NO cause. Evatt could validly claim that in 
none of the States was there a 'broad, popular movement' against 
theproposals. The organisation for NO was in the hands of 
specially-created Constitutional Leagues and other such U.A.P. 
'front' organisations(4). 
In June, 1944, a meeting of U.A.P. leaders and office-bearers 
had unanimously pledged to do all in their power to defeat the 
referendum and had adopted an eleven-point post-war programme to 
counter suggestions of barrenness in Opposition policy for the 
post-war world (5). 
Rather lame rationalisations were offered by Opposition 
leaders, federal and state, for their volte-face since the Canberra 
Convention. Their arguments were "carried to extraordinary lengths 
of misrepresentation"(6). We have already seen that Fadden offered 
the untenable excuse that the new Bill differed from the Convent-
ion proposals in not containing a provision for State referenda(?). 
Premiers Dunstan and Playford used the insertion of the new safe-
guard on regulation-making as their pretext. They contended that 
the amendment wou~d allow the Government to totally disregard the 
will of Parliament and to substitute 'a most vicious form of 
Government by regulation'(8). This was 'a grotesque distortion 
4. S.M.H. 15/8/44., p.4 
5. S.M.H. See Appendix J for the U.A.P. post-war programme. 
A.Grenfell Price and Colin G. Kerr in A.C. Garnett op.cit; 
Chapter 11, give a good account of non-Labor ideology and 
policy as it related to the post-war period. 
6. G. Sawer op.cit. p.l72 
7. See back to page'' · 
8. Melbourne Age, 13/7/44, p.3 
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aistoPtion of the proposal'(9). 
His •convenient• non-attendance at the Convention enabled 
Menzies to detract from its work. He claimed that the discussions 
on the final draft Bill were'the most perfunctory in Australian 
history• and that on the drafting committee the Premiers were 
denied expert assistance and all the draftsmen were on the one 
side (10). However, Labor was able to refer Menzies to 1938 and 
1942 speeches in which he had been a strong proponent of Constitut-
ional change. In 1938, when Attorney-General, he favoured the 
extension of Commonwealth powers to such matters as trade and 
commerce, health, companies, industrial matters, transport, 
unemployment insurance, agriculture and the fishing industry; and 
he specified that this was by no means an exhaustive list. He 
foreshadowed that in the following year the Government would take 
steps to reform the Constitution (11). On October 2, 1942, he 
affirmed "My own mind has steadily developed in favour of increasing 
Commonwealth powers. I do believe that full nationhood requires 
creat power at the centre, for great responsibility cannot be dis-
charged without it" (12). 
Why then had the anti-Labor forces turned so complete a 
somersault since November, 1942? Labor reasoned that since the 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Sawer op.cit.,pp.l72-73· One must agree with Sawer (and 
Evatt) that the Bill, in fact, established new and additional 
safeguards against abuse of regulation-making. It removed no 
existing safeguards and conferred no new power to make regu-
lations. See Appendix K for a copy of the proposal. 
Hobart Mercury, 1/8/44, p.2. His colleague Hughes, who was 
on the committee, and who, unlike Menzies, attended all the 
sittings gave the lie to these charges. C.P.D. Vol.l77, p.1031. 
(7/3/44). 
See H.V. Evatt. Case For Greater Commonwealth Powers, op.cit; 
pp.l24-28. He had then argued "We must shut our eyes and 
minds completely to all idea of which party is putting them 
forward, or of what such and such a party will do if such and 
such powers are granted". 
Labor Weekly. 11/8/44, p.2 
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Convention there had been the federal elections at which the people 
gave their decisive verdict. The U.A.P. - U.C.P. had never expected 
for one moment to lose control of the Senate and the power this 
gave them to protect the 'rights' of the big financial, industrial, 
and pastoral interests.(l3) There was also the change in the war 
situation. In November, 1942, the threat of Jap. invasion hung 
heavily over Australia. But as the danger had faded, so had faded 
the interest of big business in 'national unity'. As the hope of 
victory rose, so rose the determination of business to get back to 
the old order of unregulated profit-making with its built-in pool 
of unemployed and arbitrary right to hire and fire, all of which 
the new powers threatened (14). Labor charged that the 'somersault' 
could not be justified by one honest argument, and we can agree 
that specious reasons were advanced for the about-face. However, 
the argument tends to overlook the continuity of business hostility 
to the Commonwealth proposals. Recall that a mammoth campaign had 
been launched by business pressure groups in the two non-Labor 
States as early as January 1943~only shortly after the Convention 
and well before the enemy had receded. And in both States, amend-
ment s to the Bill were at least partly inspired by business pressure. 
The Campaign. 
Hoping to emulate its successful 1943 election tactics, Labor 
planned for a 'whirlwind' campaign after Parliament rose on 
13. The Bulletin. 7 July 1943, p.8, regarded the possibility of 
Labor's gaining a majority in the Senate as being •as remote 
as Mt. Erebus' (sic.) 
14. e.g. see Common Cause, 22/7/44, p.4 which offers this explan-
ation. The non-Labor leaders were "but puppets in a Punch 
and Judy show. They gesticulate and dance, as the strings 
are pulled from behind by their masters, Big Business". 
Or as Calwellsid of Menzies: "There is an obvious reason for 
his change of front. The views he expresses are not those of 
the member for Kooyong; rather are they the views of his 
money-masters - the big, powerful, vested interests. Mr. 
Menzies is only a ventriloquist's doll; he is merely the 
'Charlie McCarthy' of Collins House". S.M.H. 3/8/44. p.4 
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21st July, with great reliance being placed on the vote-winning 
appeal of the Prime Minister (15). Chifley and Evatt were joint 
Campaign Directors and Mr. L.C. Haylen, M.H.R. (N.S.W.) became 
Publicity Director. 
During the campaign, as Sawer indicates, "non-Labor opposition 
was carried to extraordinary lengths of misrepresentation"(l6). 
They acted "with utter abandon and irresponsibility to produce a 
score of fearsome looking scarecrows and bogeys ••• 11 (17). Fadden 
made some fantastic allegations. He claimed, for instance, that 
the influence of the Communist Party was the real reason for the 
referendum. The Communists, he alleged, were trying to 'white-ant 
the Constitution and impose a dictatorship in Australia' (18). 
If the referendum were carried, he claimed, freedom •would vanish 
entirely' (19). "(The) proposals mean that in peace-time, you will 
work under Government compulsion; you will eat and wear what the 
bureaucrats ration out to you; you will live in mass-produced 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
The Age, 7/7/44. p.2 
Sawer op.cit. p.l72 
Editorial in the Age, 14/8/44 p.2. The Sydney Dail~ Tele~raph 
agreed that NO propagandists treated the electors 111 e lit le 
children or terrified old women' (16/8/44, p.8) 
Frustrated by these tactics, Curtin in his final campaign 
appea~ accused •sectional interests' of 'having thrown up 
murky smoke-screens; of distortion, lying and vilification•, 
and of being 'devoid of all decency' S.M.H. 17/8/44, p.3. 
S.M.H. replied that this was 'hysterical demagogy, unworthy 
of any Minister of the Crown•. (18/8/44) 
D.T. loc. cit. 
19. S.M.H. 7/8/44. p.4 
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Government dwellings; and your children will work wherever the 
bureaucrats tell them to worku (20). 
The main brunt of the NO advertising campaign in the States 
was borne by various 'front' organisations especially formed for 
. the purpose. In N.s.w. and Victoria the Australian Constitutional 
I :-.. League led the campaign. It claimed to be a "non-party" body and 
was in favour of Constitutional reform but not, of course, the 
'drastic' current proposals. According to Milner, as early as 
February 1944, business pressure· groups such as the Associated 
Chamber of Manufactures, Chamber of Commerce, later joined by large 
pastoral interests were strongly opposing the transfer, and their 
opposition took organised expression in the abruptly-created 
League. The League's almost invariable theme was "Vote NO against 
the Manpower Referendum ••• avoid the Road to Serfdom" (21). 
1. 'G. Haylen estimated the amount spent to defeat the referendum 
at £750,000 (22). 
20. 
21. 
22. 
t 
Ibid. 25/7/44 p.4. "You will have no say regarding the future 
of your children because their whole lives will be controlled 
by professors, economists, and other armchair bureaucrats" 
Ibid, 11/8/44, p.4. But perhaps the 'prize' must go to an 
Australian Constitutional League advertisement on referendum 
morning in Melbourne newspapers: "Germany 1934 ••• Ten years 
ago to-day the German people stood at the crossroads. They 
faced a Referendum for the granting of unlimited powers to the 
central Government. THE PROMISE - security for all. THE 
HARVEST - complete destruction of all personal liberty. TO-D~ 
exactly ten years later, Australia stands at the cross-roads. 
We face a Referendum on almost identically the same issues -
the concentration of power in the central Government and~he 
subjection of the individual to the interests of the State". 
Quoted by Ian Milner in "Referendum Retrospect" Australian 
Quarterly, December 1944, p.43. 
Ibid, p.42. The sponsors of the League remained very much 
anonymous. In N.s.w. its advertisements were authorised by 
John Hedge, Secretary, lOth floor, Australia House, Carrington 
St., Sydney; and in Victoria by Neil McArthur, 59 Collins St., 
Melbourne. But the Labour Movement certainly had no illusions 
on the business inspiration of the Lea~e. e.g. Common Cause 
editorial 1/7/44, p.4: 'Out Come The Aliasesl• 
Mil~er .!?~'!42 n. J ·~L •• Paton, who was ·a,ssociated \ICJ.:~h the NO canrpaf~n, 'stated 'with certain knowlef.&e' that this figure was 
'enormously exaggerated'. "A Further..jleferendu.m Retrospect" 
Australian QuarterlY, Vol.XVII. No.1 March 1945, p.l07 
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There was "a running dispute over the use of government moneys 
to pay for YES propaganda".(23) The Opposition charged that this 
was 'gross misappropriation of public money! In all previous 
referendums, they pointed out, the only propaganda prepared at 
public expense had been the official case for and against. Chifley 
replied that less than £50,000 of Government money would be spent 
and argued that the YES case was being advanced on behalf of 
Parliament (24). "Post-War Reconstruction and other Departments 
flooded the country with leaflets and booklets, officials undertook 
lecturing tours, extravagant space was impressed for advertising 
in the press, and for addresses over the radio" (25). 
Industrial Conscription. 
Probably th4fost damaging bogey exploited by the Opposition 
was the threat of a continuance of man-power controls after the 
war. People would be directed to jobs whether they wished totake 
them or not. 
During the: parliamentary debate on the Bill, Evatt had 
assured that "This Government is resolutely opposed to industrial 
conscription in peace-time" (26). However, he made a grave tactical 
error in n~ as in the 1946 referendum, including in the Bill an 
express prohibition against industrial conscription(27). Ministers 
could not deny the Opposition claim that 'industrial conscription' 
would be authorised by the 'employment and unemployment' power and 
were vulnerable to the charge that they obviously intended retaining 
23. Sawer, p.173. 
24. S.M.H. 22/7144, p.5. The Auditor General's Report, tabled in 
Parliament in June, 1945, challenged the Government's appropri-
ation of £48,300 of post-war educational funds to pay for the 
YES Campaign. D.T.l4/6/45, p.l3 
25. Round Table, Vol XXXV, December 1944, p.82 
26. C.P.D. Vol.l77, p.l352 (15/3/44) 
27. Thia,of course, would have meant amending the Convention-
approved proposals, but Evatt had already done so by inserting 
the three 'safeguards'. 
... 
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industrial conscription in the peace. If not, why hadn't they 
inserted a guarantee against it in the question? (28). 
Forced o~o the defensive, all Labor members in the Federal 
Parliament signed a pledge to the effect that industrial con-
scription would not be continued after the war ~29~. The Opposition 
refused to sign the pledge, viewin~ . ~.~ J~s ( an aqmission that the 
.. ·~ ~ 
employment power authorised industrial conscription. The pledge 
could have no value. It could not bind future Parliaments and~ it 
woUld not change the Constitution f30). 
Curtin outlined the reasons why man-power direction would. not 
be /necessary after the war. Labour of the kind required would be 
obtained in the place required without resort to compulsion. An 
II 
Employment Service would be established which would bring labour 
and employers together. Where special types of labour were 
required, special training schemes would be instituted. Government 
as~istance to meet transport costs, housing, and the provision of 
amenities would also be employed to attract labour to new areas. 
The :,whole history of the Labour Novement was a record of struggle 
f 
to establish as a basic social principle that labour was not a 
chattel to be bought or sold, or directed; that units of labour 
r 
were human beings with lives to live, and the whole purpose of 
production was to increase the worker's welfare. Industrial con-
scr!ption had been necessary during the war only because Aust~alia 
28. A.W. Fadden in S.M.H. 25/7/44, p.4 ; 
29 . S.M.H. 5/8/44, p.4 
30. R. G. Menzies in The ~' 21/7/44 . p.3 
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had to squeeze its resources to the utmost (31). 
The Socialisation Bogey. 
It was claimed by Fadden that 12 of the 14 powers sought were 
'the wrapping concealing their motive and intention•. The two 
powers 'particularly desired' were No.2 (employment and unemployment) 
which authorised industrial conscription, and No.7 (production and 
distribution) which allowed the socialisation of industry (32). 
Menzies stated that power No.7 was the •very crux• of the refer-
endum. It was designed to arm the Commonwealth with authority 
both to nationalise industries and to enter into competition with 
private enterprise (33). 
The Opposition's principal bogey-men in the socialisation 
catch-cry were E. J. Ward and, strangely, A.A. Calwell. Though it 
could be argued that Ward and Callwell were "two fiery expounders 
of almost identical points of view"(34) their standpoints must be 
distinguished. Calwell is an interesting personality in this 
period. From the Left he was denounced by the Communists as a 
'Right-wing disrupter' who had links with Catholic Action and who 
'soft-pedalled' on the 19t~ referendum (35); to his left-wing 
enemies in the Victorian A.L.P. he was •anti-working class•, 
31. 
32. 
33· 
34. 
35. 
Digest Of Decisions, No.86, p.23 (15/8/44) The 'distortion, 
lying, and vilification• referred to by Curtin is epitomised 
by the attributing (by theConstitutional League, J.T. Lang, 
and others) of the :following remark to Evatt: "The right of 
the individua~ to choose his own vocation and employment is 
only one of the freedoms which the Australian people must 
forego in the interests of the State". This was a complete 
distortion of Evatt's precisely antithetical remark at the 
A.I.P.S. Summer School in January 1944 that "To-day with the 
enormous development of industry and industrial organisation, 
corporate control and finance, there is no longer a full right 
in every person to choose his own vocation in life" see D.A.S. 
Campbell (ed.) Post-War Reconstruction In Australia, p.287. 
Evatt stated unequivocally on that occasion that fears of man-
po~Ter direction were • groundless'. And recall the misrepre- '.1 
sentation of the Copland and Coombs addresses at the Summer 
School when support for industrial conscription was falsely 
imputed to them. Milner could properly comment that "Much 
NO propaganda sought to have decisions made ••• in that atmos-
phere of 'big lie' deception and provocation which verges upon 
the intellectual climate of Fascism". op.cit.,p.46 
S.M.H.25/7/44, p.4,Curtin expressed surprise at Fadden's 
allegation. He had said nothing of the sort at the Canberra 
Convention.Digest of Decisions . No.85, p.4o (25/7/44) 
The Age. 18/8/44, p.3 
E. Spratt,Eddie Ward - Firebrand of East Sydney.(Adelaide, 
Rigby Ltd., 1965) p.21$. 
e . g . see Tribune, 20/7/44, p.3 
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'undemocratic', and 'reactionary' (36). He was also continually 
blasted from the other end of the political spectrum by Conserv-
atives and by the Press- mainly onesuspects because of his rigid 
application of Press censorship- as an 'extremist' and his name 
was invariably linked with that of Ward, the other bete-noire·of 
the Press; and during the referendum Ward and Calwell became the 
two 'whipping boys' who allegedly craved the 14 powers in order to 
achieve 'Socialism in Our Time' (37). The truth, I think, is that 
whilst Calwell endlessly denounced the sins of Capitalism in the 
violent terms employed by Ward, unlike the latter one can not find 
Calwell translating this negative anti-Monopoly Capitalism into a 
positive assertion of Socialistic objectives. Indeed, whenever 
I have discovered Calwell mentioning Socialism it was to stress the 
fact that constitutional barriers stood in its way. 
It is true that Ward conducted a referendum campaign of his 
own that greatly embarrassed Curtin and Evatt. However, there was 
little reason to link him with Calwell. The latter can nowhere 
be found in the campaign speaking in favour of the nationalisation 
of industry which Ward repeatedly espoused. Indeed, Calwell 
several times endorsed the moderate views of Curtin and Evatt on 
the future of private industry. Private enterprise, in the post-
war period, would have the greatest opportunity of expansion in 
Australia's history (38). 
36. see Labor Call, 20/4/44, p.l 
37. S.M.H. editorial 26/7/44. p.2 
38. Labor Weekly, 28/7/44, p.3; The Age 29/7/44 , p.3. Though 
Calwell's campaign speeches in no way conflicted with those of 
Curtin and Evatt, the Prime Minister could still be chided for 
allowing "Mr. Ward and Mr. Calwell to go up and down the 
country ranting and clowning, behaving like adolescent dictat-
ors, and telling the public just what the Labor Party intends 
to do now that it controls both Federal Houses".(D.T.l6/8/44, 
p.8.) The source of the 'myth' of Calwell's Socialism was a 
social function in Melbourne in June 1944. Statements attrib-
uted to Ward and Calwell were widely publicised by NO propa-
gandists to 'prove' that a section of Cabinet would press for 
I the early nationalisation of the means of production if Labor 
acquired the 14 powers (viz;S.M.H, 14/7/44 p.2) However, only 
Ward made a direct reference to Socialism. He and Calwell were 
'close personal friends with a great deal in common' and he 
hoped Calwell would live long enough to see attained the objec-
tive of Labor -'Socialism in Our Time' (Queensland Worker, 
3/7/44, p.2) Calwell agreed with Ward that Labor 'would not 
pull i~s p~nches' after it attained a Senate majority on 
1 July 1944, but there is no evidence that he had socialisation 
in mind. 
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As in the 1943 election, Curtin was caused by the pressure 
of eventsto issue a further 'No Socialisation' pledge. 11No quest-
ion of socialisation or any other fundamental alteration in the 
economic system arises" (39). Evatt and Chifley agreed that Curtin 
had exposed the 'socialisation catch-cry' as a 'vote-catching 
falsehood~ 'You can ignore so-called threats to private enterprise. 
The powers will give wider scope to legitimate private enterprise~~o~ 
The Government In Industry. 
On his return from London, Curtin in July 1944 tabled in the 
House the British White Paper 11 Post-War Employment Policy11 which 
he obviously considered good propaganda for the YES case. He 
anno~d that he proposed to have an Australian document prepared 
broadly comparable in scope with the British White Paper. The task 
of its preparation he assigned to Chifley as Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction. This was the White Paper, "Full Employment In 
Australia" whose making 'became quite a formidable operationl(41) 
and which was t~bled ten months later in May, 1945. 
Curtin made a six-point summary of the British Paper to show 
how closely Australian reconstruction policy was attuned to that of 
Britain. The points were (i) Continuance of price control, ration-
ing and control of materials for a period after the war; (ii) Con-
tinuance also of wage policy; (iii) Price control as a central 
feature of the plan with the obvious intention to continue it in 
the long run, though in a modified form; (iv) Continuance of invest-
ment priorities, particularly in the short period after the war. 
In the long run, private investment woul~ be encouraged to fluctuate 
in such a way as to even out the level of employment,and public 
investment would be adjusted to meet any deficiencies in private 
39· 
40. 
41. 
Digest of Decisions¢ Ko.85, p.46 (25/7/44l It would seem that 
both in 1943 and 19 4, Curtin had no alternative but to issue 
these pledges. To Curtin the winning of the war transcended 
all else and he realised that socialisation proposals would 
split the community asunder when maximum unity was the prime 
requisite. His_ 1943 pledge committed him only 'for the durat-
ion', but in 19~ he was committing the Government also for the 
post-war years. 
S.M.H. 15/8/44, p.6 
L.F. Crisp Ben Chifley, p.l93 
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investment; (v) Maintenance of consumer spending power to avert 
downturns in economic activity; (vi) The maintenance of cheap 
money (42). The British Government had also avowed as a primary 
aimits responsibility for maintaining a 'high and stable level of 
employment•. 
Curtin was criticised for not specifying that the document 
contemplated the encouragement of private industry (43). He 
replied that private enterprise would play an important part in 
post-war development in all democratic countries. But to hand over 
the affairs of Australia to uncontrolled private enterprise 
immediately the war ended would lead to social chaos. He was 
impressed by the fact that a document which attached so much 
importanc~o the position of private enterprise, could also advo-
cate an important measure of control. There had to be a partnership 
between government control and private enterprise particularly in 
the immediate post-war years. But unlike the British Government, 
the Australian Government did not have the necessary power to deal 
with those matters which the document considered of paramount 
importance.(44) 
On August 1, 1944, Curtin made "the first official announcement 
of Government post-war plans for industry" (45). He outlined 
plans being prepared by the Government on the advice of the Second-
ary Industries Commission in reply to accusations that the Govern-
ment would use the powers to nationalise industry and to drive 
private enterprise from the field. 
Although there was a place for expansion of public enterprise 
in indu~try, the Government recognised that it must look primarily 
to private enterprise to provide for industrial development and to 
give employment to the industrial population. It looked to private 
enterprise, either with its own resources, or with the assistance 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
Digest of Decisions, No.84, p.l2 
S.M.H., 14/7/44. p.2 
Digest Of Decisions, No.84, pp.l2-13 
D.T. 2/8/44, p.7.For a report of the statement see Digest Of 
Decisions. No.85, and S.M.H. 2/8/44 from which the following 
summary is drawn. 
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of the Governmen~ to establish new industries to produce those 
goods still imported which could be made economically and efficient-
ly in Australia. But "if private enterprise cannot or will not 
undertake these developments, the Government will have to consider 
what it can do''. 
The Commonwealth was prepared to assist private industry after 
the war, but industry must recognise that it could not be completely 
free to carry on its business solely for profit. The Government 
was considering plans to provide financial services for industry, 
including short-term capital to get peace-time production under 
way, long-term capital for new and small industries and protection 
against export-trading risks. It would assist in industrial 
research, in the training of industrial labour, and in ensuring 
, 
industry a market for goods. In return, the Government would expect 
industry to accept corresponding responsibilities. The Government 
could not prevent booms and depressions unless it could prevent 
over-expenditure on development by industry when booms were threat-
ened and could stimulate expenditure by industry when a depression 
loomed. In the disturbed years when there would be danger of an 
extravagant boom, there would need to be some limitation on the 
freedom of businessmen to spend money on development to afford 
priority to necessities like homes, schools and hospitals. If 
industry was to be decentralised, under-developed States developed, 
and country areas given amenities, the Government must influence 
the places in which new industries were established. It must also 
have power to control the price policies of monopolistic firms. 
Outlining plans for the peace-time use of Government munition 
factories which had cost the Australian people £75 million, Curtin 
said these would not be disposed of 'at a song' to private 
speculators. However, the Government would not close the door to 
any businessman willing to pay a reasonable price or rent and offer 
reasonable employment. But again, "if private enterprise either 
will not or cannot do these things, the Government will" (46). 
46. This theme was repeated in the Government's intention to ensure 
the establishment of artificial silk and motor-car industries 
in Australia after the war. If private enterprise did not pro-
vide factories, the Government would establish them itself or 
jointly with private firms. It intended to convert to full 
P.T.O. 
8?a. 
Footnote 46 Continued. 
peace-time production a number of other industries developed 
during the war, including manufacture of binoculars, optical 
glass and instruments, chemicals and plastics. The same 
general principle of permitting private enterprise to operate 
them would apply. ~· 3/8/44, p. 9 
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Factories adapted only for the production of munitions, would 
produce munitions for Australia's part in a world security system, 
and, in some cases, would be maintained in working condition on 
pilot production (sufficient to maint;dn machinery in efficient 
working order). Factories not pro4~~ munitions directly, but 
representing 'the ·nucleus general enci_neering plant on which the 
L~-
whole of the munitions industry in war-time depends' might be 
kept under Government control. Those capable of being used for 
the production of civilian goods in competition with private 
industry were the contentious ones and would be viewed on their 
merits and placed in one of three categories: (a) Those that could 
be best operated by private firms would probably be leased or sold 
if satisfactory terms· were offered; (b) In some cases they might 
be operated by alliances between the Government and private enter-
prise on the model of Amalg~mated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd (47). 
(c) In certain cases they might be operated by the Government, 
but it would be 'stupid' to enter into forms of production already 
adequately catered for mer~ly for the satisfaction of competing; 
except where private firms were unfairly exploiting a monopolistic 
position. Its purpose would be to round out the Australian indus-
trial structure by filling in those gaps known to exist, thereby 
making Austra-l:i,.a progressively more capable of meeting her require-
ments in manufactured goods (48). 
47. The nominal capital of A.W.A. was £1,000,000 in shares of £1 
each; of which the Commonwealth held 500,001. By an agreement 
signed in 1922 when the Commonwealth acquired its interest, 
it was entitled always to hold a majority of the shares issued. 
The agreement also provided that of the board of seven director~ 
three should be nominated by the Commonwealth, three elected by 
the shareholders, and the seventh chosen by these six directors, 
or, in the event of equal voting, by the casting vote of an 
arbitrator. S.M.H. 2/8/44. · 
48. There is a striking similarity between Curtin's plans and 
many of the ideas expressed recently by the current Labor 
Leader of The Opposition Mr. E.G. Whitlam. e.g. see E.G. 
Whitlam Labor And The Constitution (Victorian Fabian Society 
Pamphlet 11, 1965), and The Australian, 2/12/67. p.l 
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Curtin ruled out 'unfair competition' with private industry. 
The Government would expect any Government enterprise to meet 
capital charges on the factory and equipment it took over, at a 
value which was reasonable in~ation to its productive capacity, 
for the purpose for which it was used. The Treasurer would look 
to these enterprises as a source of revenue rather than a drain 
upon the Budget just as the Commonwealth Bank, the Post Office, 
A.W.A., and other Governmental ventures into industry had proved a 
source of revenue. 
Curtin's statement was inspired partly by the furore which 
followed in the wake of statements by the Minister for Munitions, 
N.J.O. Makin in February and July, 1944. Makin had called for a 
YES vote at the referendum on the ground that the Commonwealth's 
authority in peace-time to engage in manufacture except for defence 
purposes was highly doubtful and the Government should be author-
ised to supply civilian goods by entering industry 'on a strictly 
commercial basis' to keep the munition factories running efficiently. 
(49). He believed that a substantial proportion of munitions 
capacity was capable of turnover to peace-time requiremen~ that 
at the end of the war there would be a great demand for manufactured 
goods here and in countries adjacent to Australia; and that the 
demand for such goods·, for some time at least, would be beyond the 
capacity of existing commercial industry to produce. It would be 
grossly inequitable that this public investment should be scrapped 
and the sole benefit arising from Australia's munitions effort 
should be bequeathed to private companies and individuals.(50) 
Opposition, Press and business critics had argued that Makin's 
proposal could not be reconciled with the Government's pledge that 
there would be more scope for private enterprise after the war than 
ever before in our history (51). 
49. 
50. 
51. 
~· 7/2/44. 
Digest Of Decision, No.85 p.l (18/7/44) 
s.M.H. 8/2/44, p.4. Menzies believed that the factories would 
be needed to some extent after the war for munitions. But 
apart from that, they should be passed over to private enter-
prise - which was under an obligation to re-employ 85% of the 
people - to make civilian goods. The Age, 11/7/44, p.3 
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Curtin's assurances were welcomed by the President of the 
Australian Council of Employers' Federations, Mr. 0. D. Oberg, and 
the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Australia, 
Sir Marcus Clark.(52) 
In February 1945 at a Secondary Industries Conference, Govern-
ment representatives met representatives of the Associated Chambers 
of Manufactures for a frank exchange of views on post-war policy. 
The plans outlined above were re-affiroed and the Government 
indicated also that it contemplated no break in the traditional 
Australian policy of protecting industries which were reasonably 
assured of sound opportunities of success, which had due regard to 
present and future defence requirements, which assisted the divers-
ification of the economy, and which contributed to employment, the 
raising of living standards and the development of resources.(53) 
At the same time, in the application of Australia's traditional 
principles of tariff protection to the period ahead, when world 
trade began to flow again, our policy must be consistent with 
international obligations (54). The Government was also anxious 
to encourage Australian secondary industry to become export-minded 
and was prepared to assist in creating an export sense. An Export 
Advisory Committee had been set up. 
The Defence Povrer. 
In the referendum campaign, there was a running dispute over 
the ambit of the post-war defence power. Menzies did not deny 
that some war-time controls would be required temporarily after 
the war. They should not cease abruptly, nor would they. A con-
siderable period might elapse between the end of the fighting 
52. Age, 3/8/44, p.2. These were necessary, Oberg claimed, in view 
of previous statements of actual hostility by 'various ebullien1 
Ministers'. One commentator believed that Curtin's statement 
was "almost revolutionary in its implications when set along-
side the policy of his party". Adelaide Advertiser,5/8/44.p.6 
53. Digest of Decisions, No.95, p.22 
54. Ibid, p.23. It should be noted that there was a potential 
inconsistency here. 
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(or "cessation of hostili ties 11 ), from \ofhich the 14 powers dated, 
and the formal conclusion of the necessary treaties ( 11the termin-
ation of the present war" ) . The National Security Act would not 
expire for six months after the latter date, and this time might 
be longer than that specified in the Bill . A YES vote was not 
necessary for the period of transition (55) . 
Evatt agreed that war powers did not cease with the fighting, 
but claimed there was no legal foundation for Henzies ' argument 
that they would remain unabated to the lapsing of the Act . They 
began to taper off as soon as the fighting ended . One by one 
National Security regulations would cease to be enforceable as 
soon as the defence necessity for them disappeared. Evatt claimed 
it was absurd to talk, as other critics had, of the powers operating 
for 10 or even 15 years from now. Only the "cessation of hostilit-
ies11 was relevant in fixing their five year time limit (56) . 
Boom Or Depression? 
The Opposition claimed Labor ' s depression ' scare' was 'pure . 
humbug'. The depression, more than 10 years after the 1914-18 
war, was world-wide. Yet the Government claimed the remedy lay in 
granting powers to last for only five years after the war . The 
depression was experienced in Britain, France, and New Zealand, 
where the central Government had full powers, as well as in 
federal systems like Canada, and the United States (57) . 
In any event, }1enzies prophesied that there would be not 
depression but a period of boom after the war . There would be 
insufficient manpower to meet the demand for civilian goods that 
had been held up by the war (58) . Without the powers, Evatt 
55. Menzies was most unconvincing here. If the powers were 
already possessed, one wonders what possible objection he 
could have to re-stating them. 
56. S.M. H. , 7/8/44, p.4 
57. Fadden in S.M.H., 25/7/44 . p.4 
58i ~' 5/8/44, p . 3 
• 
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forecast an inflationary boom as the precursor of another 
depression (59). The peace problem would be one of finding not 
labour, but jobs (60). 
In the event, Menzies' argument that t he extra powers were 
not necessary, was vindicated by the sustained post-war boom. 
"Fears of unemployment seemed unjustified, and the problems of 
reconstruction, though not easy, were rather different from what 
had been expected11 (61). Indeed, Labor Ministers were able to 
boast that the years 1945-49 were a "Golden age 11 and that the 
Government's smooth achievement of demobilisation, its maintenance 
of full employment, and its record on prices, were the best of any 
nation in the world (62). However, the war-time pessimism was 
understandable in the light of history and one could appreciate 
the Government's fear of a depression imported from overseas. No 
one could pronounce with certainty on the scope of the defence 
power, and there was little reason to believe, on past experience, 
that 'government by agreement' would prove fruitful. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
~· 25/7/44, p.9. As Minister for Customs, Senator Keane 
put it: " ••• because of the scarcity of goods on the market, 
prices would rise. Inflation, the thief of the workers' 
living standards would follow. During that time big profits 
would be made, but inevitably the markets would become sur-
feited with goods, prices would commence to drop, and a 
depression would be on the way" Age, 28/7/44, p.3. 
The,~, 29/7/44, p.3 (J.H. Scullin); and Adelaide Advertiser, 
16/8 , p.7 (J.A. Beasley). There appear to have been two 
Labor schools of thought on the inevitability of depression. 
The Evatt thesis based on the first War experience was 
"dynamic", envisaging a short inflationary boom that dissolves 
into depression. The other 11 schoollf is epitomised by the 1941 
Australian Railways Union booklet whose approach was "static 11 
envisaging dislocation and an immediate slump on demobilisation. 
A.G. L. Shaw The Economic Development Of Australia (Longmans, 
1958), p.193. Recall the 'gloom and doom' of people like 
Calwell (see PfS~6o) and Fitzpatrick, who argued that if the 
referendum were lost, some time in the 1950's or even 1940's 
there would be half a million unemployed. (Smith's WeeklY, 
25/3/44, p.ll) The September 1945 Gallup Poll showed that 
most Australians as well were pessimistic about the future. 
(see p.JID) 
Norman Makin Federal Labor Leaders (Sydney, Union Printing 
Ltd., 1961) pp.l32-33 
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A £400M. Post-War Plan. 
The Minister for Supply and Shipping, J.A. Beasley, during the 
campaign, outlined Government post-war plans involving over £400 
million. There was a £200 million national works programme in co-
operation with the States covering irrigation, afforestation, 
electricity, aerodrome construction, and soil conservation. There 
was a £160 million plan to settle 50,000 returned soldiers on the 
land; and a scheme for home-building with a target of 50,000 homes 
in the first year. The Commonwealth would offer £30 million to 
the States for the erection of 30,000 home.s, and materials would be 
made available to private enterprise to erect a further 20,000. 
From this point building would be stepped up to 80,000 homes a year 
with half sponsored by government and half by private enterprise. 
Low income earners would be assisted to pay rents. 
Hospital subsidies would be offered to the States provided 
they agreed to free treatment for all patients in public wards. 
A Commonwealth subsidy for tuberculosis treatment would be granted 
as part of the free medical service to which the Government was 
determined to remove all obstacles (63). 
Decentralisation. 
The Government wooed the voters of the smaller States by 
indicating that industries were being examined having regard to 
decentralisation. The Commonwealth was examining, in conjunction 
with State Governments, the peace-time prospects of aluminium 
manufacture in Tasmania, charcoal-steel production in Western 
Austra~ia, food-processing in Queensland, and heavy industry in 
South Australia. These States were in no position to ensure that 
a new industry came to them rather than to a more developed 
ne~hbour. Only the Commonwealth was in a position to achieve 
balanced decentralisation of industry throughout the six States, 
and it could only do so if armed with the necessary power (64). 
63. S.H.H. 10/8/44, p.4. 
64. Digest Of Decisions, No.86, p.l8 (9/8/44). 
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"Hitlerism 11 ? 
There was much criticism of the Commonwealth ' s proposal to 
submit to the people a list of 14 powers for blanket appr oval or 
rejection. According to Mr . Fadden "The people have been denied 
the right to say whether they will grant one power and not another. 
The Government has forced them to say YES or NO to 14 points . 
Such procedure savours of Hitlerism" (65) . 
Labor ' s defence was that the powers interlocked and inter-
twined . If they were divided and only some were accepted, it might 
be that the powers rejected would prove, in the opinion of the 
High Court, the very ones required to give effect to the wishes 
of those who voted for the other powers (66) . 
65. S.M. H, 18/8/44, p . 4 . Sir Isaac Isaacs commented that if this 
objection was substantal, the most glaring of such undemocratic 
behaviour in our history was when the Constitution itself was 
submitted as a whole to the people, S. M. H. , 11/8/44, p . 4 
66. J.H. Scullin in S. M. H. , 2/8/44 , p . 4 . The Commonwealth Government 
pamphlet You And The Referendum, op . cit. gives a number of . 
examples of post- war tasks showing how closely the individual 
powers depended on each other, viz: 
Jobs, Powers needed : 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9,10, and 11 . 
Homes , " 11 6 , 7, 8 , 11 , and 12 
Farming, " " 2,3,5,6,7,8,10, and 11 
Social Security " 1,2,12,13, and 14 
Curtin agreed thatthe powers could not be separated (Age, 
5/8/44, p.3) . However, Crisp considers that Curtin would have 
preferred a shorter Bill . On November 23, 1943, he suggested 
to Cabinet that while banking, employment, and trade and 
commerce powers were "absolutely necessary", the others were 
"useful but not indispensable" (Ben Chifley, p.l95) . This 
would appear to be at variance with Evatt's view that the 14 
pm>Ters were "adequate but not more than adequate" . L. c. 
Haylen, the campaign Publicity Director, told me that Curtin 
viewed the Bill as a "lawyer ' s document " , far too complex for 
the man in the street . (Interview with writer, 20/9/67). 
J.J. Dedman, however,believes that this was a view expressed 
only after the referendum, and he has no recollection of 
Curtin saying that only three powers were"absolutely necessary" 
(letter to writer of 30/10/67) . Crisp argues that Labor made 
a 11bad mistake 11 in submitting a ' dragnet' list of 14 powers ; 
but this is to forget the maj or argument for submitting the 14 
powers - that they could be presented as having the unanimous 
endorsement of all federal and State leaders at the Convention;· 
and Curtin, with Evatt, had strongly urged this course in 
Cabinet. 
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The "Problem" Minister. 
The one discordant element in an otherwise harmonious 
Government campaign was the Minister for Transport and External 
Territories, Mr. E. J. Ward. Ward was a thoroughgoing Socialist 
whose "habitual style of oratory suggested a continuing class 
struggle" (67). He believed "There is only one new order accept-
able to the workers which can and will supplant the present order 
ahd that is the social ownership and control of production, dis-
tribution, and exchange" (68). Unless Socialism was established 
throughout the world at the war's end, he argued, many millions 
would have died in vain because without Socialism a further 
conflict was inevitable. Capitalism had an inherent drive to 
warfare (69). 
Ward had a "dedicated, almost frenetic devotion to basic 
Labor policy" (70), and, during the war, had assumed a "self-
imposed role of 'watchdog' on basic Labor party policy" (71). In 
the 1944 referendum campaign, he made several statements on Labor's 
proposed post-war use of the 14 powers which could not be recon-
ciled with Curtin's pronouncements and which afforded NO campaign-
ers the opportunity to exploit the Government's alleged "many 
voices", 
One of the most mobile and vigorous of the Government's 
campaigners, Ward made an appearance in four States - Victoria, 
South Australia, Western Australia, and N.s.w. He predicted a 
"speeding-up of Labor's political achievements" now that a two-
House majority had been secured. Whilst Evattmight aver that 
' 
there would be only "changes of emphasis, and of method rather than 
67. G •. Sawer, op. cit., p. 219 
68. Quoted from a 1941 speech by P. Hasluck op.cit, p.500 
69. Speech on 10/2/44. C.P,Do Vol. 177, p.l20 
70. E. Spratt op.cit., p.232 
71. Ibid, p.l45 
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revolutionary changes "( 72), \vard was quick to re-assure his 
followers that Labor wanted 11to effect great radical . changes in 
this country after the war ends 11 (73). What was wrong with the 
nationalisation of industry if the people wanted it? They 
had returned a Labor Government knowing its policy, so why shouid 
it be shackled and prevented from giving effect to thatpolicy? (74) 
Ward contended, and Menzies endorsed the view, that the power over 
production (No.7) would authorise the nationalisation of industry. 
"If in the future, the people should want the B.H.P. or the 
Colonial Sugar Refinery nationalised because they feel that these 
and any other monopoly are acting against the public interest, 
they why shouldn't the people, if they exercise this decision 
through the ballot box, nationalise them?" (75) All transport 
should be Commonwealth owned (76) and he favoured the national-
isation of the coal-mines (77). 
Though other Ministers avoided the question, Ward time and 
again reiterated that at the earliest opportunity he would press 
for the implementation of party policy to abolish the Commonwealth 
Bank Board - to take control of finance out of the hands of private 
bankers and restore the basis of the Bank as a government-con-
trolled people's bank which could finance various post-war schemes. 
72. S.M.H. 8/8/44, p.2 
73. Ibid, 
74. S.M.H. 29/7/44. Ward caused Curtin obvious embarrassment by 
posing this question a number of times during the campaign. 
The Opposition, of course, deprecated Ward's 'spoils to the ~ 
victors' approach and referred him to Curtin's 1943 election 
pledge. The Government, they protested, had no mandate for 
nationalisation. The 'mandate' is, of course, a difficult 
concept, but the same Opposition had argued at the 1943 elect-
ion that Curtin's assurances were worthless and that he would 
have to obey his other pledge to the Socialisation of Industry. 
He could not bind his party. A vote for Labor they then 
warned, would give it a mandate to socialise industry, product-
ion, distribution, and exchange. 
75. West Australian, 15/8/44. p.6 
76. S.M.H., 1/8/44. p.4 
77. West Australian, 12/8/44. p.6 
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He hoped, in time, to see the elimination of private banking.(78) 
In contradistinction to the Prime Minister's August, 1, 1944 
official pronouncement, Ward foresaw large-scale Government com-
petition with private enterprise after the war. "We may decide to 
go in for the manufacture of refrigerators, and no end of articles 
that the people urgently require" (79). Again, whilst Curtin 
hoped to 'influence' the sites of new industries, Ward would 
'direct' businessmen where to establish these works !80). And he 
added further teeth to Curtin's proposals in advocating action by 
the Commonvrealth to direct 1 Big Business 1 also as to the type of 
goods to be manufactured. Industry should not be allowed to use 
up resources on the manufacture of things dictated by profits 
whilst goods more urgently needed were neglected (81). 
Curtin and Evatt, in the campaign, called for a YES vote to 
authorise preference in employment to returned Servicemen in 
industry generally. As matters stood, the authority of the Common-
wealth in respect of preference was limited to its own employees 
and past Governments had accorded no greater measure of preference 
than this. This was because the peace-time po\orers of the Common-
wealth over industry were restricted to the setting-up of Courts 
of Conciliation and Arbitration. Curtin and Evatt were bound to a 
policy of universal preference by pledges given at the 1943 
election, but Ward now bitterly assailed the proposal. He was 
opposed to any form of prefe};'ence. He favoured a policy of full 
Ke-es1ct b/.~J...-.,t.,. t protjr~W"t,.,es 
employment and Servicemen's right~. Preference was peculiar to 
78. Courier Mail (Brisbane), 12/8/44. p.4 
79. West Australian, 10/8/44. p.6 
80. Courier Mail, 12/8/44. p.4 
81. West Australian. 12/8/44. p.6 
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Australia and it was 'defeatist' . To be of any value it must 
presuppose the existence of unemployment and competition for jobs. 
Labor's policy of full employment would obviate the need for 
preference (82). 
After the referendum, Curtin won the day in Caucus) and in 
March 1945, the Re-establishment and Employment Bill granted a 
qualified form of preference limited to seven years after hostilities 
ceased . The Government had steered a middle course between the 
extremes of absolute preference for an indefinite period as ad-
vocated by the Opposition, and non-preference as favoured by the 
unions . The provision for preference in all employment was of 
doubtful Constitutionality and the Government threw the onus on 
employers to provide preference. 
The same Bill provided for a Commonwealth Employment Service, 
vocational trainin~and various allowances and other forms of 
""' financial assistance for Servicemen re-establis~ themselves 
in civil life. The Minister described it as "the Servicemen' s 
Charter" ( 83). 
Many Voices ? 
The Opposition and Press critics were at great pains to 
picture· the entire Cabinet as a theatre of disputation on the post-
war use of the powers. They claimed to have found contradictory 
statements on most of the major issues, but it is clear that with-
out the ' assistance ' of Ward's embarrassing statements, they 
would have been virtually barren of evidence to bolster the charges. 
Fadden alleged "The Federal Government is speaking with so many 
82. e.g. see S.M.H. 29/7/44, p . 4~ Ward was voicing the attitude of 
the unions. They were hostile to 'preference' since workers in 
key industries had been prevented from enlisting though many 
of them desired to do so, and such persons should not be placed 
under any disadvantage after the war. Preference for soldiers 
would, of course, also conflict with the traditional policy of 
preference for unionists. Vide Round Table, Vol XXXV, June 
1945, p.269. 
83. See J.S.G. Wilson "Rehabilitation And Full Employment Problems 
And Policies 11 Australian Quarterly, Vol. XVII No.2 June, 1945, 
for a comprehensive account of the Bill ' s various provisions. 
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voices and in such contradictory terms that it cannot be trusted 
with the increased powers it is seeking" (84). However, there 
were only two cases adduced as evidence, other than those in-
volving Ward contradicting his colleagues. As mentioned earlier, 
even Calwell seems to have faithfully echoed the Curtin-Evatt 
'line 1 • 
It was alleged that Makin's vision of the Government as a 
large-scale post-war competitor with private industry was at 
variance with Curtin's assurances on the future of Government 
war factories. Bu~in fact, Curtin had made the authoritative 
statement of Government policy precisely to clarify the matter 
in view of the controversy sparked by Makin's remarks. There 
had been no fixed policy on the matter until Curtin 1 cleared the 
air'. 
The other instance is also of doubtful validity. The S.M.H. 
claimed that Evatt was in breach of Curtin's 'No Socialisation' 
pledges 'in 1 lamenting' the fact that "we cannot nationalise the 
coal mines unless we have power over production. I think we should 
have that power" (85). In fact, Evatt had been put 'on the spot' 
when addressing a campaign meeting of West Australian miners who 
favoured nationalisation of the mines and asked the Government's 
attitude. Far from 'lamenting' the fact, one could argue that 
Evatt's reply, an ingenious one, was non-committal on the question 
of nationalisation. He could acknowledge the fact that the power 
over production would authorise nationalisation, but himself desire 
it for entirely other reasons. Indeed, his previous disavowal of 
socialisation measures accorded closely with Curtin's stan~ and it 
. is scarcely credible that they differed on this point. During the 
campaign, Evatt, with Chifley, agreed that Curtin had exposed the 
'socialisation catch-cry ' as a 'vote-catching falsehood'. And, 
certainly in none of his justifications of the production power 
~ 
in the pas~ had he so much as mentioned the prospect of national-
isation. 
84. S.M.H. 8/8/44, p.4; and see the ' Herald 's' editorial of the 
same date~ "The Government's Many Voices", which echoed Fadden's 
sentiments. At this stage S.M.H. was searching around for 
a pretext to abandon its support for the Commomveal th' s pr-oposa.Ls. 
85. Ibid. 
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The Big Fella ! 
J. T. Lang conducted an energetic campaign against the 
referendum and this was considered an important factor in the 
comparatively high NO vote in many essentially Labor divisions 
in New South Wales. Although he later denied it, the Hansard 
record shows that Lang supported the transfer of powers when the 
Canberra Convention Bill was before the N.S.W. Parliament. He 
was thus yet another who 'somersaulted' on the issue. 
In June 1944, the Lang Labor party officially came out in 
opposition to the referendum on the ground that the powers would 
make possible the continuance of industrial conscription; they 
would perpetuate into the peace the 'bureaucratic dictatorship 
of Professors'; and t hey had been seized on by the Communists as 
a means of achieving their objective through capture of the A.L.P. 
and the A.C.T.U. There would be no post-war depression. The 
Commonwealth could meet all emergencies by banking and currency 
control. Finally, the proposals, Lang complained, were not in 
conformity with Labor's platform providing for unification (86). 
This l ast objection reads rather oddly beside Lang's later intim-
ation that "Although the Labor Platform provided for Unification, 
I was always a Federalist. I believed that the sovereign States 
had very real functions. The Commonwealth was always trying to 
filch them" ( 87) • 
Lang exploited the 'regimentation' bogey with all the arts 
of a seasoned demagogue: "They propose to introduce to Australia 
the highly centralised form of Government that has been set up in 
Germany and Russia ••• It is a plan to place Australia under that 
system of Government known as totalitarianism. It is sometimes 
described as Fascism, and sometimes called Communism"(88). 
86. Century, 30/6/44. p.l 
87. J.T. Lang. The Great Bust (Angus And Robertson, Sydney, 1962) 
P.57. 
88. Century, 30/6/44. 
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Like Fadden's, some of Lang's allegations were incredible. 
He prophesied "Whatever you want to do, whatever you want to have, 
for everything there will be a licence, a permit or a coupon ••• 
Where the whole community is under compulsion, it can only_be 
policed by thousands and thousands of men and women spying and 
informing on their fellow workers, their neighbours, and,as in 
Germany, on their own families". Every man, Lang predicted, 
would be a spy or afraid of spies (89). Every YES vote, he alleged, 
was a vote for the Communist Party. They were out to capture 
control of the A.L.P. and the A.C.T.U. Manybf the leading bureau-
crats in charge of post-war planning were 'notoriously Communist 
in their outlook'. "Through Communist union autocrats and 
Canberra bureaucrats, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party believes that it can seize control of the Commonwealth" (90). 
Some of the most damaging of the Australian Constitutional 
League's advertisements were reproduced in "Century" and, as the 
Referendum approached, its pages were packed with NO propaganda 
from traditionally anti-Labor sources (91). 
Catholic Action ? 
During the campaign, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Melbourne, Dr. Mannix, publicly announced his intention to cast a 
YES vote in direct response to allegations contained in Press 
articles by Brian Fitzpatrick(92). The latter had averred that 
Catholic Actionist influences were at work to divide the refer-
endum loyalties of some Labor men in Cabinet, Caucus and State 
Executives. He noted that approximately half of Cabinet were 
CatholiCs7 aS were a majority of members on most A.L.P. Executives, 
and alleged that the Hierarchy was strongly opposing the refer-
endum. 
However, Fitzpatrick's claims were not substantiated)and in 
July 1944 he was expelled from membership of the Labor Party by the 
Victorian A.L.P. Executive which denounced his 'filthy sectarianism' 
89. lQ!g, 4;8/44, p.6 
90. Ibid, 18/8/~. p.l 
91. Some advertisements were authorised by a C.R.Hall of 12 
O'Connell St. Sydney. Lang naturally declined to tell his 
readers that Mr. Hall was, inr~t, Secretary of the Chamber of 
Manufactures. 
92. Smith's Weekly. 25/3/44, p.ll, and 1/4/44, p.ll 
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and charged him with prejudicing the YES campaign (93). 
J.J. Dedman and L.C. Haylen agree that there was no foundat-
ion for Fitzpatrick's allegations on divisive influences in the 
Parliamentary Labor Party. Catholicmembers of the Government were 
every bit as enthusiastic as non-Catholics (94). However, Dr. 
Mannix did feel constrained to publicly deny that the Catholic 
Bishops had sought to use their influence to secure a NO vote. 
He stated that whilst he had not originally intended to express an 
opinion publicly, circumstances now left him ho choice. 
In view of the aftermath of the First War, he would vote YES 
"just in order, as I think, to save Australia from a recurrence 
of that worst form of the Servile State in which I saw hundreds 
of thousands of Australians, able and willing to work, yet 
unemployed, impoverished, humiliated and degraded". He "could not 
help noticing that most of the politicians who were fanatically 
in favour of military conscription during the last war and since 
were now horror stricken at the thought of the bare· possibility 
of industrial conscription11 ( 9 5). 
93. 
94o 
95. 
The only 'evidence' adduced by Fitzpatrick was the claim that 
Catholic newspapers like the (Sydney) Catholic Weekly, (Mel-
bourne) Catholic Worker, The Advocate, and Freedom had con-
tained much material critical of the referendum, and Catholic 
radio publicists had conducted a long campaign against the 
proposals.(Smith's WeeklY, 5/8/44, p.ll) Whilst Fitzpatrick's 
broader allegations must be dismissed for want of substantiat-
ion, in fairness to him it should be pointed out that B.A. 
Santamaria has recently disclosed the close organisational 
links between the ' Movement ' which began in August 1942, and 
key figures on the Victorian A.L.P. Executive at this period, 
such as H.M. Cremean P.J. Clarey, J.V. Stout and D.Lovegrove 
("The Movement :l941-6o, An Outline" in H.Mayer (ed.) Catholics 
And The Free Society, Melbourne, F.W. Cheshire, 1961). 
Dedman - letter to writer dated 30/10/67, and Baylen - inter-
view with writer, 20/9/67. Dedman in fact has indicated, 
though he attaches no significance to it, that in the December 
1943 Cabinet vote, four of the six supporting even wider 
po111ers were Catholics. 
The Age, 22/7/44, p.2 
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It could be argued that the Hierarchy's support for the 
CommonvTealth proposals was implicit in a comprehensive statement 
on post-war reconstruction which theBishops had produced in early 
1943 at the request of the Commonwealth Government (96). One 
could say that there were "close parallels between the 'Pattern 
for Peace' and the powers sought by Referendum in 1944 ••• " (97) 
True, the document placed great stress on rural reconstruction, 
the regulation of monopolies, bank controls, a housing programme, 
and planned immigration, but one should not ignore the strong 
anti-Socialism and distrust of Statism that it manifested. 
"It's Not My Referendum". 
August 1944 had been chosen as the date for the referendum 
to secure full benefit from the return from abroad of the Prime 
Minister, whose personal prestige was considered the Government's 
greatest asset. Hmiever, his return proved unspectacular and 
Curtin played an unprecedentedly limited part in the campaign. 
He made a restricted tour of ttvo States only, Victoria and South 
Australia, addressing only two public meetings. Curtin had 
earlier decided against visiting West Australia and had cancelled 
his proposed visit to Tasmania. Finally, he took ill late in the 
campaign, cancelling important meetings in N.s.w. and Queensland. 
In all, he had delivered only five campaign speeches, and he 
regretted that "work, strain, and illness" had prevented him 
visiting all States (98). 
Even prior to his reported illness, Curtin's limited cam-
paigning had aroused widespread comment (99). However, in his 
defence it was pointed out that first coal, and then manpower had 
required his undivided attention (100). In any event, his illness 
proved a serious set-back to the YES campaign, frustrating the idea 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
Pattern For Peace - Statement on Reconstruction. Presented to 
the Federal Government on Behalf of the Catholic Community -
National Secretariat of Catholic Action, Melbourne.n.d.(l,43) 
~. Suttor in H. Mayer (ed.) op.cit; p.43 
Digest Of Decisions, No. 86, p.26 (16/8/44) 
In some Press quarters his attitude was considered the 
"strangest feature of events" e.g. Sunday Telegraph 13/8/44, 
p.lO; Adelaide Advertiser, 12/8/44, p.4 
100. Sunday Telegraph, loc. cit. 
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that the last week could be made an opportunity for Curtin to 
throw his personal prestige behind a YES vote. 
From some quarters, Curtin came under fire for alleged 
'half-heartedness' and 'lack of enthusiasm' for the campaign. 
However, the arguments are anything but compelling. For example, 
both Don Whitington (101), and J.T. Lang (102~ alleged that 
Curtin had 'completely dumped' Evatt and the latter had conducted 
virtually a 'one man band' campaign. Curtin, they said, 'had no 
stomach for the fight'. Once he saw the referendum's prospects 
were gloomy~he had withdrawn into obscurity leaving Evatt 'holding 
the baby'. His speeches were 'dreary' and 'dispirited'. Yet 
Curtin's final speech, described by the Sydney Morning Herald as 
'hysterical demagogy~ bore all the marks of passionate concern 
for the referendum's fate, and others agreed that his speeches 
were 'fervently pro-YES' (103) 
Whitington rapped Curtin for not visiting four States and 
emphasised that YES had polled strongly in the two States where he 
campaigned. But Whitington failed to explain how a 'dispirited' 
~ 
and 'dreary' campaigner could possibly ha.ve swayed doubtful votes. 
A 
It is hard also to reconcile the view that Curtin opted out of the 
campaign to escape the consequences of defeat when, in almost the 
same breath, it _is asserted (by Whitington, Lang and others) that 
his prestige would suffer tremendously as a result of his very 
withdrawal, and that Evatt's would be greatly enhanced. 
101. Sunday Telegraph. 20/8/44. p.2 
102. Century. 28/7/44, 11/8~44, 18/8/44, and 25/8/44. Typical of 
the campaign of misrepresentation by the NO side,was the 
distortion by Lang, the Australian Constitutional Leagu~ and 
other~ of Curtin 1 s statement that; "The referendum is no longer 
my referendum. It is the referendum of the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment, and of the State Premiers and Leaders of the Opposition" 
(Digest Of Decisions, No.83, p.46, 5/7/44). Curtin was, of 
course, reminding that these proposals had been sponsored by 
the Canberra Convention. But in the Lang version, he had 
quipped "It's not my referendum", and the implication was that 
the Prime Minister was not personally concerned for its fate. 
103. Sunday Telegraph, 13/8/44. p.lO 
;.: 
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J.J. Dedman emphatically denies that Curtin lacked enthusiasm 
for the referendum. He had borne a grievously heavy burden and 
was not at his best, mentally and physically. Reports that Curtin's 
speeches were 'dispirited' should be discounted, he says, since 
detracting from the Prime Minister's performance was obviously a 
good technique for defeating the referendum. 
My conclusion is that Curtin had a burning belief in post-war 
reconstruction and that his limited campaign was necessitated, in 
his ovm words, by "work, strain, and illness". War administration 
in particular was apparently very 'heavy going' at this stage. 
Certainly Curtin's detractors were very wide of the mark in pre-
dicting that his 'lack of vigour' would spark recriminations when 
Cabinet and Caucus re-assembled. 
Besides Curtin, there were allegations that "Some Federal 
Ministers are not displaying in this campaign anything like the 
activity and enthusiasm that they have shown in Federal election 
campaigns" (104). Don Whitington submitted that "most senior 
Ministers have shown they do not l~ke a fight" (105). Like 
Curtin, they had shown little interest in the campaign when it 
became clear that the referendum was doomed. It was admitted by 
all the critics, however, that Evatt, Dedman, and Ward had campaign-
ed vigorously but, with the exception of Evatt and Dedman, every 
member of the War Cabinet was singled out by Whitington and Lang 
for alleged inactivity. 
Dedman has informed me that he was "too busy campaigning" to 
notice what other Ministers were doing, but "it certainly never 
entered my head that some were half-hearted" (10~). He denies that 
senior Ministers like Makin, Drakeford, Chifley or Forde, did not 
do their best,and points out that Beasley was then on the verge 
of the illness that later caused his retirement. 
One has only to take the case of Chifley to demonstrate that 
such allegations lacked any foundation. A more credible view is 
that Chifley "had nearly wrecked his health seeking a YES vote"(l07). 
) 
1otj:. West Austral~an 1(/8~4. p.6,I~Milne~ o~.ci~ p.44, and Brian' F'1tzgatricksm:i.th s ~kl~ 219/Y.Y._,p.ll ag ee ~nat some MinipteiS did ot appear to nave ent=usi~sm Ibr t e issue at all-though in 
none of these cases were the M1nisters specified. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
loc.cit. 
Letter to writer op.cit. 
L.Fo Crisp, Ben Chifley, p.l97n. 
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In the Cabinet room in December 1943, he had taken a very strong 
stand for extended Commonwealth powers, and the referendum defeat 
meant for Chifley that many of his plans as Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction had to fall back on "government by agreement" 
among Commonwealth and State Governments, with all the delays, 
frictions, compromise, and half-measures inherent in that system(l08) 
After the referendum Chifley made clear his attitude to Parliament 
by warning that many people who voted NO might "have reasons to 
rue that action bitterly. This country is in grave economic 
danger"(l09). It is thus inconceivable that Chifley did not try 
his utmost to secure a YES vote. 
The Campaign In The States. 
L.F. Crisp has explained that "State politicians and State 
party officials have vital and deeply-rooted vested interests in 
the status quo, if only in their own jobs and career prospects 
and the influence and patronage which they wield ex officiis. 
Labor ••• has had an almost continuous history of recalcitrant 
State leaders ••• who have openly opposed, quietly sabotaged, or 
ostentatiously abstained from supportingJeconomic powers referenda 11 
(110). In the 1944 referendum, he believes, Labor's State Branches 
were again "far from solid in support 11 (lll). And one can sense much 
'silent opposition' or •veiled hostility' at the State A.L.P. 
level during the campaign. This is understandable in view of the 
lukewarm attitude of the States to Constitutional reform which we 
have encountered over the period covered by the thesis. However, 
the claim is rather difficult to substantiat~ particularly as all 
State A.L.P. Executives and every State Parliamentary leader at 
least went through the motions of campaigning for a YES vote. The 
Labor Premiers would have found it hard to do otherwise. They 
were constrained by their pledges at the Convention and the fact 
that they had argued the merits of the proposal when the Bill was 
before their State Parliaments. These very factors did not, of 
course, deter the anti-Labor Premiers from deserting the proposals. 
108. Ibid, p.l97 
109. IOTa. 
110. AUStralian National Government, op.cit. p.52 
111. Ibid, p.l51 
107. 
However the stand of the 1942, and particularly the 1943, Federal 
Conference would also be a factor in the attitude of the Labor 
Premiers, and State Conferences had overwhelmingly endorsed the 
measure. However, it was claimed that "More (State) Labor 
politicians are, in fact, praising the referendum with far from 
faint damns than are giving it real, as against lip-serving 
support" (112). • 
It was widely believed that the Queensland Government was 
'bitterly opposed' to the transfer of powers (113). State Ministers 
had "not hesitated to make statements which criticise the Federal 
Government and give NO supporters useful talking points" (114). 
Despite a perfunctory YES campaign by the State Branch, its •real 
position' was believed to be represented by a sensational attack on 
the Commonwealth Government during the campaign by Mr. C.G. Fallon 
who was the official Campaign Director for YES in Queensland (115). 
Fallon bitterly assailed the Federal Government for its "bureau-
cratic control" and the actions of "Peeping Toms" in tapping 
correspondence and telephone conversations. If the referendum were 
lost, he averred, these things would be among the main causes (116). 
His attack had 'the completely vocal approval' of Deputy Premier, 
Hanlon (who, we recall, had been bitterly opposed to the Commonwealth 
112. S.M.H. 14/8/44. p.2. Whilst I have heavily discounted Press 
suggestions of 'apathy' andehalf-heartedness• at the Federal 
A.L.P. level, I attach much more credibility to similar 
allegations of 'inarticulate opposition' at the State level. 
A reading of the foregoing chapters will make the reasons plain. 
elg. 
113. QLl. 17/8/44. p.9. Tribune, 3/8/44, p.7 
114. Adelaide Advertiser, 16/8/44, p.5 
115. Fallon had resigned the Federal Presidency of the A.L.P. in 
June~allegedly because striking Civil Constructional Corps 
cooks in Queensland had been gaoled. He had been a bitter 
antagonist of Curtin over the latter's 1943 conscription 
proposal. He was Secretary of the Queensland Branch of the 
Australian Workers' Union~and it was suggested that the Govern-
ment had for many years been 'notoriously' susceptible to the 
influence of the A.W.U., the members of which realised that 
this influence would be of less practical value if the workaday 
1 powers of the Queensland Parliament were transferred to Canberra1 
On the other hand, all State Branches of the union had endorsed 
the referendum and papers like the "Australian Worker" and 
Queensland "Worker" gave abundant space to YES campaign material. 
116. S.M.H. 24/7/44, p.4 
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in the past, on State Rights grounds); and, it was believed, the 
'silent approval' of Premier Cooper (117). 
The Federal Opposition Leader, R.G. Menzies, welcomed the 
outburst, saying it was a little puzzling coming from the Director 
of the YES campaign, though it made good sense (118). 
In Queensland, all ten divisions voted solidly for NO. Electors 
apparently swallowed the main NO propaganda point that Canberra was 
already uninterested in Queenslan~· and granting of the powers would 
deprive the State of what it needed to foster its own development. 
Again, the State Industrial Court had 11a well-established reputat-
ion of being much more generous to the workers of Queensland than the 
Federal Arbitration Court has ever been, and it is no secret that 
thousands of unionists in Queensland do not desire to exchange the 
State tribunal for a Federal one 11 (119). The A.W.U. had indeed 
resolved at an earlier stage of the Commonwealth's proposals that 
the Federal Government should not attempt to replace State awards 
without conferring with the union representatives (120). The 
desire to have the best of both systems was also found in Western 
Australia, where the Labor Government had sponsored an amendment 
to the Convention Bill to permit any trade union to choose between 
Commonwealth or State determination. 
In New South Wales the A.L.P. Executive was a staunch Common-
wealth supporter~but Parliamentarians were reported as 'frankly 
apathetic 1 (121). Although Caucus had pledgedits unanimous support 
in securing a YES vote, the decision had been preceded by friction 
with the Central Executive which had 'directed' apparently reluctant 
M.P.'s to march in a YES procession (122). The politicians' apathy 
117. Ibid, 14/8/44. p.2 
118. S.M.H. 24/7/44. p.4 
119. Advertiser, 12/8/44. p.4 
120. Cardenzana op.cit. p.l4 
121. SundaY Telegraph, 13/8/44. p.lO. S.M.H. 27/7/44. p.4 
122. D.T. 3/8/44. P•7 
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appears to have stemmed partly from the fact that the campaign 
in N.s.w. was in the hands of a committee convened by the Labor 
Council and consisting of an equal number of representatives of the 
State A.L.P., the Labor Council, and the Communist Party. (123). 
Premier McKell was believed to have been 'leg-roped' into the 
campaign (124). And McKell lent credence to such claims by launch-
ing a withering attack on bureaucracy and incursions on personal 
liberties on the very day of Fallon's similar outburst (125). 
Indeed there was even a rumour circulating that Clive Evatt was the 
only N.S.W. Minister on whose personal YES vote the Commonwealth 
could depend (126). 
It was in N.s.w. that the Government's referendum hopes were 
most cruelly disappointed. Opposition by Lang Labor, as indicated 
earlier, made big inroads into the Government's support in 
essentially Labor divisions. At the previous State election, the 
party polled 113,272 primary votes in the 22 seats it contested. 
Lang conducted a solid campaign in 'Century• articles, at meetings, 
and in broadcasts, and on polling day his followers were in atten-
dance outside polling booths distributing how-to-vote cards. Of 
the 18 divisions voting NO, ll were represented by Federal Labor 
members. Even in Evatt's electorate which less than a year previous-
ly had given him an unprecedented majority, there was a small 
majority for NO; and Chifley's seat voted solidly for NO. 
In Tasmania, where it was also rumoured that the Labor Govern-
ment was lukewarm to the proposals (127), all divisions voted 
resoundingly for NO. Exploitation of the small State fear of 
neglect under centralised control from Canberra appears, as in 
Queensland, to have been the main consideration. 
123. Common Cause, l/7/44. p.3 
124. S.M.H., 14/8/44. p.2 
125. Ibid. 31/7/44. 
126. S.M.H. 14/8/44. p.2 
127. Sunday Telegraph, 13/8/44. p.lO 
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Of the losing States, YES polled most strongly in Victoria. 
In that State only the A.L.P. was formally united~and there were 
incongruous political bedmates on the YES side. A very represent-
ative committee including members of all parties, trade unions, the 
Young Nationalists• Association and the Australian Natives' Assoc-
iation, conducted the campaign. It was supported by the U.A.P. 
President of the State Legislative Council, a number of radical 
State Country Party members, the Federal Independents, Coles and 
Wilson, Sir Isaac Isaacs, J. V. Barry K.c., and the State Labor 
leader, J. Cain. 
Ian Milner believes that the influential committee contributed 
considerably towards securing a firm YES majority in the metro-
politan electorates. The fact that the committee did not open its 
public campaign until as late as 1st August, lent some weight to a 
post-referendum view of Dr. Evatt that, given another fortnight's 
campaigning, the result might have been different, in Victoria at 
least (128). In both this State and South Australia, which voted 
for the proposals, very representative non-party committees con-
ducted the campaign and there were no Press suggestions, as in all 
the other States, that Labor campaigners were apathetic or opposed 
to the transfer; and in these two States Labor seems to have achieved 
a high degree of unity on the issue. The Labor leaders, R.Richards 
(S.A.) and J. Cain (Victoria), both campaigned actively for the 
proposals. 
J.L. Paton~ieves that the YES cause received considerable 
support because its advocacy of decentralisation was believed by the 
smaller States of West Australia and South Australia (129). And it 
is true that some Ministers, particularly E.J. Ward, made a central 
point of their campaign in these two States, the pledge that the 
States would get their share of post-war industries if the Common-
wealth obtained the power over production. However this argument 
fails to explain how the same appeal did not strike responsive 
chords in ~ueensland and Tasmania. In both South Australia and 
West Australia the 'Centralisation' bogey was exploited to the 
limit as in the other small States. The YES vote in Curtin's 
home state of West Australia is the most perplexing, as Premier 
128. Milner op.cit. pp.44-45 
129. op.cit. pp.l08-109 
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Willcock was a very lukewarm Commonwealth supporter, though the 
State Executive strongly supported the referendum. 
The Press. 
According to Crisp, the referendum went down before an 
"Australia-wide press barrage" (136). In the smaller States, 
indeed, the proposals met fierce and unanimous resistance, but the 
referendum obtained some support in the more populous States. 
Following the lead of the anti-Labor politicians, many sections 
of the Press did a complete about-face after earlier lauding the 
achievements of the Constitutional Convention. These included the 
Sydney Morning Herald, the Bulletin, the Courier Mail, the Brisbane 
Telegraph, and some others. j 
·The Sydney Morning Herald,which had been strongly behind the 
Commonwealth from the outset, switched allegiance only on the very 
eve of the referendum, though signs of a change of mind had been 
in evidence for weeks. It freely acknowledged the strong theoretical 
case for Constitutional reform, but complained of "the increasing 
disregard shown by Ministers and their officials alike for the 
basic liberties of the people". There was "growing evidence" of 
"grave abuses which have flowed from the exercise of special war-
time powers", and the new powers, if granted, might be used "to 
set the peace-time life of the community in the mould of a regimented 
State operated by bureaucratic planning" (131). Yet the 'Herald' a 
short time previously, had deprecated thk very approach in arguing: 
11But surely the Common'IJTeal th is not forever to be denied powers 
possessed as a matter of course by other Parliaments, simply 
oPfotiENTS 
because a party temporarily in office may make what its opoponts 
deem to be an undesirable use of them?" (132). In November, 1942 
it had likewise asserted that "to deny to Parliament powers which 
are abstractly reasonable, simply out of fear they may be abused, 
is to put our democracy in leading strings" (133). 
130. Ben· Chifley, p.l96 
131. Editorial, 12/8/44, p.l 
~ 
132. Editorial, 1/3/44. p.6 
133· Editorial, 27/11/42. p.4 
112. 
The(Sydney) 11Daily Telegraph" supported the referendum. It 
thought the issue simple. "If you want efficient planning for the 
post-war period, vote YES. If you want muddled control by six 
parish-pump StateGoverrunents, vote NO" (134). The NO side had 
fallen back on an appeal to fear, "because, on the plane oy Teasoned 
argument and facts, they have a poor case". At the same time, it 
reproved Curtin for failing to discipline the'adolescent dictators•, 
Ward and Calwell (135). 
In Victoria, the Melbourne Herald and the Age supported the 
referend~whilst the Argus and the Sun News-Pictorial were opposed. 
The Age argued persuasively that Australia alone among the Countries 
of the British Commonwealth did not possess the powers and, "A YES 
verdict would only sanction a tentative, temporary trial of the 
powers deemed to be the minimum needed, with opportunitie~f with-
drawing approval if the people consider their use or working unsatis-
factory"(l36). It considered that "the real distinction is between 
those who take the national as distinct from the parochial view of 
Australia's problems, tasks, and difficulties. It is not an issue 
between Socialists and individualists ••• " (137). 
The Argus believed that the Constitution should not be amended 
pending a 'proper' Constitutional Convention "representative of the 
best legal, intellectual, and ethical wisdom tqat Australia holds, 
chosen from every section of our Australian life, and particularly 
irrespective of party label" (138). 
In the smaller States, almost without exception, the Press 
adopted the 'parochial view• that the Melbourne Age had warned 
against. The Brisbane Courier Mail (139), the Adelaide Advertiser 
(140), the Perth West Australian (141), and the Hobart Mercury (142), 
134. Editorial 1918/44. p.7 
135. Editorial 16/8/44. p.8 
136. Editorial 17/7/44, p.2 
137. Editorial 25/7/44, p.2 
138. Editorial 19/8/44. p.2 
139 . Editorial 17/8/44, p.2 
140. Editorial 18/8/44, p.4 
141. Editorial 18/8/44. p.6 
142. Editorial 18/8/44, p.3 
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all took as their main theme the supposed threat to the progress 
and development Qf their own State posed by centralising power in a 
permanently unsympathetic Commonwealth. However, despite their 
narrow provincialism, none of them ruled out Constitutional amend-
ment in the abstract. But they felt the current proposal went too 
far, and a common attitude was to favour a 'proper', elected Con-
stitutional Convention to revise the Constitution as a whole 
calmly., away from the atmosphere of party strife. 
Results. 
A majority of electors in four States, and a majority of all 
electors voting (143), rejected the proposal. Majorities were 
recorded for YES only in Western Australia and South Australia 
viz: (144) 
YES NO INFORMAL Queensland (Passed the Powers Bill 
in 1943) 216,262 375,862 7,41+4 
New South Wales (Passed the Powers 
Bill in 1943) 759,211 911,680 23,228 
Victoria (Conditional passing of 
· Powers Bill) 597,848 614,487 15,236 
Tasmania (Rejected the Powers Bill) 53,386 83,769 2,256 
South Australia (Amended the Powers 
Bill) 196,294 191,317 4,832 
West Australia (Amended the Powers 
Bill) 140,399 128,303 2.!637 
1,963,400 2,305,418 56,633 
Curtin declared that he was "disappointed,but not surprised at 
the result" (145).' The Government would carefully and sympathetic-
ally consider any pos'tive proposals for Constitutional amendment 
put forward by those who had urged a NO vote. 
143. 
Dr. Evatt believed that because of •a widespread but unjustified 
54.7% of formal civilian votes were for NO (Australian Public 
Opinion Polls Nos. 217-31 published August-September, 1944) 
As at the 1943 federal election,Servicemen polled more strongly 
than civilians for the Government and voters in the Services 
returned a YES majority. (E.R. Walker op.cit., p.78) 
144. Table adapted from Round Table, Vol XXXV, December 1944, p.76 
145. S.M. H. 21/8/44. p.l. This was seized on by his critics to shmr 
that Curtin had been resigned to defeat during the campaign, 
that he had thus not bothered to mount a full effort~and that 
he had left the work to Evatt. They again recalled his stateme~ 
"It's not my referendum". 
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fear of post-war industrial conscription and man-power direction, 
the proposals failure to secure the full weight of regular Labor 
support" ~46). He felt another fortnight's campaigning by the 
Government would have cleared up "the bewilderment of a section of 
the people". 
Post-Mortem. 
The tactics of the NQPropagandists had forced the Government 
on to the defensive from the start of the campaign, and we could 
agree with Whitington that the referendum "was doomed to failure 
almost from the beginning" (147). The volume and character of NO 
propaganda reduced YES advocates to arguing the necessity for this 
power and that, of pleading that the safeguard against government 
by regulation \:as not intended to create an executive dictatorship. 
As Ian Milner has argued, instead of a sustained and constructive 
setting-out of what would be done in the post-war period if the 
powers were granted, YES advocates found themselves absorbed in 
repudiating the industrial conscription and socialisation bogeys 
and in creating, in turn, rival 'scares' such as the spectre of a 
post-war depression, and the loss of child endowment benefits should 
the referendum lose(l48). One could agree with Milner that these 
appeals had much more reference to the facts than their NO counter-
parts. The fear of a depression was historically-based, and a post-
referendum High Court decision in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case 
lent support to Labor's doubts by calling in question Section 81 
of the Constitution as a foundation for social security legislation; 
and in 1946 the Government felt compelled to place the matter beyond 
doubt by again appealing to the people. However, war-time restrict-
ions with a people strained by man-po,fer shortage in the fifth year 
146. Ibid. 
147. The House Will Divide, op.cit., p.l24 
148. Milner op.cit. p.45. The respective approaches are best 
epitomised by the official booklet sett~ng out the cases for 
and against the referendum,in which Labor's recurring theme 
was a feared post-war depressionland the Opposition painted a 
gloomy picture of a bureaucrat's paradise in which all were 
regimented and restricted. Alteration of Constitution; Federal 
Referendum 1944, The Case For And Against, Canberra, Common-
wealth Electoral Office, 1944. 
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of war, provided an atmosphere which stimulated popular response 
to the NO rather than the YES kind of appeal (149). 
I would also agree with Milner that Labor erred in placing so 
much reliance on the 'rush' tactics successfully used in the 1943 
electio~land in staking so much on personal appeals by the Prime 
Minister. Before Curtin's return from overseas in July, there 
was marked inactivity on the part of official Labor. By contrast, 
weeks before the YES case began to be presented in any organised 
way, the Constitutional League and Opposition campaign was in full 
flood. Indee~ as early as February 1944, business pressure groups 
were strongly opposing the referendum (150). And, of course, 
Curtin was unable to undertake the nation-wide campaigning which 
could have considerably influenced wavering voters in the various 
States. Brian Fitzpatrick also lamented that the Government had 
had nearly two years to educate the public on the issues involved, 
but had rested everything upon a four week campaign. He claimed, 
with a good deal of justice,that the YES side was already doomed 
when the 'campaign' started (151). 
However, it is almost universally accepted that the 'major 
weakness' of the YES side was the failure to give adequate effect 
UM 
to Dr. Evatt's October 1942 desiderat~ of 'telling the people' 
more about the ~bjects to be achieved' (152). Of course, the 
149. Milner, loc.cit. 
150. A nation-wide opinion poll on August 12, 1944 revealed tha~ 
among male voters,NO supporters had increased from 3~ in 
February to 53%> while the YES vote had declined from 49% to 40%. 
151. Smith's Weekly, 2/9/44, p.ll 
152. See Milner p.45; G.Sawer op.cit, p.219; Round Table Vol. 
XXXV, December 1944, p.76. Surveying a flood of letters-to-
the-editor for and against the referendum, the Daily Telegraph 
intimated that the bulk of the NO writers complained that the 
Government had not explained how it would use the powers. 
(Editorial, 11/8/44, p.8). 
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diversionary campaign tactics of the NO side, as we saw, made the 
'telling' difficult. But> despite Evatt's hindsight, it is ironical 
that both the form in which the proposals were placed before the 
people, and the popular uncertainty about the manner in which the 
powers were to be exercised, were major factors in their rejection. 
The skilful exploiting of the Government's alleged 'many voices' 
could scarcely have relieved this situation. 
In a line of attack that appears to have had a profound ; 
influence on voters, the Sydney Morning Herald protested that it 
was not enough for the Government to describe what would happen if 
it failed to get the powers. Voters wanted to know what would 
happen if it did get them. Vague objectives had been stated, but 
the methods of achieving them had neither been disclosed nor dis-
cussed (153). In Britain, the Government had put before the British 
public during the last couple of years, elaborate plans for re-
construction so that they might be subjected to close and critical 
examination. The Commonwealth Government had no apparent plan of 
employment. It had to go to a British White Paper to show in some 
form what it wanted to achieve (154). J.L. Paton agrees that the 
Government did itself a grave disservice by not following the 
Brt tish practice of issuing a White Paper on its plans. (155). 
Howeve~ the critics failed to allow for the fact that the detailed 
blue-printing of British plans had not been hampered and delayed by 
the Australian uncertainty on the scope of post-war Constitutiqnal 
powers. And, in any event, the eventual appearance 
White Paper in May 1945 served not to appease but to enrage the 
same critics who assailed its •regimentation' implicatiohs. t' 
A common view is that the Government erred badly in repeating 
Hughes' fatal 1915 mistake of dropping a referendum proposal at a 
time when the nation's mood gave it a ch~nce of ~eptance, in 
~· • ~ ... , ,1 ..... 
return for the States' agreement to 'refer' the powers. The matter 
dragged on unresolved for 18 months, and by the time the Government 
in August 1944 asked the people to decide, the crisis atmosphere 
of 1942 was a thing of the past. The enemy had receded,and the 
austerity of civilian life under the strain of a very high degree 
153. S.M.H. 26/7/44. p.2 
154. S.M.H. 12/8/44. p.l 
155. op.cit. p.l09 
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of mobilisation 7had been more generally experienced. Rationing and 
shortages had grown more severe, powers of direction. over labour 
had been exercised in an increasing field, and a much larger pro-
portion of the population had been 'pushed around' (156). 
A bad blunder had been the failure to include a guarantee 
against industrial conscription, fear oDWhich, as Dr. Evatt 
acknowledged,. clearly alienated many Labor supporters. Brian 
Fitzpatrick had early warned that a sustained propaganda campaign 
to allay workers• fears on this point would be necessary to secure 
victory; but he could find no sign of any such campaign (157). 
Labor, of course, did not launch a full-scale campaign until well 
into July and Evatt had to concede that the Government had left ) 
itself insufficient time to re-assure workers. He believed at least 
another fortnight would have been required. 
Enthusiastic endorsement of the referendum by the Communist 
Party proved a source of embarrassment to the Government and allowed 
people like Lang and Fadden to assail its motives. 
Finally, in some Press quarters, the defeat was attributed to 
the 'noisy fanatics', Ward and Calwell (158). I repeat that the 
SlllfVI/Y 
attack on Calwell was unwarrante~and the ·Daily Telegraph perhaps 
betrays the real motivation for its anti-Calwellism by protesting 
that "any doubt about the scope of his own powers, Calwell disposed 
of last April when he imposed a Gestapo gag on the Press" (159). 
A From that date, Calwell became the main bete-noire of the Press)and 
it appears that they were prepared to go to any lengths t6 discredit 
him. 
Gallup Polls. 
' 
An examination of nation-wide opinion pol,ls in this period is 
illuminating. In both May and November 1942 a majority of people 
in all States (except Tasmania and Western Australia) favoured 
156. An interpretation similar to this is advanced by E.R. Walker 
QR~.cit. , p.l02; D. Whitington The House Will Divide, p.ll5; 
and L.F. Crisp Ben Chifley, pp.l94-95. 
157. Smith's WeeklY, 15/4/44. 
SvrJM'/ 
158. Deily Telegraph, editorial, 20/8/44. p.l 
159. Ibid. 
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abolition of State Parliaments. Of the total sample, 60% favoured 
abolition (160). Attitudes were little affected by political 
affiliation,and it is generally argued that a referendum at this 
stage would probably have succeeded. 
After the Canberra Convention,all States and two voters in 
every three favoured the transfer of the 14 powers. At this stage, 
non-Labor supporters were slightly more favourable to the proposal 
than Labor voters (161). Indeed, it was not until the Federal 
Opposition adopted the "party approach" and opposed the proposals 
in Parliament in February 1944 that a significant change was 
reflected in the opinion polls. And I would argue that the change 
of public attitudes between 1942 and 1944 was at least as much 
related to the change in the stand of the anti-Labor parties as to 
any change in the war situation or increasing war strain. 
The February 1944 Poll implied that a referendum would probably 
have been carried by small majorities in all States except Tasmania 
(162). Until then, all polls had shown negligible difference of 
opinion between Labor and non-Labor voters. But now, whilst 58% of 
Labor voters supported the transfer, only 37% of non-Labor people 
did. The poll, significantly, was taken whilst Parliament was 
debating the Bil~and non-Labor voters were obviously responding 
to party appeals. The previous poll in December 1943,had suggested 
that 70% of the sample would vote YES and 61% of those interviewed 
remained in favour of unification (163). In each case this had 
been an improvement on the figures of December 1942 when 64% had 
favoured the transfer, and 60% supported abolition of the States. 
Thus) until the February 1944 poll when the Federal Opposition had 
just declared its stand, a nation-wide majority of 70% seemed 
likely for the referendum,and Labor and non-Labor voters were 
160. 
161. 
Australian Public Opinion Polls, Nos. 47-55 published June 1942, 
and Nos 82-89 published November 1942. (Files in Mitchell Lib-
rary). 
Ibid. Filed with Nos. 90-102 
162. ~· Nos. 180-185 
163. The April 1944 poll showed 56% of Australians still in favour 
of abolition of the States. 
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equally in favour. I am therefore sceptical of the theory that 
public opinion had been transformed on the question of transferring 
the powers by the change in the war situation and the increased 
war-weariness that occurred betwee~ sa~ November 1942 and August 
1944. The big change in opinion came only in February 1944 and then 
primarily, it would seem, because party politics were now injected 
into the question. I am inclined to believe that a 1942 or early 
1943 referendum, if plagued by the party strife of August 1944, 
would have met the same fate. 
The April 1944 poll showed little change from February 1944, 
and a YES majority still seemed possible. But later polls bear 
out the validity of Ian Milner's point that> whereas the NO side 
launched its campaign as early as February, Labor erred badly in 
awaiting Curtin's return in July. The polls indicate that this 
strategy was disastrous. It was between April and May, whilst 
non-Labor campaigned and Labor remained inactive, that the real 
turning of the tide occurre~ and thenceforth the referendum looked 
doomed. This validates Fitzpatrick's contention thatthe YES side 
was already doomed when the four weeks' campaign began, viz:(l64) 
FEB APR MAY JUN ill AUG 12 
YES 49 48 41 37 35 40 
NO 34 37 47 49 52 53 
UNDECIDED 17 15 12 lit 13 7 
The Government's fortunes took a further dip in June)and by 
July had reached their nadir. And, the polls indicate that the 
change is accounted for almost entirely by non-Labor voters joining 
their party and deserting the YES side - not, it would seem, by any 
change in the war situation (165). From its low point in July-
164. Adapted from A.P.O.P. Nos. 217-231.(F19ure-s f-or mqJt vorer-s onl~) 
165. In February 1944, 37% of non-Labor males supported YES; in 
April this was steady at 36%, in May there was a marked drop 
to 27.%, and in June to 17%. On the other hand, 58% of male 
Labor voters supported YES in February and April; which 
declined somewhat to 52% in May, and 51% in June. 
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when t he Labor campaign began - the YES side built its support 
back againto the level of May. This lends some credence to Evatt's 
claim that the result might have been different with another 
fortnigh~s' campaigning. And we could agree with Milner and Fitz-
patrick; that a longer, more sustained campaign may have succeeded, 
particularly as those won over by the Government between July and 
August seem to have been regular Labor voters returning to the 
fold, and the Government lost primarily because it failed to 
secure the full weight of regular Labor support (166). 
The August poll disclosed the motivation behind people~' 
voting intention. It revealed the principal bogeys of the NO 
campaigners -socialisation of industry and industrial conscript-
ion - as the main reasons for a NO vote. On the other hand, most 
intending YES voters were reacting to the fear of post-war unemploy-
ment (167). 
166. This table confirms the point that the Government's July-
August recovery was mainly due to unsure Labor voters being 
converted by the YES campaign (source: A.P.O.P.Nos. 217-31) 
Labor 
Supporters 
JUL AU~ 12 JUL AUG 12 
YES ~ 9 Non-Labor YES 11 10 
--- Supporters ---
80 82 NO 33 29 NO 
UNDEC. 15 12 UNDEC. 9 8 
The poll of August 12, taken one week before the referendum 
proved an accurate guide to the result. It revealed 51% 
intending to vote NO, 39% to vote YES, and 10% were undecided. 
Excluding those undecided)the intending NO vote was 56%. 
In the event 54.7% of the formal civilian vote was for NO. 
167. See Appendix L. 
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CHAPrER XIII 
The White Paper On Full Employment - May 1945 . 
My account of Labor ' s plans for the post-war world and its 
vision of the "new social order") ends on the note of the White 
Paper "Full Employment In Australia" . J . J . Dedman had relieved 
Chifley of the Post-War Reconstruction portfolio in February 1945, 
and the Department of War Organi$ation of Industry was dissolved 
into the other Department under Dedman and Dr . Coombs in February-
July 1945 (1) . Accordingly, it was Dedman who tabled the White 
Paper in the House on May 30, 1945 . HO\oJever , Chifley had continued 
to take the closest interest in its evolutioH (?). The vfuite 
Paper was the final, most systematic statement of Labor ' s 
objectives and the methods of attaining them . It was the final 
formulation of the "Labor dream ~' adapted to the fact of failure 
to obtain wider Constitutional powers . 
Dedman described the document to Parliament as "a chru:·ter 
for a new social ordei'" to replace the old order of the inter-\oJar 
years , when the prime objective was rigid adherence to a certain 
financial policy which looked upon unemployment and dwindling 
world trade as necessary evils . It was not an isolated p·olicy , 
but part of the general social patte:r·n in which reform of the 
banking system , steps for the re-establishment of Servicemen , and 
the series of social security measures already introduced were 
1 . L. F . Crisp Ben Chifley, P . l97n . Dedman would appear to have 
been the obvious choice for the job when '(far Organisation of 
Industry became of less importance . He had been largely 
responsible for the five objectives l~id down by the 1943 
Federal Conference for the Department to pursue in the post- war 
period, and he had great sympathy with most of Chifley ' s planso 
J . T . Lang , as early as February 1944 , (Century 18 . 2 . 44 , P . 4) 
claimed that Dedman had already been selected by Curtin to 
relieve Chifle~but that action would be deferred pending the 
referendum as :Jedman ' s known susceptibility to advice by 
' Frofessors ' might prejudice its prospects . However , Dedman 
denies that the changeover was in train before the referendum 
and contends that his work in rebalancing the war effort in 
1944 determined Curtin ' s choice (letter to writer) . 
2. Ibid . , P . 193. See Crisp loc . ci •1 PP . 193-94-, on the making of 
til'e\'lhi te Pap r 1 •,,hich proved 
11 a "o ...... r: .idable operation", taking 
ten months to complete . 
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parts (3) . The basic purpose of the banking legislation , which 
was related to this measure , was to ensure that no ' outworn 
financial prejudices ' or the resistance of vested financial 
interests would ever again be a bar to full employment (4). Full 
employment ~as to be the Government ' s contribution to the 
individual's security, while at the same time the less fortunate 
would be protected from hardship by social security measures . 
Full employment would spell opportunity, and opportunity would 
open the way for achievement . He pointed to the evils of 
unemployment : wasted lives and resources and missed opportunities 
for social betterment . The war had shown that .full employment 
could be achieved under critical conditions; and he believed that 
it could be attained in peace- time in lf.lays consistent with a free 
society . 
The approach of the Post- War Reconstruction Department to 
the problem had already been expounded ' unofficially ' by Dr . I . C. 
Coombs on several occasions , notably in a lecture delivered in 
June , 1944 (5) , and the \'lhite Paper inevitably contai ned much that 
3 . S .M.H. 31 . 5 . 45 , P . 5 . 
4 . In March , 1945, the Government brought down two Bills to alter 
the operation and control of the Commonwealth Bank . Control of 
the Bank was to be vested in a Governor assisted by an Advisory 
Council and responsible to the Treasurer , rather th!l. _ in a Bank 
Board of the kind Si r Earle Page established in 19~4. The main 
purposes of the legislation , according to Chifley , ~J to 
strengthen the central banking functions of the Bank , to ensure 
that the monetary a,nd banking policy of the Bank would be in 
harmony with Government policy , and to ensure the development 
and expansion of its general bankinu business by active 
competition with the trading banks CD . ~nitington , The House 
rlill Divide , on . cit . PP . 125-26) . The Bills gave permanent 
legislative expression to the existing emergency controls over 
the trading banks , wbich had been exercised by National Security 
regulations . Cbifley believed that Labor ' s main aims in 
Government , viz . a full employment economy and a State providing 
social security in a free society , required full control over 
banking . A. \'1. Stargardt (ed . ) Things i·Jorth FiP;htinp:; For -
Speeches by Joseph S~ne~ict Chifley , Melbourne, Australian 
Labor Party , 1953 , .0. 
5 . Problems Of A Hie:-h ..... ti.i-.Jlo ment Econom (The Joseph Fisher 
cture in Commerce 1944 , University of Adelaide , Adelaide, at 
the Hassell Press , 1944). 
123 . 
\'las familiar . E . R. Walker has placed the document in its 
international context (6) . Its main thesis, he points out , most 
closely resembled that of Beveridge ' s ' Full Employment in a Free 
Society '. The objective was not merely the avoidance of cyclical 
depressions along the lines of the British \•lhi te Paper of Hay 
1944-, but ' work for aU alona; the lines of Beveridge and the 
Murray-Wagner-Thomas Bill (7) , with rather less emphasis on 
fostering ' free competitive enterprise and the investment of 
private capital ' than the Bill . It also differed from its British 
and Canadian (8) counterparts in giving much less prominence to 
the expansion of world trade>and none to the particular problem 
of reduction of trade barriers . 
The Australian document , in Dedman ' s words , "first sets 
forth boldly and unequivocs.lly the Government ' ,, intention to 
.... ecure full employment for the people of Australia after the war . 
Secondly, it outlines the method by v-rhich the Government proposes 
to achieve this aim . Thirdly , it examines the special problems 
which will face the Australian economy in the transition from war 
to peace" (9) . 
The \Vbite Paper manifested a whole- hearted acceptance of 
Keynesian economics . It stated categorically that "full employment 
is the fundamental aim of the Commonwealth Government" (10) . The 
basic premise was that Governments should accept the responsibility 
for stimulating spending qn goods and services to the extent 
necessary to sustain full employment . Full employment could be 
maintained only so long as total expenditure provided a market 
for all the goods and services turned out by Australian men and 
6 . Walker op . cit ., P. 379 . 
7. Introduced in the United States Congress in January , 1945 . 
8 . A Canadian Government Paper on ' Employment And Income ' 
published in April, 1945 . 
9. S.M.H. 31 . 5.45 , P. 5. 
10 . Parliament Of The Commonwealth Of Australia Full Employment In 
Australia, (Government Printer , Canb er ra , 1945) P . 3 . 
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women (11) . 
The chief threats to full employment were the instability 
of private capital expendi tur , 1d of expenditure from overseas . 
Publ ic capital expenditure \vo.s the principal feature of expenditure 
that could be readily varied to offset variations in the more 
unstable sections of expenditure . When employment tended to 
decline , resources could be usefully employed by the decision to 
embark upon developmental work and to improve the collective 
capital equipment of the community . Precisely the opposite course 
had been followed during the DepressionJ when public works were 
reduced. at a time when all other expe11di ture was falling . 
Similarly , when private spending was tending to expand , some 
reduction might be made in public capital spending . However , if 
private spending seemed likely at any time to expand to a level 
where it might prevent the completion of urgent l y needed public 
capital projects , the Commonwealth and State Governments should 
seek means by which they could determine which capital projects , 
publ ic or private , were the more important to the community , and 
accord priority to those projects . 
Full employment was defined as "a tendency towards a 
shortage of men instead of a shortage of jobs" (12) . This was 
also Beveridge ' s criterion. It did not envisage ' everybody in a 
job '. Some people would be away from work because of sickness , 
some would be taking a tspell' bet\veen seasonal or periodical 
employment , some would be in the process of changing from one 
employment to another offering better prospects , · some \vould take 
11 . "The essential condition of full employment is that public 
expenditure should be high enough to stimulate private 
spending to the point where the two together will provide 
a demand for the total production of which the economy is 
capable when it is fully employed", Ibid., P. 5 . 
12 . Ibid . P . 6 . 
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time to acquire new training to equip them for other employment 
(13). There would not be ' work for work ' s sake ' but employment 
directed to worthwhile purposes. Direction of labour would not 
be continued after .the war . Man power would be acquired without 
compulsion through the work of an Australia-wide Employment 
Servicej · J.1d financial and other assistance to overcome the costs 
of transfer . 
The Paper warned th~~ in pushing total expenditure to the 
level necessary to maintain full employment, we might from time 
to time go too far. The economy would be threatened with the 
danger of inflation . An important factor here would be the 
Government's control of credit through the Commonwealth Bank 
which could be used to stop a boom or to stimulate private 
spending. In genertl , interest rates were to be kept low and it 
would be the responsibility of the Commonwealth Bank to ensure 
that the banking system did not initiate a general contraction 
·of credit or contribute in any way to the grO\'Ith of unemployment 
through a decline of expenditure . 
The Paper recognised that ' in the pastJ~he chief 
fluctuations in total spending and employment in Australia> h.ave 
arisen from changes in the value of Australian exports in response 
to the varying prosperity of world markets ~ and set out the 
following policy to be pursued to meet any such threat to full 
employment in the future (14)~ 
13. Such a state of affairs both Beveridge and the Australian 
vlliite Paper boldly termed ' full employment ~ whilst Coombs 
in his June 1944 lecture,more cautiously spoke of ' a high and 
stable level of employment ' (t~e term used also in the 
British White Paper) . Coombs assumed that , on the average, 
four per cent of males and two per cent of females seeking 
employment would be unemployed (Problems Of A High Employment 
Economy op . cit ., P . 26) , but the assumption is not stated 
openly in the \'Jhite Paper. E . R . Waker (op . cit. , P . 380) 
posed the question whether the general public \·lould be 
satisfied with such a policy and claimed it would be difficult 
to explain to the remaining unemployed , even if few in number , 
why 'full employment ' did not include them . 
14. This was not part of the Beveridge plan . It reflected the 
special problems of a primary produce-exporting country . 
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(a) To seek agreement with other nations by which the 
latter would undertake to do everything possible to 
maintain the level of their ovm employment . 
(b) To participate in developing other forms of inter-
national collaborati . , 1~signed to expand world trade 
and to mitigate fluctua~ions in prices of raw materials 
and food~stuffs . 
(c) To prepare now for the post-war development of 
Australia ' s export markets . 
(d) To develop measures to stabilise the incomes and , 
hence the expenditure , of Australian export producerG 
' 
so as to offset the short- term f l uctuations in the 
demand for Australian exports . 
(e) To stabilise total expenditure and employment in the 
face of any expected reduction in s pending from 
overseas on Australian products 1 bJ bringing about a 
compensating expansion in publ ic capital expenditure 
and by other means (15) . 
The document mentions as ' the chief possible sources ' to 
finance the appropriate level of Government expenditure - taxation 
and borrowing, either from the public or the central bank . The 
' main source ' should be taxation (16) . However , there were 
limitations on the extent to which taxation could be used . It 
should cover at least all expenditure on current iteiJ 1d also 
some contribution toward capital expenditure . Financing by the 
Commonwealth Bank could be used to advantage up to the limit of 
available men and r~sources , butl if carried beyond this point > 
would create instability and threaten full employment (17) . 
15 . \Vhite Paper op . cit., P . S . 
16. A. C. Garnett op . cit ., P . l83 , believes this was probably 
inserted as a repudiation of ' social credit ' theorists inside 
the A. L. P . who argued that the expenses of Government could 
and should be financed by central bank credits . 
17 . White Paner , PP . l2-l3 . 
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In the immediate years of transition from war to peace , 
there would be special problems . The fundamental problem was 
that the war-time excess of spending power would pe.rsist until 
more adequate supplies of peace-time coods asain became available . 
~[this period, control of prices , materials , and investment 
· &tri::~l.:contHtue . 
As Crisp indicates ''The Vlhi te Paper repeatedly drove hte 
the hint that, in a federal Austr.;:.lia, the Commonwealth and 
Stat~ Governments must join forces &~d act in concert if full 
empl9yment were to be achieved and sustained •.• 11 (18,) . In h:if 
viewf I' the \'fui te Pap~r r epresented the authentic , forward- lookiL.g , 
~ 
refohnist _;tradition 1 of the A. L. P . Tt was the product of Labor 
united and in the ascendancy . '1 However , 11 Its ideas of the 
employment ••. bear the marks of inter-war 
exper,ienceJ rnd proved much too cautious in terms of post-war 
I ' ~ 
reall.ty a_s. it laterl ern:orged" (19) . 
Public Reception 
The White Paber met a ;hostile response 'fr.om Opposition , 
businesG, and Press quarters· v:,hich assailed its alleged 
• 
' regjl..inentation' implica't;j_o·ns'. The Sydney Morning He:rald epitomised 
• 
the ~eactibn of the ' critic~ in arguing that a ~olicy of ' always 
' - t. 
jobs than men ' could be ma.:J,.ntaii1ed orily by perpetuation 
re'straints ' wpich lie,ld enterprise and 
in check, and \•JOuld mean nothing short of a 
18 . ~Ben Chifley , P . l94 • 
• 
individual liberty 
' totalitarian regfme ' 
• • 
19 . i'Ibid . As mentioned , the \vhite Paper apparently envisage& 
,an unemployment ra~e of three or four per cent . This woHld 
doubtless seem a creditable achievemepJ~by ~tra~.~·. ~i th the \fl:'tf9~:~v'Yar~rnpliQY;trt,~t ffifrag4f aibQ.'3J:'~14 \p~?cent of m'en 
and women seeking work . • 
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for Australia (20) . Business leaders thoroughly endorsed this 
thinking jand one claimed that the document should be re- named 
"To Hell \'lith Democrac~" ( 1) . On the other hand I'1r . G. Anderson, 
President of the N. S . \·1. T+ades and Labor Council, felt that the 
Government had not gone as far as many of its supporters would 
have liked, but had taken an initial step towards implementing 
Labor ' s platforr (.?2) ~ 
The most eloquent statement of opposition to the proposals 
ca: e,""' U'adoxicaL.J) -"'rom one of the bogey-men of the anti- referendum 
forces , Professor D. B. Copland (23) . Copland argued that the 
fundamental conflict between freedom and security should be kept 
al\'.'ays in the foreground1 and insisted that people did not want to 
have their lives planned for them by anyone . The case for 
liquidating controls over the transition period was overwhelming . 
He objected to the teri.: ' full employment' and to the slogan of 
' more jobs than workers to fill them '. He was opposed to the 
20 . S.M .H. editorial 31 . 5 . 45, P . 2 . And see D. T. 1 . 6.45 , P . 8 
,lhJ.ch agreed wholeheartedly . There appears to ...:....:ve been no 
Parliamentary debate on the Paper, but comment by some 
Opposition spokesmen is recorded in the Press . They added 
little to the above sentiments (e . g . see P . C. Spender in 
S . ~L H. 19 . 6 . 45, P . 4) . Round Table commented that , though 
Opposition leaders hotly criticised the 'regimentation ' 
aspects of the plan , they had made no formal statement on 
the \~ite Paper. They were in the dilemma of having much to 
say in condeqmation of it , but of lacking cny well-thought-
out alternative to pl"ce before the public . Theirs wa$ a 
' negative attitude ' (Vol . XXXV, September 1945 , P . 372) . 
21 . Mr . B.R . Orr, President , N. S . W. Chamber of Manufactures 
(S . M.H. , 10 . 8 . 45, P. 5) . The Director of the Associated 
Chambers of Manufactures , !-lr . L. \1/ithall , also hotly attacked 
the plan (S . M.H. 1 . 6 . 45, P . 3) . 
22 . S . M. H. , 1 . 6 . 45 , P . 3 . 
23 . See S .M. H. 9 . P . 45 , P . 2, and A. C. Garnett op . cit . , P . l89 . 
In January 19·lj1 Copland had expressed the following views in 
lectures at H9.rv· rd University which were later re-printed in 
a book The Road To Hi~h Employment (Havard University Press , 
1945) . 
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policy stated in the Australian \1/hi te Papr r ) nd in agreement with 
an American government report suggesting a level of from five to 
eight per cent unemployment . He criticised the Beveridge Plan 
as being unrealistically ' perfectionist ' in its advocacy of ' full '7 
rather than merely ' hig~ •, mployment , and argued that the former 
could not be maintained without undue regimentation and danger-of 
inflation . In a short market for labour , some employers would 
offer higher pay and start a viciou~ spiral of wages and prices . 
Thus , he argued , a certain minimum pool of unemployed was the 
only alternative to labour regimentation , price control, and the 
fixing of maximum as well as minimum wages . 
A. C. Garnett argued that the Opposition parties were in 
agreement with the more cautious positiott of the professor (~4) . 
Yet this was the same Opposition which had charged Copland and 
other Government advisers with seeking to foist a post-war 
bureaucratic dictatorship on Australians (recall some of Fadden ' s 
hysterical accusations) . Here is conclusive evidence that 
Copland ' s standpoint was grievously misrepresented during the 
referendum . But , as stated earlier , a clo~e reading of his 
address to the Canberra Summer SchoolJ disclosed the same deep 
concern for personal liberty as he was no\tl manifesting . 
The long-continued post- war prosperity may have vindicated 
Menzies ' prophecy of a boom rather than Labor ' s predicted 
depression , but the latter ' s post- war plan of ' full employment ', 
cautious though it proved in terms of post-war reality , was a 
much more accurate prophecy of things to come than the dilemma 
posed by the Opposition of a pool of unemployed or post- war 
regimentation . 
24 . A. C. Garnett loc . cit . 
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CHAP.rER XIV 
Labor , Socialism , And The New Order . 
If , like D.·, . Rawson , we take Socialism to involve the 
publ ic ownership of at least the larger industrie~ (1) , then we 
can state categorically that the Curtin Government ' s vision of 
the ' new social order ' was not a Socialist one . The economic 
and social reconst;ruction plans of the Government aimed at 
realising welfare and security objectives accepted by all the 
leading Allied Governments . This would involve far-reaching 
Government post- war controls over private enterprise, but these 
economic policies had their counterpart in Britain under a 
Conservative Party-dominated Government . Curtin, for example , 
was able to draw a strong parallel between the projected post-war 
controls of his Government and those foreshadowed by the British 
\•!hi te Paper of l'-1ay 1944 . 
James Jupp has indicated that "there is a substantial 
degree of similarity bet'v'Jeen the post-war reconstruction policies 
of the A. L. P . and those beinr; put into operation in \•!estern 
Eur·ope at the same time , by socialist and non-socialist 
governments alike . That the non-Labor parties were unlikely to 
have adopted similar measures may, indeed, have been a significant 
factor in their political eclipse in the immediate post-war years" 
(2) and he adds that "\•lhat the war-time A. L. P . government wanted 
was the same range of powers which the British government found 
necessary for carrying through its post- war policies . Some , at 
least , of those powers would have been desired by a non-Labor 
government as well" (3). To E.R. Walker , the adoption by the 
1943 A. L .P . Federal Conference of a list of objectives 
' intellectually related ' to those espoused by bodies like the 
National Resources Planning Board in the U. S . A. and the League 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
Labor In Vain? op . cit; P . 61 . 
Australian Party Politics (l\'Ielbourne University Press , 1964) , 
Ibid., P .l08 o P . lOl . 
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of Nations Delegation on Economic Depres.:.ions >"signified (Lcibcr ' s) 
participation in a world-wide movement of social thought and 
aspiration 11 ( 4) . We c 1.:1 thus conclude that the Labor Government 
was preparing for a controlled and welfare- motivated economy 
after the war, aiming at realisation of objectives officially 
proclaimed by all the United Nations - full employment , social 
security , an expanded national income , and improved living 
standards for the masse~ . 
As Richard Windr;yer (5) pointed out at the time , the 
conditions brou[ht about by the war were very similar in &11 
democraciPs , and the difficulties to be solved , when peace came , 
almost identical . Not surprisingly , the proposed methods of 
grappling with these probl ems were similar . Control by 
Government was "not some artifice i nvented by the Australian 
Labor Government as a means of introducing socialism" (G) . 
\'Jindeyer condemned ••the narrow , ~emote provincialism too often 
seen in discussion of Australic.n affairs •• ( 7) . The reaction to 
Labor ' s insistence that there must be no sudden cessation of 
controls after the war1 seemed to assume that it was something 
ha'T)pe~1.i.ng i n Australian politics disconnected from the current 
of world affairs . However , there was a thriving contemporar y 
literature in England and America, occupied with discussion as to 
how far the driving force of private enterprise should be 
marshalled , organised , and supplemented by the authority of the 
State (8) . In Australie , leadinG politicians and business 
spokesmen used such opprobrious terms as ' Fascist ' or 
' Totalitarian ' because of views that after all were highly 
respectable . \vas it possibly because these gentlemen did not 
4 . E. R. Walker , P . 349 . 
5. "The Powers Bill 11 Australian Quarterl y , June 1944 . 
6 . Ibid . P . 7 . 
7 . Ibid • P • 5 • 
8 . To support this point , Windeyer quoted the opinion of a long 
list of authorities such as tho ~ditor of the London Economist , 
the Vice- President of the U. S . . ~ ., the Nati onal Resources 
Planning Board of the U. S . A., and the Indian Government . 
Ibid . , PP. 7- 10 • 
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know how far the best opinion had gone in older countries? (9) 
The 'best opinion ' among overseas Conservatives vms indeed 
at one \.Yi tb the Curtin Government in arguing that private 
enterprise often languished before the w -::, ~1d that if Governments 
took the initiative in the post- vrar period and encouraged and 
assisted , private enterprise might become a powerful instrument 
for develop:.i,.ng the economy and fulfilling its true function . 
Such planning , as the Australian Government insisted , involved no 
real threat to legitimate private enterprise and initiative (10) . 
Sir John Anderson , Chancellor of the Exchequer , speaking to the 
directors of the Bank of England and merchants of the City of 
London , declared that private enterprise must now be willing , if 
it wished to prosper in the post- war world : II genuinely and 
re~ularly to consult with the Gov ernment on the main lines of 
policyJ and accept the determination of the Government to take a 
much closer interest in tl1e general lines of industrial and 
commercial policy that in the past .•• The interest of the 
Government in private enterprise docs not mean interference by 
the Government at every stagt • The closer the voluntary 
consultation , the less frequent will be the need for compul sion 
later 11 (11) . 
The Labor GoYernment through Curtin , :Evat J ~1d other 
senior Ministers7 had pledged itsel f to give ' ample scope ' to 
private enterprise in the post- war yearE; ,d not to attempt 
more than was necessary to restore ind..Ist .... s , provide ful l 
9 . Ibi d . , ...~ . v . 
10 . Curtin h. ad expressed these sentiments in his s~eech opening 
the Constitutional Convention (S . M. H. 25 . 11 . 42 ). 
11 . Quoted in Ian Milner op . cit ; P . 48 . 
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employment , full production , and full consumption (1~) . 
However , spokesmen for Australian business interests 
betrayed little awareness of enlightened overseas opinion . 
The President of the Associated Chamb0rs of Manufactures 
of Australia (Mr. H. J . Hendy) protested of the ComMonwealth ' s 
J post-war plans that. "It should be left to us who know our own 
way of life , \'/ho know the Australian outlook and temperame11t1 
to carve out our own system • • . Hhatever was right or \'lrong 
with our pre-war civilisation , there can be no doubt that it 
conferred great benefits on many of the peoples of the countries 
where it was most highly developed ••• Australian manufacturers 
will have a most determined argument to hold v!hat we have and to 
add to it if we can . If we are to lose anythi1 ~ J '"'I must be 
taken from us , not supinely handed over"(l3) . ue went on t;o 
say th ; " ~s the end of the war drew nearer , and the problems 
of rebuilding were at hand , I hope 'that we \'fill hear less and 
less of so- called ' New Orders '. I do not take kindly to any 
suggestion that Governments needed to ' plan ' for manufacturing 
industry, because plans inevitably breed controls , and official 
planning was of such remarkable fecundity that controls were soon 
12. One might protest that the Government ' s November 194·4 
decision t;o nationalise interstate air-lines - which was 
finally circumvented in the :figh Court - v~as inconsistent 
with Curtin ' s numerous ' I1o Socie.lisation ' pledges . But 
nation~l ownership and control of such a vital and 
increasingly monopoly - dominated public utility as air 
transport, could be justified on quite other e;rounds than 
those of socialist principle . As Round Table commented 
"There is a larc;e section of the community , even of that 
:;cction opposed to Labor politically , which thinks that the 
nationalisation of the air- lines is desirable . In Australia 
the railways , tramwo~cJ and bus services are practically all 
run by the Goveril.I'ile t 1 nd this section thinks that ·the 
addition of the air-' es to the Government traffic services 
is a natural development" . Vol . XXXV , March 1945 , P . l78. 
13. S . M.H . 5 . 11 . 43, P . 4 . 
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about them like a swarm of locusts 11 • (sic . ) (14) 
We can agree with Ian Milner ~hat the opposition to the 
granting of additional Commonwealth powers was not , in fact , 
grounded on any valid fear of consequential socialist legislation , 
but rather upon a determination to undermine confidence in , and 
so unseat the Government (15) . True , the two powei·s singled out 
for attack during the referendumj were chosen for the alleged 
reason that they would open the door to the impl~menting of 
Labor ' s socialisation objective (16). But , as Milner insists , 
the political record of the Government hardly suggested an ambition 
to risk a referendum defeat for the purposes of securing powers 
for post-war socialisation (17) . Indeed the Government had · 
resisted the increasing pressure of the Miners ' Federation, not 
only for nationalisation~ but even for further government control 
I 
of the coal-mines . One can not but agree with Milner,t~at it was 
surely obvious that the voice of E . J . Ward was not the controlling 
voice of the A. L. P . (lR) . 
14. Quoted in Labor Call , 11 . 11 . 43 , ~) · 7 · On November 8 , 1943 , 
the S . Il . H . remarked that; "If anJt'1ine; could undermine public 
faith in the future for ~~hich we fight, it would be the 
' back to 1939 ' movement proclaimed in Melbourne last weeh." . 
15 . op . cit; P .46 . 
16 . Not coincidentally , they were also the two powers whose 
exercise , stoppin~ well short of socialisation , still posed 
the bigg8st threat to the pre- war 1 ri3hts 1 of Big Business 
such as the arbitrary right to ~ire and ~ire and the 
disciplinary device of a pool of unemployed . 
17 • Ibid • P . 4 7 . 
18 . One has only to read Brian Fitzpatrick ' s weekly column on 
post-war reconstruction questions in Smith ' s Weekly during 
the war years , to appreciate the frustration of thoroughgoing 
socialists at t~e ~oderate, reformist trend of the 
Parliamentary leadership . He regarded the claim that the 
Labor Government was bent on post-war socialisaGion as ' a 
good joke ' ; as far as he was concerned there were only ' two 
socialists ' in the Cabinet . (Smith ' s ~eekly , ?6 . 2 . 44 , P . ll) 
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On this interpretation , what the anti- referendum forces 
sought above all to resi....>.._ j 1s Labor ' s attempt to prepare for a 
controlled and welfare- motivated post- war economy,to supersede 
the ' old order ' of unregulated. profit- makin.::, l th its pool of 
unemployed and unrestricted right !Jo hire o.ud fire . However , 
as Rawson \'larns , though the portrayal of the A. L . P . a,s a party 
which soue;ht a predominantly Government- owned economy was "not 
only an exaggeratio~but a deliberate exaggeration for electoral 
purposes", on the other hand , ''one should not underrate non-
Labor ' s capacity for self- deception" (19) . 
19 . Labor In Vain? PP .?l-72 . 
APPENDIX A 
THE CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (WAR AIMS AND 
RECONSTRUCTION) BILL INTRODUCED BY THE 
COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY GENERAL DR. H. V. EVATT 
ON OCTOBER, 1, 1942. l 
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1. This Act may be cited as Constitution Alteration (War Aims 
and Reconstruction) 1942. 
2. The Constitution is altered by inserting in Chapter I after 
Part V the following Part and Section :-
"Part VI - War Aims and Post-War Reconstruction 
1160A - (1) The Parliament shall have full power to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government 
of the Commonwealth, its territories, and all 
places under its jurisdiction or control, for 
the purpose of carrying into effect the war aims 
and objects of Australia as one of the United 
Nations, including the attainment of economic 
security and social justice in the post-war world, 
and for the purpose of post-war reconstruction 
generally. 
11 (2) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing 
sub-section, it is hereby declared that the power of 
the Parliament shall extend to all measures which, 
in the declared opinion of the Parliament, will tend 
to achieve economic securtty and social justice, 
including security of employment and the provision 
of useful occupation for all the people, and shall 
include power to make laws with respect to -
(a) the reinstatement and advancement of those who 
have been members of the fighting Services of 
the Commonwealth during the war, and of the 
dependents of such members who have died or been 
disabled as a consequence of the war; 
(b) employment, including the transfer of workers 
from war-time industries; 
(c) the development of the country and the expansion 
of production and markets; 
(d) the production and manufacture of goods and the 
supply of goods and services, and the establish-
ment and development of industries; 
(e) prices of goods and services, including their 
regulation and control; 
(f) profiteering; 
(g) the encouragement of population; 
(h) carrying into effect the guarantee of the four 
freedoms, that is to say-
(i) freedom of speech and expression; 
(ii) religious freedom; 
(iii) freedom from want; and 
(iv) freedom from fear; 
1. Adapted from a copy of the Bill contained in H.V.Evatt Post-War 
Reconstruction - A Case For Greater Commonwealth Powers, op.cit. 
nn. 115-116. 
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(i) national wor~s and services, including water 
conservation and irrigation, afforestation and 
the protection of the soil; 
(j) the improvement of living standards in both 
rural and urban areas; 
(k) transport, including air transport; 
(1) national health and fitness; 
(m) the housing of the people; and 
(n) child welfare. 
"(3) All the powers conferred upon the Parliament by 
this Section may be exercised notwithstanding 
anything contained elsewhere in this Constitution 
or in the Constitution of any State and shall be 
exerciseable as, on and from a date to be proclaimed 
by the Governor-General in Council." 
1 
APPENDIX B 
POST-WAR WAY OF LIFE 
MOST PEOPLE EXPECT GREAT CHANGES 
138. 
First inquiry into thaPost-war aspirations of Australians, 
recently completed by Australian Public Opinion Polls, shows 
that about three out of four people expect great changes in our 
way of life after the war. Foremost in the minds of all classes 
is a desire to eliminate unemployment and improve the living con-
ditions of working people. 
Question : 'Would you like to see any great change in our way 
of life after the war? 1 
Of each 100 interviewed 
66 answered YES 
20 said No, and 
14 had no opinion. 
People in all circumstances are among the 20-in-the-100 who do 
not wish for any great changes. About 40 per cent of them were 
Labor Party supporters. The 66-in-the-100 were fairly representat-
ive of the population as a whole, with only a slight working class 
bias. Some of them had only vague or mixed ideas about what they 
wanted, but nearly nine out of 10 were able t<;> give a definite 
answer to a second question : 
'What are the chief changes you desire? 1 
Most people stressed only one objective, and of each 100 who 
answered the second question :-
24 seek 'work for all ', 'better conditions for 
working people' or 'social security•. 
11 specifically referred to improved housing, 
education or medical services. 
20 said 'more even distribution of wealth' or 
'equality•. 
16 favoured more control of private enterprise, 
a changed economic system, or Socialism. 
' 7 answered 'more religion', 'brotherly love' or 
'improved morality'. 
5 said 'no more wars' or 'better international 
understanding', and 
17 gave various answers such as 'more industries', 
~ess red tape' or 'a better deal for farmers'. 
About six people referred to material improvement, compared 
with each one who mentioned hopes of a better moral basis for our 
post-war world. 
1. Adapted from A.P.O.P. Bulletin headed rtPolls 56-65:'published 
July-August, 1942. 
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DELEGATES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
HELD AT CANBERRA FROM NOVEMBER 24, 1942 to 
DECID-1BER 2, 1942. l 
Commonwealth 
House of Representatives 
The Rt. Hon. J. Curtin M.P. 
The Hon.F.M. Forde M.P. 
The Rt. Hon. A.W. Fadden M.P. 
The Rt.Hon.W.M. Hughes C.H, K.C., 
M.P. 
The Rt.Hon.H.V.Evatt K.C,LL.D., 
M.P. 
Rt.Hon.R.G.Menzies, K.C, M.P. 
Prime Minister 
Minister for the Army and 
Deputy Prime Minister. 
Leader of the Oppdsition and 
Leader of the Country Party. 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition 
and Leader of the United Australia 
Party. 
Attorney General and Minister for 
External Affairs. 
The 
The 
The 
Hon.J.B. Chifley M.P. Treasurer. 
Rt.Hon.Sir Earle Page G.C.M.G., 
C.H., M.P. 
Sen.The Hon.J.S. Collings 
Sen.The Hon.R.V. Keane 
Sen.The Hon.G. McLeay 
Senate 
Sen. B. Sampson D.s.o., V.D. 
Minister for the Interior. 
Minister for Trade and Customs, 
and Vice-President of the Execut-
ive Council. 
Leader of the Opposition. 
New South Wales 
The Hon.W.J. McKell M.L.A. 
The Ron. A. Mair M.L.A. 
Victoria. 
The Hon.A.A.Dunstan M.L.A. 
The Hon. J. Cain M.L.A. 
Queensland. 
The Hon.F.A. Cooper M.L.A. 
~~. G.F.R. Nicklin M.L.A. 
Premier and Colonial Treasurer. 
Leader of the Opposition. 
Premier, Treasurer, and Solicitor..! 
General. I 
Leader of the Opposition. 
Premier and Treasurer. 
Leader of the Opposition. 
South Australia. 
The Hon.T. Playford M.H.A. 
The Hon.R.S.Richards M.H.A. 
Premier, Treasurer, and Minister 
for Immigration. 
Leader of the Opposition. 
1. Compiled from Official Record of Proceedings of The Constitut-
ional Convention op.cit., p.(iii) 
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Western Australia. 
The Hon.J.C. Willcock M.L.A. 
Mr. A.F. Watts, M.L.A. 
Tasmania. 
Premier, Treasurer, and Minister 
for Forests. 
Leader of the Opposition. 
The Hon. R. Cosgrove. M.B.A. Premier and Minister for 
Education. 
The Hon.H.s. Baker D.s.o., M.H.A. Leader of the Opposition. 
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THE CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION) 
BILL PRESENTED TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BY THE 
COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY GENERAL DR. H. V.-EVATT on 
NOVE!'-1BER 24, 1942. l 
1. This Act may be cited as the Constitution Alteration (Post-
War Reconstruction) Act, 1942. 
2. The Constitution is altered by inserting in Chapter I after 
Part v, the following Part and Section :-
"Part VI - Post-War Reconstruction. 
11 60A -(1) 
" ( 2) 
II ( 3) 
The Parliament shall have full power to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government 
of the Commonwealth for the purpose of post-war 
reconstruction. 
It is hereby declared~without limiting the general-
ity of the preceding sub-Section~that the Parliament 
shall have power to make laws with respect to -
(a) the reinstatement and advancement of those who 
have been mambers of the fighting Services of 
the Commonwealth during the war and of the 
dependents of such members who have died or 
been disabled as a consequence of the war; 
(b) employment and unemployment, security of employ-
ment, the improvement of standards of living, 
and the relations between employer and employee; 
(c) trade, commerce, and industry (including the 
production, manufacture and supply of goods and 
the supply of services); 
(d) companies; 
(e) investment; 
(f) profiteering and prices; 
(g) the marketing of goods; 
(h) transport; 
(i) national works; 
(j) social services and social welfare; 
(k) health and housing; and 
(1) the protection of the aboriginal natives of 
Australia. 
The power of the Parliament to make laws under 
paragraphs (f) and (g) of the l a st preceding sub-
section may be exercised notwithstanding anything 
1. Copy as contained in S.M.H., 25/11/42. p.6 
II (4) 
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contained in Section 92 of the Constitution. 
The Parliament may make laws authorising any State 
or any Minister, officer, or instrumentality of a 
State or any local authority constituted under a 
law of a State to assist ih the execution of any 
power conferred on the Parliament by this Section". 
1 
I 
3. Section 116 of the Constitut-ion is altered to read as follows :J 
II 116. Neither the Commonwealth nor a State may make any 
law for establ~shing any religion or for imposing 
any religious observance or for prohibiting the 
free exercise of any religion, and no religious 
test shall be required as a qualification for any 
office or public trust under the Commonwealth or 
a State". 
4. The Constitution is altered by inserting after Section 116 
the following Section :-
11ll6A. Neither the Commomrealth nor a State may make any 
law abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
Press". 
APPENDIX E 
MOTIONS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1942. 
A. Motion Moved By the Leader of the 0 
The Rt. Hon. A. W. Fadden M.P. :-
143. 
"That while the Convention recognises the need to confer 
increased powers upon the Commonwealth, it is of opinion 
that the war preoccupation of many hundreds of thousands 
of Australians (including those in the fighting services 
and prisoners of war), who have a vital interest in improved 
post-war conditions and a right to an informed vote, renders 
it impracticable to secure a deliberate judgement on the 
complex problem of such a fundamental change in the whole 
system of government in Australia as is proposed. Accord-
ingly, it expresses the view that : 
(a) the war powers of the Commonwealth being very extensive, 
advantage should be taken of the opportunity during the 
war of securing practical experience in co-operative 
Commonwealth and State action in relation to social and 
economic questions; so that in due course specific 
Constitutional changes may be made with the greatest 
possible knowledge; 
(b) the consideration of what changes should be made in the 
Commonwealth Constitution to meet new circumstances 
should, at an appropriate date, be referred to an 
elective Convention representative of the people. 11 
B. Amendment Moved B the Premier of Tasmania 
The Hon. R. Cosgrove M.H.A. :- 2 
"That this Convention is of opinion that -
(a) Adequate powers to make laws in relation to post-war 
reconstruction should be conferred on the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth; 
(b) It is undesirable that permanent alterations of the 
Constitution should be effected at this critical stage 
in Australia's history; 
(c) For this reason, legislative power with respect to 
suitable additional matters in relation to post-war 
reconstruction should be referred to the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth by the parliaments of the States under 
Section 51 (XXXVII) of the Constitution. 
(d) Such reference should be for a period of not less than 
five years and not more than seven years from the 
cessation of hostilities, and should not be revoked 
' during that period. 
(e) At the end of such period, or at an earlier date, a refer-
endum should be held to secure the approval of the elect-
ors to the alterations of the Constitution on a permanent 
basis. " 
1. As contained in Official Record Of Proceedings of The Con-
stitutional Convention, op.cit. p. iv. 
2. As contained in Ibid, p. 144. 
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DRAFT. COMMONWEALTH POWERS BILL UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSED BY THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1942. l 
1. This Act may be cited as the Commonwealth Powers Act 1942. 
2. The following matters are hereby referred to the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth, that is to say -
(a) The reinstatement and advancement of those who have been 
members of the fighting Services of the Commonwealth 
during the war and the advancement of the dependents of 
those members who have died or been disabled as a con-
sequence of the war; 
(b) employment and unemployment; 
(c) organised marketing of commodities; 
(d) uniform company legislation; 
(e) trusts, combines and monopolies; 
(f) profiteering and prices (but not including prices or rates 
charged by State or semi-governmental or local governing 
bodies for goods or services); 
(g) the production (other than primary production) and dis-
tribution of goods, and, with the consent of the Governor 
in Council, primary production, but so that no law made 
under this paragraph shall discriminate between States or 
parts of States; 
(h) the control of overseas exchange and overseas investment; 
and the regulation of the raising of money in accordance 
with such plans as are approved by a majority of members 
of the Australian Loan Council; 
(i) air transport; 
(j) uniformity of railway gauges; 
(k) national works, but so that the consent of the Governor 
in Council shall be obtained in each case beforethe work 
is undertaken and that the work shall be carried out in 
co-operation with the State; 
(1) national health in co-operation with the States; 
(m) family allowances; and 
(n) the people of the aboriginal race. 
3. (1) This Act shall not be repealed or amended except in the 
manner provided in this Section. 
(2) A Bill for repealing or amending this Act shall not be 
presented to the Governor for His Majesty's assent until 
the Bill has been approved by the electors in accordance 
with this Section. 
1. See Ibid, pp. 153-154 
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(3) On a day to be appointed by the Governor-in-Council,but 
not sooner than three months after the passage of the 
Bill through both Houses of the Legislature, the Bill 
shall be submitted to the electors qualified to vote for 
the election of members of the Legislative Assembly. 
(4) When the Bill is submitted to the electors, the vote 
shall be taken in such manner as the Legislature provides. 
(5) If a majority of the electors voting approve the Bill, it 
shall be presented to the Governor for His Majesty ' s 
assent. 
4. This Act, and the reference made by this Act, shall commence 
on the date upon which it is assented to, and shall continue 
in force for a period ending at the expiration of five years 
after Australia ceases to be engaged in hostilities in the 
present war; and no law made by the Parliament of the Common-
wealth with respect to matters referred to it by this Act 
shall continue to have any force or effect, by virtue of this 
Act or the reference made by this Act, after the expiration of 
that period. " 
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APPENDIX G 
THE 1943 FEDERAL ELECTION 1 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
A.L.P. U.A.P. U.C.P. 1]12. 
1940 36 ~ 23 13 2 
1ru 49 14 9 2 
~ 
1946 
N.B. 
1. 
~ including NonCommunist Labor Party (4) 
SENATE 
Senators Not 
Facing Re-Election 
A.L.P. 
3 
Elected 1943 19 
U.A.P. U.C.P. 
12 2 
NON LABOR LABOR INDEPENDENT 
% Votes % Seats % Votes % Seats % Votes i Seats 
35.8 
47.4 
32.4 
39.2 
53.0 
51.8 
66.2 
59.5 
11.1 
o.6 
1.3 
1.3 
When in 1946 the non-Labor parties increased their vote 
enormously, it was the 1943 Independent vote returning 
to them. The defection from Labor was slight. 
Tables from D. J. Kingsmil1 The 1943 Federal Election, final 
honours year thesis, Department of Government, Sydney University 
1958. 
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APPENDIX H 
FIVE POST WAR OBJECTIVES AS LAID DOWN BY THE 
194 3 A. 1. P. FEDERAL CONFERENCE. l 
lo . The proper use of the nation's productive resources, technique, 
skill, scientific discoveries and inventions, so as to attain 
and maintain a high, rising standard of living. 
2. These resources to be used for the production and distribut-
ion, in sufficient quantities, of the goods and services 
required to meet the fundamental needs of the whole population 
for sound nutrition, adequate clothing, housing, medical care, 
and education. 
3. No man or woman able and willing to work to be left without 
employment for periods of time longer than is needed to 
transfer from one occupation to another, or, when necessary, 
to acquire a new skill; adequate social security payments 
to cover interruption to earnings through sickness, old age, 
transfer from one occupation to another, or similar causes. 
lt. Equality of educational and occupational opportunity for all, 
irrespective of family circumstances and income. 
5. Progressive reduction of inequality of income, of leisure, 
and of working conditions. 
1. See 1943 Conference Report, op. cit. p.42 
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AMENDMENT MOVED BY THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION THE RT. HON. 
R. G. MENZIES K.C. M.P. DURING DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 
1 
ALTERATION (POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS)BILL 1944. 
11 (1) The reinstatement and advancement of those who have been members 
of the Fighting Services of the Commonwealth in any war and the 
advancement of the dependents of those members who have died or 
been disabled as the consequence of such war, the reinstatement 
and rehabilitation of those other ·persons, who by reason of 
war conditions have been displaced from their normal peace-time 
occupations, the reconstruction of primary and secondary indus-
try, are the first obligations of government in the immediate 
period after the war; 
(2) that the existing powers of the Commonwealth are not shown to 
be inadequate for such purposes; 
(3) that it is, however, proper that any doubt on these points 
should be resolved by appropriate Constitutional amendment; 
(4) that no amendment should be approved which could authorise 
the socialisation of industry, the undue centralisation of 
administration, or the maintenance of such laws as unnecessar-
ily interfere with the liberty of citizens to choose their own 
means of living, and to exercise their rights as free people; 
(5) further, that the House is concerned at the ·extent of the 
surrender of legislative powers to administrative officials; 
(6) that, to afford adequate power to the Government and sufficient 
protection to the citizen, the Bill should be withdrawn and re-
drafted so as to declare or provide, over a period of fiv~~yea~ 
from the termination of actual hostilities, that the Common~~t.~! 
wealth Parliament has, or should have (as the case may be~ ... ;• -u 
power to make laws for the peace,, order and good governmept -of\ 
the Commonwealth with respect to 'the': fullest repatriatio~·· 1 , 
powe:s; the use of grants? ~oan~f'inaurc;LUq.~,: -~ ~61N~~.f.~p~:-~::;r~-~: 
publ1c works for the prov1s1on of emplqy:meflt· ~d:· 'ttlS ::Rt:~~r 
ion or correction of unemployment; the or.i.aru..:sed 'ifia'rlt¢::Lpgo::-qf · 
primary products of which there ''rs- normally an eJCP.Ort surplus; 
and notwithstanding anything contained in Sectio~izthe pre-
vention of unreasonable restraint of trade; the prevention of 
inflation; the use of economic regulations only to the extent 
necessary to deal with the problems of transition from ,.,ar to 
peace; air transport; national health; family endowment; and 
the people of the aboriginal race; but should not have povrer 
to enable the Executive to engage in any civil production, 
industry, or commercial process, not authorised by its exist-
ing powers; 
( 7) that provision should be ma.de that during such period, the 
exercise of such additional powers , when it possesses a 
legislati ve nature, should be by Parliament or if performed 
by virtue of some delegation by Parliament should be in terms 
which when Parliament is sitting have been first laid before I 
and not disapproved by Parliament, and when Parliament is not 1 
sitting have been circulated to members at least 14 days before 
becoming operative. I 
1. From C.P.D., Vol. 177, pp.l027-l028 
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(8) that provision should be made for the setting-up, within 
a period of two years after the termination of actual 
hostilities, of an elective popular Convention for the 
review of the structure and working of the Constitution. 11 
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1 
POST-WAR PROGRAMME OF THE UNITED AUSTRALIA PARTY 
"We believe that in a new and peaceful and happier world, Govern-
ment and citizens must set themselves to achieve -
(a) adequate repatriation benefits for all members of the Fight-
ing Services and their dependents; 
(b) adequate employment and good wages for those willing and 
able to work; 
(c) the highest living standard which the physical and human 
resources of the nation can provide; 
(d) social provision in relation to superannuation, sickness, 
and unemployment, and widowhood and misfortune generally, on 
a contributory basis; 
(e) a full recognition that those engaged in industry, whether 
as employers or employees, have reciprocal rights and duties 
and must be treated as co-operators entitled to share in all 
advances of prosperity, the rewards of capital not being 
allowed to be out of harmony with the rewards of labour; 
(f') stability of primary and secondary industries and the devel-
opment of new and adequate markets for their products; 
(g) public and private health services accessible to all people; 
(h) a revised, expanded, and varied system of child and adult 
education, designed not only to improve technical skill of all 
kinds, but to develop the spirit of true citizenship; 
(i) the ownership of attractive homes obtainable at a reasonable 
cost on easy terms; 
(j) the restoration as soon as possible of normal individual 
freedoms, including the right of men and women to select 
their own vocation; 
(k) increase of population and the encouragement of family life." 
1. From S.M.H., 17/6/44. Adopted at a Melbourne Conference of. 
U.A.P. leaders and office-bearers who unanimously resolved 
to do all in their united power to defeat the 1944 Refer-
endum. 
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THE SAFEGUARD ON DELEGATED LEGISLATION INCORPORATED IN THE 
CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (POST-\vAR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEMOCRATIC 
1 
RIGHTS) BILL 1944. 
Proposed sub-Section (4) of New Section 60A :-
11(4) A regulation of a legislative character under the authority 
of any law made by the Parliament in the exercise of any 
power conferred by sub-Section (1) of this Section :-
(a) shall, subject to this Section, take effect on the 
expiration of the fourteenth day after its contents 
have been notified in the manner provided by the 
Parliament to each Senator and each member of the 
House of Representatives or on such later date as is 
specified in the regulation; 
(b) shall not take effect if, within fourteen days after 
its contents have been so notified, either House of 
the Parliament passes a resolution disapproving of 
the regulation; and 
(c) shall take effect on t he date of its making or on such 
later date as is specified in the regulation, if the 
Governor-General in Council declares on specified 
grounds that the making of the regulation is urgently 
required. 11 
1. Copy in H. V. Evatt, Post-War Reconstruction - Notes On The 
Fourteen Powers And The Three Safeguards,.op.cit. p.$3. 
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1 
REASONS FOR VOT ING INTENTION AT 1944 REFERENDUM. 
QUESTION: "What do you consider the main reason the Commonwealth 
is asking for the powers ? 11 
Intending NO Voters % Intending YES Voters % 
Socialise Industry 30 Avoid depressions (37%) 
Industrial Conscription 20 Ensure full employment (28%) 65 
Avoid depressions (9%) Abolish States 10 
Ensure full employ-
ment (6%) 15 Control monopolies 10 
Abolish States 10 Help returned soldiers 10 
Control monopolies 8 Socialise Industry 5 
Help returned soldiers 4 
No idea 13 
- -
100 100 
1. A.P.O.P. published August-September 1944, Nos. 217-31 
153. 
APPENDIX M 
1 WARTIME CURTIN MINISTRIES. 
First Curtin Ministry: October 7, 1941 to September 21, 1943. 
Rt. Hon. J. Curtin 
Hon. F. M. Forde 
Hon. J. B. Chifley 
Rt.Hon. H.V. Evatt, K.C. 
Hon. J. A. Beasley 
Senator the Ron. 
J. S. Collings 
Hon. N. J. o. Makin 
Hon. E.J. Holloway 
Senator the Hon. 
R. v. Keane 
Ron. A. s. Drakeford 
Ron. W. J. Scully 
Senator the Ron. 
W. P. Ashley 
Hon. E. J. Ward 
Hon. c. w. Frost 
Hon. J. J. Dedman 
Ron. H. P. Lazzarini 
Senator the Hon. 
;r. M. Fraser 
Senator the Hon. 
D. Cameron 
Hon. G. Lawson 
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. 
Minister for the Army. 
Treasurer; from December 22, 1942, 
Minister for Post-War Reconstruction. 
Attorney General and Minister for 
External Affairs. 
Minister for Supply and Shipping. 
Minister for the Interior. 
Minister for the Navy and Minister for 
Munitions. 
Minister for Social Services and 
Minister for Health. 
Minister for Trade and Customs and Vice-
President of the Executive Council. 
Minister for Air and Minister for 
Civil Aviation. 
Minister for Commerce and Agriculture. 
Postmaster-General and Minister for 
Information. 
Minister for Labour and National Service. 
Minister for Repatriation and Minister in 
charge of War Service Homes. 
Minister for War Organisation of Industry 
and Minister in charge of Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research. 
Minister for Home Security. 
Minister for External Territories. 
Minister for Aircraft Production. 
Minister for Transport. 
1. Compiled from Paul Hasluck The Government And The People, 
op.cit, Appendix 1. 
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War Cabinet • • from October 7, 1941. 
Rt. Hon. J. Curtin, Hon. F.M. Forde, Hon. J.B. Chifley, Rt. Hon. 
H.v. Evatt K.c., Hon. J.A. Beasley, Hon. N.J.o. Makin, Hon. A.S. 
Drakeford, from 11 December 1941 Hon. J.J. Dedman. 
Second Curtin Ministry: September 21,1943 to July 6, 1945. 
Rt. Hon. J. Curtin 
Rt. Hon. F.M. Forde 
Hon. J. B. Chifley 
Rt. Hon.H.V. Evatt K.C. 
Ron. J.A. Beasley 
Ron. N.J. 0. Makin 
Senator the lion. 
R.V. Keane 
Ron. E.J. Holloway 
Hon. A.S. Drakeford 
Hon. W.J. Scully 
Senator the Hon. 
\'1. P. Ashley 
Hon. J.J. Dedman 
Senator the Hon. J.S. 
Collings 
Hon. E. J. Ward 
Senator the Hon. 
J.M. Fraser 
Hon. c. W. Frost 
Ron. H.P. Lazzarini 
Senator the Hon. D. 
Cameron 
Ron. A.A. Calwell 
War Cabinet 
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence 
Minister for the Army. 
Treasurer; Minister for Post-War Recon-
struction to February 2, 1945. 
Attorney General and Minister for 
External Affairs. 
Minister for Supply and Shipping to 
February 2, 1945, thence Vice-President 
of the Executive Council. 
Hinister for the Navy and Minister for 
Munitions; from February 2, 1945, Hinister 
for Aircraft Production. 
Minister for Trade and Customs. 
Minister for Labour and National Service. 
Minister for Air and Minister for 
Civil Aviation. 
Minister for Commerce and Agriculture. 
Postmaster General and Vice-President of 
the Executive Council to February 2, 1945 
thence Minister for Supply and Shipping. 
Hinister for War Organisation of Industry 
to February 19, 1945; Minister in Charge 
of Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research; from February 2, 1945 Minister 
for Post-1-lar Reconstruction. 
Minister for the Interior. 
Minister for Transport and Minister for 
External Territories. 
Minister for Health and Minister for 
Social Services. 
Minister for Repatriation. 
Minister for Home Security; from February 
2, 1945 Minister for Works. 
Minister for Aircraft Production to 
February 2, 1945 then Postmaster-General. 
Minister for Information. 
. 
. from September 21, 1943 
As for the previous Ministry. 
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1 
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES 
ALLEN, S.F. 
The Advertiser (Adelaide): 
August 1944 copies. 
The Age (Melbourne.): July to August 1944 
copies. 
The New Order : Wh ? What? How? (Sydney, n.d. 
19 3? : Mitchell Library reference: 940.958 (Social credit pamphlet). A 
The Argus (Melbourne): August 19~~ copies. 
AUSTRALIAN ARMY Social Security : six booklets (1945) 
EDUCATION SERVICE Mitchell reference : 360.99 
A 
---------· Postwar Economic Problems ( 1945). 
Mitchell : 940.953 
A 
AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF Of Proceedin s of A.C.T.U. 
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AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC 
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AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS 
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BUTLIN, S. J. 
CALWELL, A. A. 
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Official Report Of Proceedings of Special 
Commonwealth Conference November 1942; and of 
16th Commomvealth Conference, December 1943 : 
Mitchell 329.3 
A 
File of Bulletins issued periodically to 
subscribers; in Mitchell Library catalogued at 
MDQ 301.6 (1941 to 1945 polls) 
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A Trade Union Plan for Australian Post-1var 
Reconstruct ~i.on (Melbourne, 19Y·1) 
The Australtan Worker : Copies October 1942 to 
August 1944. 
Promises And Performances In Australian 
Politics 1928-1959, (Institute of Pacific 
Relations, New York, 1959). 
War Aims Of A Plain Australian, (Sydney, Angus 
and Robertson Ltd., 1943). 
The Emergence Of The Liberal Party Of Australia, 
1942-194 , (Government III honours thesis, 
Department of Government, University of Sydney, 
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The Bulletin : Copies October 1942 to August 
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War Economy 1939-42, (Australia In The War of 
1939-1945, Series 4 Civil , Vol III, Canberra, 
Australian War Memorial, 1955). 
Labor's Role In Modern Society, {Melbourne, 
Lansdowne Press, 1963). 
1. R. M. Albaugh in Thesis Writing - A Guide To Scholarl~ Style, (Littlefield, Adams and Co; Paterson, New Jersey, 19 0) has 
pointed out that "Current practice favours arranging all items 
in the bibliography under one alphabet rather than listing 
primary sources, secondary sources, books, magazines, and 
newspapers separately" (p.90). Ny bibliography is arranged 
accordingly. 
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CHIFLEY, J. B. 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTRALIA 
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COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL 
OFFICE 
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COOMBS, H. C. 
Post-War Reconstruction In Australia, 
(Australasian Publishing Co.Ltd. for A.I.P.S. 
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Histor Of The Australian Labour Movement: 
A Marxist Interpretation~ Sydney, Current 
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Background To The 1944 Fourteen Powers 
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Department of Government, University of 
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Common Cause (Official organ of the Miners ' 
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MDQ 331.8805 
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Convention Of Representatives Of The Common-
wealth And State Parliaments On Proposed 
Alteration Of The Commonwealth Constitution, 
Held at Canberra, November 24 to December 2, 
1942; Record of Proceedings, Government 
Printer: Mitchell, 342.901 
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Parliamentary Debates, Government Printer, 
Canberra : Vols. 165, 20 Nov - 13 Dec 1940; 
168, 20 Aug-8 Oct, 1941; 169, 29 Oct- 17 Dec, 
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Digest Of Decisions And Announcements And 
Important Speeches By The Prime Minister, 
Government Printer, Canberra : Nos. 2 to 93 
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You And The Referendum, (pamphlet, n.d.,l944). 
Problems Of A High Employment Economy, (Joseph 
Fisher lecture in Commerce 1944, University 
of Adelaide, Adelaide at The Hassell Press, 
1944.) 
The Courier Mail (Brisbane) : August 1944 
copies. 
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----------------· 
FITZPATRICK, B. C. 
GARNETT, A. C. 
GRATTAN, C . H. (Ed.) 
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c 
The Daily And Sunday Telegraph : various 
copies. 
Evatt The Enigma, (Melbourne, Lansdowne Press, 
1967). 
"The Selection Of Labor Minist.Fies 1941 to 
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Freedom And Plannin In Australia, (University 
Of Wisconsin Press, 19 9 : espec. Chs. 7, 11, 
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The New Order, (E.F. Grey, Brisbane, 1943, 
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McCALLUM, R.B. and The British General Election Of 1942, (Frank 
A. READMAN Cass and Co. Ltd., London, 1964, 2nd edn.): 
espec. Chs. 3, 8. 
McKNIGHT, A.D. and 
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H. Mayer (ed.) Australian Politics: A Reader, 
(Melbourne, F. w. Cheshire, 1967, 2nd edn.) 
Pattern For Peace, Statement On Reconstruction 
presented to the Federal Government, on behalf 
of the Catholic Community, Melbourne, n.d. 
(1943). 
The People And The Constitution, (Sydney, 
A.I.P.S. Monograph I, n.d.) 
Full Employment In Australia (Government 
Printer, Canberra, 1945, No.ll, Group H) 
: Mitchell reference, Q 331.19 
A 
"Depression And War, 1929-50" in G. Green-
wood (ed.) Australia: A Social And Political 
Historl, (Angus and Robertson, 1955.) 
"A Further Referendum Retrospect", Australian 
Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No.1, March 1945, 
pp.l04='ll. 
Advance Australia Where? (London, Cassell and 
Co. Ltd., 1943). 
Open RoP;d To The New Social Order, (Sydney and 
Melbourne Publishing Co. Ltd., n.d.) : a plea 
for post-war socialisation; Mitchell, 335 
p 
Public Administration, Journal of the Austral-
ian Regional Groups of the Institute of Public 
Administration, Vol. v, No.2 (new series), 
June 1944: "The Constitutional Referendum 
Issue". 
Queensland Worker, (Official organ of the 
Queensland Branch of the A.L.P.) :October 1941 
- August 1944 copies. 
The Round Table, a Quarterly Review of the 
Politics of the British Commonwealth (Mac-
millan and Co. Ltd.), Vol XXXIII to XXXVI 
incl. (Dec.l942 to Sept. 1947) : Mitchell, 
325.342 
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Labor In Vain, (Melbourne, Longmans, 1966) : 
espec. Ch 5, "The Significance Of Socialism". 
11Labor, Socialism, And The Working Class", 
Australian Journal Of Politics And History, 
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Interview : 
On Wednesday 20th September 1967 from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. I had 
an interview with Mr. L. c. Haylen former M.H.R. for the Federal 
seat of Parkes, N.S.W. (1943 to 1963), and Publicity Director of 
the YES Campaign in the 1944 Referendum. 
Correspondence : 
(a) Outgoing -
(i) Letter dated 27-10-67 to the Ron. J. J. Dedman former 
Minister for War Organisation of Industry 1941-45, 
Minister for Post-War Reconstruction 1945-49, Minister 
for Defence 1946-49; M.H.R. for Corio, Victoria 1940-49 
seeking information on various matters covered by the 
thesis. (10 pp.) 
(ii) Letter dated 27-10-67 to Professor L. F. Crisp, School 
Of General Studies, Australian National University -
also seeking information on various events dealt with 
in the thesis. (6 pp.) 
(iii)Letter dated 14-9-67 to Mr. c. Wyndham, Federal Secretary, 
Australian Labor Party, enquiring whether Federal A.L.P. 
Caucus minutes have been preserved from the period,covered 
in the thesis, and whether I might gain access to them. 
(iv) Letter dated 14-9-67 to the Librarian, National Library 
Of Australia, Canberra A.C.T., enquiring about material 
held by the Library relating to the Curtin Labor Govern-
ment including the papers of Federal Labor Parliamentar-
ians active in this period. 
(v) Letter dated 6-10-67 to the Archives Officer, Australian 
National University Library, Canberra, A.C.T., enquiring 
about material held by the Library relating to the CUrtin 
Labor Government, including the papers of Federal Labor 
Parliamentarians and the minutes of various trade unions 
for this period. 
(b) Incoming -
(i) Letter dated 30-10-67 from the Hon. J. J. Dedman con-
taining comment on various questions and propositions 
raised in the writer's letter of 27-10-67. (5 pp.) 
(ii) As the writer's letter to Prof. Crisp was forwarded late 
in the academic year just prior to the annual examinat-
ions when he was occupied with examining honours theses, 
it was returned on 2-11-67 with a series of helpful 
comments in the margin on the various issues raised by 
the writer. 
(iii)Letter dated 4-10-67 from l1r. C. Wyndham explaining that 
one must write direct to the Secretary of the Parliamentary 
Labor Party, Hr. F. Birrell, M.H.R. to gain Caucus' 
permission to examine its own minutes. The matter was not 
pursued by the writer whose main interest, in any event, 
was in the deliberations of the Cabinet in this period. 
In this regard, the Hon. J. J. Dedman proved of much 
assistance. 
(iv) Letter dated 27-9-67 from the Librarian, National Library, 
indicating that certain papers (listed therein) of J. B. 
Chifley, J. J. Dedman, and E. J. Ward were held, all of 
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which, except for a few items, were closed . There was 
also little useful material in this respect in Mitchell 
Library. 
(v) Letter dated 17- 10- 67 from the Archives Officer, A. N. U. 
Library informing that papers of Parliamentarians were 
not held and enclostng lists of trade union records held, 
(8 pp.) including various minutes covering the period of 
the thesis . However the material did not appear to 
warrant further action. 
N\101 HO:J !ON 
